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ABSTRACT 
This thesis offers a Marxian critique of `marketization' in school provision 
and schooling. The first part argues that a degree of marketization of school 
provision and schooling has taken place in the UK. It examines contemporary 
philosophical defences of these markets in the works of James Tooley and Harry 
Brighouse. The second part broadens the philosophical context by examining 
some of the philosophical ideas associated with the growth of markets which Marx, in 
his theory of alienation, is both influenced by, and against which he reacts. The 
central argument is that alienation is a necessary consequence of marketization, on 
account of the transfer of control (and, increasingly, ownership rights) from the 
public to the private sector. This results in the control of school provision and 
schooling necessarily being passed, even from those who are to some extent 
working under the direction of democratically elected institutions, to those who may 
well use the marketization process primarily to further their own interests. This 
further loss of control is bound to increase alienating relations and estrangement. 
The third part examines whether it is possible to escape from alienation by 
moving in a socialist direction while retaining markets to varying degrees. Critical 
accounts are given of different proposals of this kind, drawn from David Miller, 
Patricia White and Oskar Lange. It is argued that, because these proposals all retain 
market relations, these would make an unalienated form of education impossible. By 
contrast Mihail Markovic argues that markets, as remnants of capitalism, cannot of 
necessity prefigure an unalienated society. The final chapter, with reference to 
Marx's concept of 'the realm of freedom', distinguishes Marx from anarchist thought 
and illustrates the relations and conditions which would be necessary to support an 
unalienated society, and enable education as an `end-in-itself'. 
I hereby declare that, except where explicit attribution is made, the work presented in this 
thesis is entirely my own. 
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Introduction 
No man is an Island, entire of itself; 
every man is a piece of the Continent, 
a part of the main. 
John Donne 1571(? ) -1631 
Devotions XVII 
Marx died in 1883, but his ideas are still relevant 
In September 2008 the myth was exploded that the capitalist system had the 
checks and balances necessary to prevent market collapse. In this thesis I support the 
argument that, although Karl Marx is dead, his ideas are still relevant, especially his 
analysis of the alienating relations which are necessarily present within markets. In 
particular, I apply Marx's philosophical analysis of alienation to the marketization 
of school provision and schooling . 
I begin this thesis by producing empirical evidence to show that the 
marketization of school provision and schooling is not merely a series of isolated 
reforms, as many liberal philosophers of education assume, but rather the result of a 
series of policy moves which are designed to reconstruct school provision using the 
external and internal relations involved in the market, defined in the classical sense of 
the term. 
I am not aware of any liberal philosopher of education who has attempted 
either to analyze how the marketization of school provision would necessarily 
increase alienating relations, or how certain relations and conditions would necessarily 
overcome this alienation. I maintain that the failure of these philosophers of 
Although the social relations involved in exploitation are linked to alienation, exploitation is different from alienation, and is not 
systematically analyzed in this thesis. Exploitation involves the loss of part of the wealth which a social individual creates; 
alienation deals with the loss of the capacity to develop human powers and capacities of social individuals as a result of social 
relations in which their activity is embedded. 
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education to recognise the alienating relations present within a market is due to a 
perception of the market resulting from an ontology based on external relations 
that are contingent in nature. According to this ontology the relations present in 
market reforms may or may not develop in a specific direction and their development 
is, therefore, speculative. I therefore maintain that an ontology based on external 
relations consequently results in such philosophers perceiving the developing 
market in school provision as merely a series of isolated and separate package of 
reforms. 
In contrast, within an ontology based on internal relations the range of all 
possible developments is necessary: that is, each actual development has to have been 
inherent in the relevant social relations. However, the sufficiency of the conditions 
and social relations for the occurrence of a particular social development involving 
human activity also depends on human thought and action. It is therefore the range of 
possibilities which is determined by inherent social relations, rather than any 
particular outcome within the range. The act of introducing market relations into 
school provision and schooling necessarily alters the possible directions in which 
schools can develop. For example, almost any private involvement in school 
provision or schooling would operate as a `Trojan horse, ' potentially opening up the 
sector to the process of privatization. 
The social relations which James Tooley and Harry Brighouse describe are 
perceived to be only external, and therefore contingent. In this thesis I argue that 
this ontology leads Brighouse to argue a) that the results of commodification of 
schooling are speculative (Brighouse, 2000, p. 49), and b) that such commodification 
does not necessarily lead to a situation where markets drive out education (Brighouse, 
2000, p. 52). 
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The reliance on external relations has also caused such philosophers to perceive 
the developing market in school provision as an isolated and disparate package of 
reforms not necessarily linked to the marketization of schools. For example, in his 
Reclaiming Education (2000), Tooley explicitly questions the argument of Geoff 
Whitty, David Halpin and Sally Power (1998) that the "state reforms of devolution" 
are "actually moves towards markets" (Tooley, 2000, p. 13). 
By contrast, Marx's systematic analysis of the markets and alienation is based 
mainly on social relations that have necessary or essential connections (Marx, 1975 
[f], p. 323) which mutually condition each other (Marx, 1975[f], p. 335). These 
connections are defined as `necessary' because they contain "all possible 
developments prefigured by the relevant relations" (Oilman, 1976, p. 19). 
Marx argues, firstly, that alienation arises through the selling, and the 
consequential relinquishment of control of their labour by those who, having no 
capital, must sell their labour so as to use the capital owned by the capitalists to make 
their living. Secondly, and being interrelated, for Marx alienation also includes 
estrangement. For Marx, this latter condition occurs when something existing outside 
and independently of the social individuals2 confronts them as a hostile and alien 
power. In Marx's philosophy, the social processes which Hayek describes would be 
necessarily alienating because they form a "force over and above" social 
individuals, dominating the latter, and over which these individuals have no control. 
For Marx, the `active interconnections' between alienating structural relations 
and the subjective experience of alienation would necessarily influence the 
awareness of the social individual. Within an ontology based on external relations, 
although social individuals might be happy in circumstances where social relations 
2A social individual can be defined as individual-in-social relations. 
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are alienating, this psychological state is contingent and so consequently will not 
necessarily continue. For example, social individuals might be happy in their work 
because they are involved in activities which they find fulfilling. Within such 
alienating structural relations happiness is contingent on particular social relations 
and conditions existing and happiness is not necessarily supported by such structural 
relations. What has not changed, in the above example, is the structural relation 
within capitalism between workers and an owner of the means of production. 
By contrast, I maintain that within the objective structural relations of a non- 
alienated society the normal psychological state will be one of non-estrangement. 
This is because the structural relations which support non-alienation will, in the 
normal course of events, usually result in the subjective experience of non- 
estrangement. Under such social relations social individuals would not necessarily be 
happy all the time; this latter state would be because of contingent accidents and not 
because of the objective structural relations. For example, an individual might be 
unhappy when certain personal relations break down. 
An alternative theory of alienation has been provided by Jean-Paul Sartre. In 
his Critique of the Dialectical Reason ( first published in 1960), Sartre states that the 
foundation of alienation is "the concrete and synthetic relation of the agent to the 
other through the mediation of the thing, and to the thing through the mediation of 
the other" (Sartre, 1976, p. 66, n. 27 ). Unlike Marx, for Sartre, alienation is an 
immutable ontological state (Sartre, 1976, p. 181). As a consequence, Sartre does not 
analyze the necessary interrelation between objective social relations and the social 
individual and, in particular, the conditions and relations which necessarily result in 
alienation. 
In this thesis I note that Tooley does not systematically consider alienation. 
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When Tooley does refer to alienation he equates alienation solely with 
"disaffection" and "falling engagement" of young people in the process of education 
(Tooley, 2002, p. 5). The process of "disaffection" and "disengagement" is also 
referred to in the government paper entitled Schools Achieving Success (DfES, 2002, 
pp. 13,30). 1 note above that this concept of alienation is based on the view that 
alienation is a psychological state which is fundamental to the human condition and 
does not necessarily result from social structural relations such as the market. 
Therefore it is not surprising that the role of the market in supporting the development 
of such dispositions is not examined by either Tooley or by the UK New Labour 
government. However, for Marx, alienation is supported within objective structural 
relations so, for him, there is no immutable ontological state which constitutes the 
foundation of alienating relations. 
Methodological discussion. 
My exploration of alienation develops from an analytical philosophical 
approach into a more interrelated and dynamic ontology which is based on necessary 
relations. The ontological approach I use is based on internal as well as external 
social relations and, to my knowledge, has not been used within the philosophy of 
education in order to explore the marketization of schooling and its alienating 
relations. In this ontological approach, internal social relations are necessary relations 
which mutually influence each other. For example, when Marx uses such ontology, he 
argues that within private property relations "the worker exists as a worker only when 
he exists for himself as capital, and he exists as capital only when capital exists for 
him" (Marx, 1975[f], p. 335, original italics). As a consequence, for Marx, "the 
existence of capital is his [the worker's - GT] existence, his [the worker's] life, for it 
determines the content of his [the worker's - GT] life in a manner indifferent to him" 
14 
(Marx, 1975[f], p. 335, original italics). 
Within an ontology based on internal relations, the appearance and / or function of 
an entity necessarily changes when some of or all, of internal relations in that entity 
change: for example, if wage-labour disappears, the worker's relation with capital 
radically alters and capital as a logical category would no longer exist. Within the 
ontology of internal relations, alienation is not the result of an all-or-nothing set of 
structural relations. Although everything is internally related, some things are more 
closely related than others. As Bertell Ollman has noted: 
Each capitalist practise [sic] and institution reflects the alienated 
relationships of the whole system, but the more distinctive qualities of 
alienation - separation from and loss of control over one's immediate 
environment, mistaking human for inhuman agencies, manipulation by 
indifferent and/or hostile forces, etc. - exhibit differences of degree 
and form .... (Oilman, 1976, p. 
265). 
In this thesis I argue that although the most intense form of alienation occurs 
within capitalism alienation is still present, to some degree, in `socialist' models 
based on the market, even though the conditions of work there might be more 
agreeable for many workers. This is because, within economic relations based on 
commodity production, surplus value and exchange value are still present. Chapters 
Eight and Nine of this thesis outline what conditions and relations would be 
necessary in society to prefigure education as an unalienated activity. 
In this thesis I maintain that the marketization of school provision introduces 
new internal relations into schools: relations which then remove potential control 
from parents and communities and transfer them to private entities. Schooling thus 
becomes a tool in the hands of these new controllers of schools, who have been seen 
to use it for both business and ideological reasons, and who introduce relations which 
are oppositional to the education process. 
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Within my research, empirical data is used on occasions to illustrate the content 
of social relations and the influence of past social relations on present processes. I 
also argue that historical processes play a prominent part in seeking to understand the 
nature of present economic and political relations. However, my thesis does not 
depend upon such empirical or historical research to confirm or deny the presence of 
alienating structural relations. It is the content of such relations which is a matter of 
empirical or historical data. In the process of change, although content is important in 
so far as it influences change, the form of social structures is largely a matter of 
logic, and it is this logic which I mainly explore in this thesis. It is for this reason that 
I do not explore the detail of pedagogical practices within the social processes which I 
analyze. 
Marx is the main theorist to systematically consider alienation in objective 
market relations3. I therefore explore his theory in connection with the marketization 
of school provision. I have found Marx a convincing theorist because he gives a 
systematic analysis of the markets, showing the necessary connection between the 
alienating relations involved. 
A prominent place is also given in this thesis to those thinkers who have proposed 
possible solutions to the problem of alienation. These tend to be thinkers who support 
different forms of market socialism. One such theorist is David Miller, who argues 
that alienation can be overcome even in an end-state where the market is present. 
Miller rests this proposal on the hope that a form of progressive consciousness can be 
used to transform the structures of the market into non-alienating relations. In Chapter 
Six I produce arguments to show why I consider that this is not possible. In Chapter 
Seven I consider the form of a socialist market designed by Oskar Lange, which he 
3 Other theorists, such as Bertell Oilman, have merely presented Marx's work on internal relations in a 
more systematic way. 
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proposes as a synthesis of Marxism and market socialism. I maintain, in Chapter 
Seven, that although in Lange's model the emphasis would appear to be on 
socialist relations rather than market relations, market relations and laws are 
fundamental to the operation of both the `socialized' sectors and non-socialized 
sectors of the economy. 
Lange's model is interesting because it is very similar to those previously used by 
many Soviet bloc countries. I show how Lange's model was at variance with Marx's 
writings and, by doing so, I hope to have laid to rest ( for the purposes of this thesis at 
least) the accusation that Marx's writings are a variant of the form of political 
economy found in the former Soviet bloc under Stalin and his successors (or, for that 
matter, in China). 
When considering my alternative to market-based school provision and schooling, 
I base my arguments primarily on the writings of Karl Marx and Mihailo Markovic. 
Both these writers attempted to overcome alienation by positing the conditions and 
relations needed for unalienated activity. In this thesis, I argue that these conditions 
and relations are needed in order for it to be possible for education to be an unalienated 
activity which would bean `end-in-itself. ' 
Structure of the thesis. 
This thesis is divided into three main parts, themselves divided into a total of nine 
chapters. In Part One, Chapter One, I introduce the context for the thesis by using 
empirical evidence illustrating how UK governments from 1979 to date have 
attempted to develop a market in school provision and schooling. I use this empirical 
data to show how the `choice-based mechanisms' have increasingly developed the 
key features of classically defined markets, including commodification of school 
provision resulting in an increase in the alienating relations. In this thesis I maintain 
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that the social relations involved in the marketization of school provision and 
schooling are necessarily oppositional to those needed to provide an unalienated 
society. As a result of the empirical evidence gathered in Chapter One, I conclude 
that the internal market created so far is not a series of isolated events, but is rather 
a set of internal relations which will necessarily influence the future organization of 
schools in the direction of marketization in the classical sense of the term. 
Part One, Chapter Two describes and criticises examples of two different 
market models which have influenced recent education policy in England. The first 
is the lightly regulated model of the type supported by Tooley, which has been 
dominant in the Conservative Party since Baroness Thatcher's premiership, and 
which also seemed to influence Gordon Brown, Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer 
from May 1997 - June 2007 then Prime Minster from June 2007 - May 2010. 
Minimal or `light touch' regulation usually means regulation which preserves 
rules enabling the enforcement of contracts, so preventing coercion and enabling 
`free markets' to operate smoothly. The other popular model is of a more 
specifically regulated market, championed by such philosophers of education as Harry 
Brighouse. The details of this model are outlined and analyzed in Chapter Two, where 
I argue that regulation fails to ameliorate the worse aspects of the market, including its 
alienating relations. 
Part Two outlines the conditions and social relations which led to the growth of 
the market, including the ideological context supporting the process of marketization. 
In Part Two, Chapter Three, I consider the philosophical tendencies against which 
Marx reacts, and yet also on which he builds: namely those of Thomas Hobbes, 
Adam Smith, Georg Wilhelm Friederich Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach. I note that 
Adam Smith's description of alienation is mainly psychological in nature and that 
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therefore, for Smith, alienation is a contingent state. In Chapter Four I consider 
Marx's theory of alienation, and in Chapter Five I apply this analysis to the 
developing market in schools and show how market relations intensify the alienating 
relations that are present in capitalist society. 
Part Three introduces proposed solutions to the problem of alienation caused by 
the marketization of schools. In Part Three, Chapter Six, I consider David Miller's 
model of market socialism and the means by which he tries to overcome alienation; 
and I relate Patricia White's ideas on school provision and schooling to this 
model4. I show that capitalist relations are still present within Miller's model, and 
also why progressive consciousness alone is insufficient to overcome alienation. 
Chapter Seven describes the oppositional and alienating relations present in the 
model of a socialist market used in `Soviet Marxism' and supported by Oscar Lange. I 
show how Lange's `Marxism' is at variance with the works of Marx and, therefore, 
why his model cannot be said to be a synthesis of market socialism and Marxism. 
Chapter Eight describes a response from Mihailo Markovic, a Yugoslavian/Serbian 
praxis theorist, to the type of statism supported by Lange. 
Unlike Lange, Markovic supports a `social market' as a transitional stage in a 
society which is developing into a non-market economy, in which the conditions 
and relations would gradually support unalienated activity. Within such conditions 
and relations Markovic envisages education becoming a form of unalienated 
activity within which social individuals would have the possibility of developing 
their capacities as `ends-in-themselves. ' 
The development of capacities as ends-in-themselves is something which liberal 
philosophers of education such as Tooley and Brighouse advocate, but which, I have 
° In Beyond Domination (1983) White admits to being influenced by David Miller's ideas on the market 
(White, 1983, p. 48). 
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maintained, would not necessarily be achievable within the structural relations of 
capitalism. I maintained in Section 4.9 that the choice of education as an end-in-itself 
is not part of the normal course of events in capitalism, because the structural relations 
of capitalism are necessarily oppositional to the educational aims of Tooley and 
Brighouse. 
In contrast, Chapter Nine outlines the conditions and relations which would be 
necessary for an unalienated society to exist, and which would support the possibility 
of an unalienated form of education as a normal activity. I argue that these 
conditions necessarily include the availability of the abundance of goods and services, 
in turn enabled by advanced automation. This automation, by freeing social individuals 
from being directly involved in production, would also enable the ability of all social 
individuals to take part in activities meaningful to them. The existence of such a 
society would be dependent on social individuals being willing to support each other, 
in the absence of a coercive state. (It is envisaged that there would be associations of 
social individuals particularly interested in science and technology, and that the 
technological underpinning of this society would be undertaken by means of these 
associations). I argue that only these conditions and structural relations could 
enable education as `meaningful' activity, because such structures and conditions 
would support the development of human capacities and interests in an unalienated 
way. 
I note that, as at 2010, the policies of all three major UK political parties 
support the marketization of school provision and, therefore, necessarily increase the 
alienating relations in society and erode the social conditions and relations which could 
be prefigurative of education as an end-in-itself. In this thesis I, therefore, conclude 
that policies enabling the marketization of school provision and schooling should 
20 
not be supported. Instead support should be given to the structural relations and 
conditions which support the development of those social processes which could 
be prefigurative of a less alienating society, and consequently, which would support 
the development of education as an end-in-itself. 
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Part One: Setting the scene and defining the problem 
Chapter One 
The developing nature of relations within the markets for school provision and 
schooling since 1979. 
Introduction 
This chapter maintains that certain events which occurred within school 
provision since 1979 were not a series of isolated reforms, but instead were the 
result of a series of policy moves designed to reconstruct the distribution of school 
provision using the structural relations found in the classical model of the market 
(Ball and Youdell, 2008). In this thesis, I argue that almost any private involvement in 
school provision and schooling would operate as a `trojan horse', potentially opening 
up the whole sector to the process of privatization. Recently, the sociologist Stephen 
Ball described this process in the following way: 
With each new piece of legislation, each new regulation or procedure, 
each new category of school, new possibilities emerge. Things that 
were unthinkable become possible, and they then become obvious and 
necessary (Stephen Ball, quoted by Peter Wilby, 2010, p. 1). 
The view that the creation of a market in school provision and schooling was 
instead merely a series of separate reforms in the provision of schools is one that has 
been held by such philosophers of education as Harry Brighouse, (Brighouse, 
2000, p. 19) ; Terry McLaughlin, (McLaughlin, 1994[b], p. 154); James Tooley, 
(Tooley, 1994[ b], p. 149 in Bridges and McLaughlin; 2000, pp. 10-13; 2003, p. 428) 
and John White (White, 1994, p. 122). 
I began to argue in the late 1990's that the choice-based mechanisms (some 
introduced in 1975), were not merely policy moves designed to create internal 
markets, but were also attempts to restructure school provision and schooling to 
enable the process of marketization and the transfer of schools from public to 
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private control. This view is supported in The UK Government's Approach to 
Public Sector Reform Cabinet Office, 2006), by educational theorists such as 
Geoff Whitty, David Halpin and Sally Power (Whitty, Halpin, and Power, 1998, 
p. 128); and by Glenn Rikowski (Rikowski, 2003, p. 1). 
Important and interesting though the work of Ball is on the marketization of 
schools and schooling, he argues that this process is mainly an "epistemic shift" 
or " profound change in the underlying set of rules governing the production of 
discourses... " and that social structures and relations mainly "take shape as the 
flesh and bones of the dominant discourse (S. Ball, 2004, p. 15). Ball argues that 
this process is designed to result in "reworking of existing public sector delivery into 
forms which mimic the private and have similar consequences in terms of practices, 
values and identities" (Ball, 2004, p. 2, GT's italics). Although I acknowledge that 
the process of marketization involves changes in the "dominant discourse, " I dispute 
the contention that the resultant changes in structural relations primarily occur as a 
result of this discourse. 
In this thesis I argue that the process of marketization is primarily geared to 
bringing about a fundamental transfer of property relations from the public to 
private sector, and that it is this transfer which contains the social relations which 
prefigure all possible developments. In the next section I outline, in an abstract form, 
the relations regarded as being necessary for a `perfect' market. 
1.1 Characteristics of the developing markets in school provision and schooling. 
Unlike `internal markets', `perfect markets' are based entirely on private 
property relations. According to Stephen Munday there are five main assumptions 
involved in the analysis of perfect markets. These are, firstly, that there are a large 
number of buyers and sellers in the market. This means that no producer or consumer, 
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acting individually, can affect the market price or any other part of the market 
operations (it being assumed also that market-rigging by a number of players does not 
occur). Secondly, Munday posits that what is being bought and sold is a commodity, 
that is, all products are identical and therefore it is immaterial to any purchaser from 
which supplier he or she buys. Thirdly, says Munday, there is perfect knowledge in 
the market among both consumers and producers. This would therefore preclude a 
situation, for example, where producers or suppliers are aware of product quality 
variations unknown to purchasers. Fourthly, Munday says, all factors of production 
have to be perfectly mobile such that they can be exchanged between production of 
different goods. Finally, for Munday, in a perfect market there should be no barriers 
to entry, or exit from, the industry concerned for producers (S. Munday, 2000, p. 19). 
This last condition of course also needs to apply to consumers in any market. 
What has been normally described as `the market in schools and schooling' refers in 
fact to separate markets. However, entrepreneurs often operate in several markets. 
For example, Mott MacDonald (a major construction firm involved in Private 
Finance Initiative [PFI] contracts) also owns Cambridge Education Associates 
(which specializes in both school management of schools and staff training); while 
the Unity Academy, Middlesbrough, is sponsored by the major construction 
company, Amey. Amey also works in conjunction with Nord Anglia. n 2001 Amey 
was given a 7-10 year contract to run certain London Borough of Waltham Forest 
schools in conjunction with Nord Anglia (which specializes in school management 
and the provision of schools). For ease of analysis, I consider separately the markets 
school provision, schooling and the building of schools. 
1.1.2 The market in school provision. 
The first market I consider is in the provision of schools. This market directly 
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relates to my thesis on alienating relations in schools. The market in state-funded 
schools which are `owned' by private sponsors has been in existence since the 
Education Act 2002 has been in force. The Education Act 2002, Part One (Transfer 
Schedules), Schedule 7 (paragraphs 3a and 3e), specifically allows for the transfer of 
"any right or liability held by the authority as holder of interest in the land to be 
transferred to a person (the transferee) who is specified in the scheme and is 
concerned with the running of an academy" t unless the school ceases to exist as a 
school. This legislation enables sponsors to act `as if they were the owners of schools. 
Under the standard lease provisions, an Academy can make alterations to school 
buildings, sub-let the property and grant licenses over the land. However, the 
company must gain permission for any change of the use of land. If the site ceases to 
be used for a school, the land reverts back to the ownership of the Local Education 
Authority (LEA) according to the Act (Education Act 2002, Schedule 7 [Former 
Academies], paragraph 8 [6] ). As well as giving sponsors `ownership' rights, the 
same Act also gave the owners of Academies the right to alter their teachers' 
national conditions of service, giving the owners direct control over the conditions 
under which the teachers work. 
As at early 2010 the organizations sponsoring most Academies were the United 
Learning Trust, Oasis and the Harris Federation. The United Learning Trust is 
currently the largest sponsor of Academies. It is a subsidiary of the United Church 
Schools Trust, which runs fee-charging schools. Oasis, which sponsored the second 
largest number of Academies, is a Christian organization and its ethos is informed 
accordingly. The Harris Federation had the third largest number of Academies. As a 
consequence of the control they had through ownership, the activities of such firms 
An academy is legally a company limited by guarantee with charitable status, a legal entity often 
called a not-for-profit company. 
25 
directly intensified alienating relations within schools (see Chapter Five for more 
details). 
Although Academies are not-for-profit organizations, high salaries and 
expenses are allowed. Moreover Section 11, Education Act 2002, allows such 
schools to become companies which can invest in other companies which are profit- 
making entities. School sponsors then can hire these firms to run their schools on a 
contract-for-profit basis. In this case, profits are derived from the difference between 
the contract price and the actual cost it takes to run a service. In this process certain 
state revenue (money paid by the state to run the services) is transformed into private 
profit. For example, Francis Beckett reported that, as of 2007, Alec Reed (of Reed 
Employment - who has sponsored the West London Academy) had paid £140,030 
to Reed Charity (chaired by Mr Reed), £37,683 to Reed Learning and £3,251 to Reed 
Training, without putting any of the work out to tender ( Beckett, 2007, p. 92). 
Another further opportunity for involvement by these firms in schooling came after 
the Conservative Liberal coalition government announced that it wished to encourage 
more schools to be run by parents ( Wilby, 2010, p. 1 ). It is expected that many of 
these parents would need help in running their schools from companies already 
involved in schools. 
1.1.3 Markets in school services. 
The second market which I consider is the market in `outsourcing' of 
educational services (such as management, some LEA services, inspection services, 
teacher appraisal, and teacher vocational training, catering and teacher supply). When 
this market began to develop, those showing particular interest in the management 
and ownership of schools were firms whose `core' business was information 
technology, finance and for construction. Such firms sought to deal with their lack of 
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expertise in education in two main ways. They tried to recruit senior staff from LEAs 
and/or they sought to take over, or merge with, firms which had educational expertise 
but which tended to be small. For example, Mott MacDonald merged with Cambridge 
Education Associates; Ensign formed an alliance with Tribal, and Nord Anglia with 
Hermes Pensions. In 2008 Nord Anglia was to be taken over by Barings Private 
Equity Asia in a deal worth £190m. (Blackhurst, C. [ed. ], 2008). Barings specialized 
in mid-market buy-outs that required capital for expansion or re-capitalization. 
Barings were to allocate Nord Anglia's assets to both the Learning Services 
Division and the International Schools Division of Barings: as a result, they were to 
operate both in the market for the `outsourcing' of school services and the market 
in the ownership of schools. Sections 11 and 12 of the Education Act 2002 
specifically support governing bodies in contracting the services needed by a school 
(including teaching and management) to for-profit companies. 
Although such a market does not directly result in alienating relations, it can affect 
the conditions in which schooling takes place and influence the actual content of 
alienating relations. Importantly, some of these firms are investigating setting up not- 
for-profit trusts, allowing them to run schools directly; as well as to make profits by 
selling services to the trusts (Wilby, 2010, p. 2). 
1.1.4 Markets in school materials. 
Next, I consider the market in provision of commodities to schools (for 
example, computer technology and information technology materials, classroom 
materials, testing packages, training packages and financial management packages). 
This market has broadened under the influence of the development of new information 
and communications technology (internet, satellite, video-conferencing, video- 
cassettes) for `e-learning'. This market can particularly affect schooling if the school 
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is used to promote the consumption of certain of these goods and services. This thesis 
is not specifically about commerce in the classroom, but I note that commerce in the 
classroom may influence the content of schooling and have a distorting effect on 
education. The effect can be particularly powerful when the firms providing this 
material are also controlled by school `owners', because they have a commercial 
interest in ensuring that their commodities are portrayed in an advantageous way. 
1.1.5 The market in school building. 
Finally, there is the market in the building, refurbishment and maintenance of 
schools, using finance partnerships such as PFI (Private Finance Initiative), PPP 
(Public Private Partnerships) and BSF (Building Schools for the Future). In this 
market contracts to build and/or maintain schools are signed by LEAs, who 
undertake to pay back the sums involved over a 25-30 year period. The firms involved 
in this market are usually from the construction industry. In this last-named `market' 
a handful of `qualified bidders' with set rates are selected by the government and 
then a mini-competition for building contracts is run. Importantly this is a market for 
contracts and not in school provision. As was pointed out in Section 1.1.2, some of the 
firms in this market are also involved in markets in the provision of schools and/or the 
supply of commodities and education services. 
1.2 The process of creating market relations in school provision and schooling, 1979 
to 1997. 
I begin my survey in 1979 when the Conservative Party came to office with a 
neo-liberal ideology. In the mid-1980's, as a result of the success of privatizations 
such as those British Telecommunications and British Gas, the Conservative 
government began to discuss the privatization of schools. The Conservative 
government recognised that the ability to take schools out of LEA control was 
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dependent upon delegated budgets, per capita funding and parents able, and willing, 
to vote for their school to `opt out' of LEA control (K. Baker, 1993, p. 215). 
In 1986 the then Education Secretary, Kenneth Baker, unveiled his plans for a 
pioneering network of City Technology Colleges (CTCs) in urban areas. These 
colleges were to be sponsored by the private sector and were to specialize in science, 
technology, business, languages, sport or the arts. Although CTCs were to be partly 
funded and regulated by the government, they were to be more independent of LEA 
control and were able to own their land and buildings. 
Each college was intended to take about 1,000 pupils, who would be specially 
selected who would not pay fees. Baker made it clear that the Treasury would 
directly make extra public money available to help finance the costs of new colleges, 
thereby by-passing local authorities, so that CTCs would be more easily perceived as 
being fully independent of LEA control. 
Private sector sponsors of CTCs could have legally been from the business 
community, churches for from existing educational trusts, although they tended to be 
from companies. These sponsors were asked to make a major contribution to the 
initial capital set-up costs. Sponsors were initially asked to provide £8m. for each 
school toward capital costs, but when sponsors refused to put forward this amount of 
money, the government requested £2m. and stated that it would provide the remaining 
initial costs (£l Om. on average). Although the government was paying most of the 
capital costs and all the running costs, the sponsor had ownership rights of the CTC. 
Thus a policy move was made to significantly change the relations between the 
sponsors and the management of the schools by involving local employers and 
industrialists in the management (K. Baker, 1993, p. 177). 
Some influential members of the Cabinet regarded these structural reforms as 
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part of a process leading to a more market-based system of school provision (K. 
Baker, 1993, p. 163). That Baker also conceived of these reforms in this way can 
be seen from a strategy memorandum he sent to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 
1986, suggesting that these reforms would result in such a market (reprinted Baker, 
1993, pp. 479,481). The fact that this market was not merely an internal one, but 
also one based on private sector control, is also endorsed by Richard Pring (1987)2. 
The Education Act 1988 instituted a set of reforms in which the development 
of market structures was enabled by a new legislative framework. This Act instituted 
the provision of the information needed for a market between schools and parents. A 
National Curriculum was also established which enabled the standardization of the 
subject matter in the curriculum. National testing on its contents for pupils aged 
seven, eleven, and fourteen enabled the results of individual schools to be recorded. 
Later the Education Act 1992 required schools to publish National Curriculum test 
results, as well as those of external examinations. This information on comparison 
between schools was seen as essential for market activity. 
The 1988 Act also removed the restriction on the numbers of pupils that 
schools could admit, allowing each school to potentially increase the numbers 
admitted by up to ten per cent over the previous maximum roll. Parents, as a collective 
body, could decide whether they wished their school to remain in local government 
control or whether they wished to vote to `opt-out' and seek grant maintained status. 
These `opted-out' schools were to be funded directly by the Department for Education 
and Science (DfES). These schools also had autonomy, including over staffing. 
In 1991 the Local Management of Schools (LMS) was instituted and gave 
2 In his 1987 article "Privatization In Education", Pring recalled a meeting with "a very distinguished 
Chief Education Officer" who in 1981 had stated that privatization was deeply embedded within 
Treasury thinking and would shortly result in "the gradual transformation of a public sector into a 
private sector" (Pring, 1987, pp. 289-90 ). 
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schools freedom to manage their resources. School governors assumed a de facto 
position of employers, while LMS schools were allowed to have control over their 
own budgets. These budgets were to be allocated by the government according to a 
formula related to the number and ages of pupils at individual schools. The transfer of 
budgets to schools meant that purchasing power was now under school management. 
This resulted in a further essential structural change in the creation of the conditions 
for a market. This also forced LEAs into the market to sell their professional services 
to schools. This transformed the administration of schooling into a set of contractual 
relations which enabled cost and profit calculations to take place. As a consequence, 
the social relations between schools and LEAs became those consumer and producer, 
rather than of supportive partners sharing expertise. 
1.3 New Labour and the marketization of school provision and schooling. 
Although the Conservatives lost the general election in 1997, the process of 
marketization of school provision and school services continued unabated under the 
UK New Labour government. On its election New Labour adopted the following 
policies, which were to inform and influence their marketization of school provision. 
These policies were a) the reduction of personal taxation and taxation on investment 
(Britain Deserves Better, Labour Party Manifesto [later referred to as BDB], 1997, 
pp. 13,14 ); b) reliance on private sector to be dynamic enough to manage public 
services more efficiently (BDB, 1997, p. 13 ); c) the expectation that corporate 
businesses would divert money into education (BDB, 1997, pp. 8,9; Tony Blair's 
Morpeth School Speech [MSS], 1997, p. 1); d) the recognition of the inevitability of 
economic globalization and the harnessing of part of this process for the needs of the 
UK (T. Blair, MSS, 1997, p. 1; T. Blair's speech "New Britain in a Modem 
World", 1998, pp. 1,3); e) the attempt to encourage the private sector by following 
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a policy of deregulation so that markets would be lightly regulated (T. Blair's CBI 
Speech, 1997, pp. 1,3), and f) the re-organization of education generally to 
produce an adequate number of suitably skilled workers to compete internationally 
(BDB, 1997, pp. 7,12 ). 
New Labour continued the Conservative Party policies of `opting out', local 
management of schools, and the National Curriculum and its tests. This was hardly 
surprising because the continuation of `opting out' was necessary to create the 
diversity needed for market competition, while the National Curriculum tests were 
needed to provide information for the operation of the market. Grant Maintained 
Schools stayed when New Labour came into power but were required, under the 
Schools Framework Act 1998, to become either Foundation Schools3 or to rejoin the 
LEA as Maintained Community Schools. 
In 1998 the New Labour government began to entice private sector providers 
into the market by setting up Education Action Zones (EAZs). EAZs were intended 
as a means of `levering in' private sector finance and management into the 
management and development of schools, especially in disadvantaged areas. 
Businesses which sponsored zones were allowed to nominate the Chair of each 
EAZ, and one business was to be the lead partner in each zone. These zones were 
defined on the basis that each: 
will normally comprise between 15 and 25 primary, secondary and 
special schools, working in partnership with local parents, Early Year 
Providers, businesses, the LEA, community organisations, TEC(s) 
[Training and Enterprise Councils - GT], career services, colleges, 
other statutory agencies (such as health authorities, the youth service 
and the police) and others (House of Commons, H. C. 130,2000-1, p. 
12). 
In the event, EAZ nationally raised barely half the government's target for 
3 Foundation Schools employ their own staff directly and control their own admissions procedures. 
Their buildings and land are owned by the governors of the school and they have a charitable status. 
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sponsorship (£1,296,000 rather than £2,562,000). Some EAZs were successful: others 
raised only four to five figure sums (House of Commons, H. C. 130,2000-1, p. 12). 
Only Newham, in East London, raised more than a quarter of its EAZ budget from the 
private sector and, at least in one year, exceeded its sponsorship target (H. C. 130, op. 
cit; Times, 22 November 2000, p. 4). It is important to note that the Newham EAZ, in 
the so called `arc of opportunity'4, was an area projected to have a buoyant economic 
future because land values were expected to rise dramatically following extensive 
publicly-funded infrastructure projects. This extended site followed the previously 
industrial lower Lea Valley, which had been extensively bombed in World War II and 
subsequently only partly rebuilt. It also had close proximity to Canary Wharf with, at 
the time, a likely perception of potentially unlimited funds from global finance. 
In June 2000, the consultants Capital Strategies issued a report entitled The 
Business of Education ( Capital Strategies, 2000, p. 9) in which they noted that 
firms were reluctant to invest in schools because they believed the market to be over- 
regulated. Capital Strategies particularly cited the constraints of the National 
Curriculum; the period within which sponsors were supposed to reach their targets; 
the length and complexity of the bidding process the sponsors' lack of educational 
expertise, and the involvement of local councillors and governors in schools (this 
last factor allegedly causing sponsors to be marginalised over strategic decisions). 
1.3.1 The Academies programme. 
Despite the limited success of EAZs to involve the private sector in school 
provision, in 2000 New Labour introduced City Academies (from then on known 
as Academies, because their remit was extended beyond urban areas). Academies 
were companies limited by guarantee and had a charitable status. 
4 See the advertisement for Newham Council recruitment in Estates Gazette, 6 March 2010, p. 179. 
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The New Labour government continued to loosen regulation in 
order to attract investment from businesses in school provision5 (which, according to 
WTO and EU rules, has to apply to foreign firms wishing to invest in the UK, as well 
as to domestic entities). 
Despite this relaxation of the rules governing the regulation of school provision, 
the government still failed to attract a sufficient number of business sponsors. The 
government asked for a maximum contribution of £2m., later to be reduced to 
£500,000 (which could be paid in kind), towards the cost of a new school; or £1.5m. 
in the case of refurbished old buildings. In return, the government allowed donor(s) to 
determine a school's ethos and curriculum even though the government had provided 
the balance of the funding in line with an agreed budget. Each Academy received a 
General Annual Grant from the Secretary of State to meet its normal running costs. 
This was calculated on the basis of the funding formula of the LEA in which the 
Academy was situated, with an additional allowance for the money which the LEA 
would hold back from Maintained Schools for centrally provided services. 
The Education Act 2002 went some way to addressing the reservations which some 
sponsors had been voicing since 1998, in particular those of constraints of the 
National Curriculum and of the lack of strategic control by sponsors, since the latter 
claimed to be otherwise answerable to a governing body composed mainly of 
teachers, support staff and a few LEA representatives. As a result of the Education 
Act 2002, sponsors could appoint the majority of the governing body and Academies 
were required to have within the governing body only one parent governor and only 
one staff governor. Moreover, there was no requirement to have any teacher on the 
s The deliberate nature of this strategy, in response to industry complaints, was endorsed by oral 
evidence from a Director of Cambridge Education Associates at a London Institute of Education 
seminar organised by The Economic and Social Research Council on 5 May 2005. 
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governing body (it was said that teachers could be represented by any other staff 
member) while the LEA representation, with its committee of elected councillors, had 
now been replaced by self-governing trusts led by corporate sponsors. 
As a consequence, in 2006, sponsors were not asked to pay capital costs but 
merely to promise goods in kind. The recession in 2008/09 caused a further decrease 
in sponsors. As a result, in 2009, New Labour announced that it was scrapping the 
sponsorship fee and reducing set-up costs for Academies opening after 2011 (Turner, 
2009, p. 6; DCSF Press Notice 2009/0158,7 September 2009 ). 
I contend that, as a result of this change in governance, it was legitimate to ask 
whether governing bodies had been integrated into the corporate sector as part of a 
process of creating a form of corporate and self-governing ownership (Ranson and 
Crouch, 2008, p. 48). I contend that this brought the alienating relations found in 
markets directly into schooling and that this necessarily resulted in the increase in the 
comparative disengagement experienced by teachers and pupils within schooling. 
This process is further explored in Chapters Four and Five. 
Although Academies were expected to provide a broad and balanced curriculum 
based on the requirements of the National Curriculum, they could seek the Secretary 
of State's permission to disapply parts of the National Curriculum. There was a 
requirement to follow only the `core' curriculum of English, Mathematics, Science 
and Information and Communications Technology. In addition the sponsor could 
choose a subject specialism (since all Academy schools were to be `specialist'). 
A significant change in property relations with respect to Academies took place 
with the implementation of Schedule 7, Education Act 2002 (which inserted 
Schedule 35A into the Education Act 1996). As was noted in Section 1.1.2 the 
Education Act 2002 allows schools to buy the land on which they are built, to 
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own school buildings, to employ staff, control admissions and to trade for services 
independently from the LEA. Section 11, Education Act 2002, also gives schools the 
power to form companies which, in some cases, could trade with other companies 
having the same owner as the school. Under this legislation schools can also merge to 
form chains or `federations', gaining economies of scale and thereby increasing the 
profit-making capacity for third parties (see Section 1.1.2). In return for their 
sponsorship, sponsors are given the right to rename the school(s) concerned and to 
control the board(s) of governors. The basis for the government's Academies 
programme has been a collection of legislative powers taken from the 1988 Education 
Reform Act and originally intended to establish City Technology Colleges (CTCs). 
City Academies resembled the CTCs in five main ways. Firstly, as with CTCs, City 
Academies were established by partnerships involving the government, the voluntary 
sector, church and business sponsors. A sponsor's role was to "animate the 
academy's vision, ethos and management structures" (Francis Beckett, 2007, p. 24, 
quoting the Specialist Schools and Academies Trust). Secondly, City Academies were 
to be directly accountable to the Secretary of State. They were state-funded with the 
Treasury directly making funds available to assist with capital costs and the entire 
day-to-day running costs. Under this system the LEA was merely a commissioner of 
schooling: once an LEA had `commissioned' an Academy it could do nothing about 
the way the Academy worked. Thirdly, sponsors were asked initially to provide £2m. 
as a contribution to initial capital start-up costs but, in return, the government would 
pay the running costs and allow sponsors to influence the curriculum. Fourthly, like 
CTCs, City Academies could specialize only in technology, languages, sport or the 
arts. Fifthly, like CTCs, City Academies were registered as independent schools and 
so they, therefore, were outside the legislative framework specifically governing 
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`normal' state schools. The sponsors/owners of Academies also had jurisdiction over 
teachers' pay and conditions since, unlike their colleagues in `normal' state schools, 
Academy teachers were not employed under the terms of the Schoolteachers Pay and 
Conditions Regulations. Academies therefore could vary teachers' conditions of 
service, according to financial circumstances (including profit considerations of other 
suppliers to Academies). Academies could replace more senior teachers (who were 
also more expensive) with cheaper teachers and/or extend teachers' working hours 
(perhaps through holiday reduction). 
Originally, Academies were also able to set their own criteria for admission. They 
were able to use admissions tests and `structured discussions' between parents and a 
member of the school's senior management team. The final decision on which pupils 
went to a particular Academy rested with the head teacher. As Academies were not 
Maintained Schools, they did not originally come under the remit of the 
government's admissions adjudicator and were allowed to select up to ten per cent of 
their intake by `aptitude'. Appeals over admissions made, in the first place, to the 
school governing body. From 16 January 2008 parents were able to appeal to the 
admissions adjudicator, but this would have been for a ruling only over how the 
school had applied its own criteria rather than on the fairness of the criteria itself. 
Therefore, despite the government's apparent commitment to parental choice in 
admissions to secondary schools, the balance of power had been slipping away from 
parents towards schools, as their own admissions authorities, choosing their own 
pupils. 
The explanation given by the government for these Specialist Schools and Academies 
was that they would import managerial expertise from business, which would both 
raise standards and increase curriculum innovation. For the first few years Ofsted 
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produced little evidence of standards being raised by such managerial input. However, 
in spite of this lack of evidence, the government planned to increase the number of 
Academies and Specialist Schools. In the 2005 White Paper entitled Higher 
Standards, Better Schools For All, the DfES stated that it wished to "enable every 
school to become a self-governing Trust School, with the benefit of external drive and 
new freedoms, mirroring the successful experience of Academies " (DfES, 2005, p. 
23, GT's italics ). However, unlike Academies, Trust Schools were to remain part of 
the "local authority family of schools" (DfES, 2005, p. 28). The Education and 
Inspections Act 2006 introduced this new `Trust' status, which was broadly 
similar to the foundation status (Section 1.3, n. 2) incorporated into the Academies 
programme. 
All Trust Schools which appointed governors and held land had to be charities 
and were required to use any income they received or generated for charitable 
purposes. Trust Schools could be partnered by the local not-for-profit sector or by 
businesses. Trust Schools could appoint their own governors, employ their own staff, 
set their own admissions procedures and could apply for `additional flexibilities' both 
for curriculum provision, and for pay and conditions of work for staff. Trust 
Schools could also own their own school buildings and land, and would be able to 
contract or procure their own building projects, but were required to use any income 
they received for charitable purposes. 
1.4 New Labour policies from 2007 to 2010. 
In June 2007 Gordon Brown became Prime Minister and it appeared to some that 
the marketization processes might be slowed down, if not halted. In his first House of 
Commons speech in his new capacity as Secretary of State for Children, Schools 
and Families, Ed Balls stated that he would reduce the curricula freedoms of 
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Academies, although there would be no change in the formal powers of local 
authorities. In this speech Ed Balls signalled some changes of emphases from 
previous Secretaries of State for Education. New Academies could now only 
proceed if the Secretary of State was satisfied by LEA responses to consultation. This 
was interpreted as meaning that LEAs had a de facto veto over the establishment of 
new Academies (H. C. Debates, 10 July 2007, col. 1321). There were also to be 
fewer sponsorships from multi-academy groups and wealthy individuals, and more 
from universities and local authorities (Meyland-Smith and Evans, 2009, pp. 17-18). 
Fiona Millar argued that these changes did not amount to a fundamental change in 
the Academies programme. Millar noted that, although Academies would 
become more accountable and also more collegiate and mainstream, they had not 
changed fundamentally since Academies were still independent schools and 
sponsors were still in almost exclusive control. Millar noted that the new prospectus 
for Academies clearly stated that sponsors would always have the controlling interest 
on the governing arrangements, while the governing body was still unelected and so 
excluded representative parents. Millar noted that "when the school is up and 
running, the local council can have little realistic leverage", even as local authority co- 
sponsors (Millar, 2007, p. 4). 
It was argued by Rogers and Migniulo (2007) that sponsorship gave ownership 
rights so, "for a very modest investment, control of a public asset, which continues to 
be publicly funded, passes in perpetuity and with minimal accountability to private 
individuals or institutions, albeit of a philanthropic bent" (Rogers and Migniulo, 2007, 
p. 13, quoting Sir Jeremy Beecham from the Local Government Association, GT's 
italics). 
In the following year, Ed Balls, as a Labour/Co-op MP, declared his particular 
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interest in Trust Schools with co-operative governance models. In this model local 
community groups, including parents, teachers and local businesses can come together 
to give input and to help govern schools, provided that they are members of the Trust. 
At the time, Ed Balls said: 
I want to see more parents and communities actively involved in 
schools and the co-operative model is an ideal way to do this. This is 
about putting power in the hands of those who are directly engaged 
with local schools, and who know best what is needed in their area (Ed 
Balls, DCSF Press Notice 2008/0196,11 September 2008, p. 1). 
In the same press release, Peter Marks, Chief Executive of the Co-operative Group, 
said: 
We believe that the co-operative structure allows all stakeholders 
greater participation in the running of the school and a sense of 
ownership and engagement which has sometimes been missing in the 
public sector (Peter Marks, DCSF Press Notice 2008/0196,11 
September 2008, p. 1). 
The Labour Party Manifesto 2010 largely endorsed the sentiments of Ed Balls 
outlined above (Labour Party Manifesto, 2010, Section 3: 3). The role of central 
government in schools would also remain largely unchanged: central government 
would still set the overall direction of schooling. The 2010 Labour Party Manifesto 
stated that local authorities would also be expected to create more provision if 
necessary, or if parents were dissatisfied with schools, or if standards were low. 
These problems would be addressed by federations of schools with proven 'track- 
records' which could `take over' failing schools (Labour Party Manifesto, 2010, 
Section 3: 3). Where parents were dissatisfied with schools, local authorities would 
be required to secure `take-overs' of poor schools, or in some cases secure entirely 
new provision. 
Importantly, although parents could "trigger a ballot on whether to bring in a new 
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leadership team", they still have little control, by way of local government 
representatives, on what goes on in the school. Therefore, it can be seen that the 
policy of New Labour was still away from democratic control and towards 
management by "trusted accredited providers" (Labour Party Manifesto, 2010, 
Section 3: 4). This process led a study jointly commissioned by the London University 
Institute of Education and the Sutton Trust to conclude: 
The Academies programme's apparent endorsement by the PMDU 
[Prime Minister's Delivery Unit - GT) review and its subsequent 
acceleration means that Academies will remain part of the schools' 
landscape for some time to come. It has survived a change in prime 
minister and a succession of Secretaries of State, and is now supported 
by the Conservative Party..... (Andrew Curtis et. al., 2008, p. 49). 
In the next section I show that the policy of marketization of school provision and 
school services is supported by the other main parties and would probably continue 
unabated no matter which of the three main political parties were to be in power. 
1.5 The Conservative and Liberal Parties and their education policies from 2000 
onwards. 
Although there were some differences in emphasis in the education policies of the 
three major UK parties, there were also many fundamental similarities. All three 
worked to a market model of school provision which was to be very similar to the 
Academies programme developed by Tony Blair. In 2000, although the Conservative 
Party had supported the Academies programme, including the establishment of 
primary academies, they believed that New Labour was heading towards a policy of 
too much state regulation. In 2008 David Cameron, as Leader of Conservative Party, 
described this concept in the following way: 
where a church, a voluntary body, a private school, a third sector 
organisation can set up a new school in the state sector and take state 
pupils and make sure they are subject to minimum standards in terms 
of inspection, they get state money per pupil, and they can bring that 
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innovation and dynamism to the state sector that we need 
(Cameron, 2008, p. 9, GT's italics). 
A similar concept is advocated by James Tooley, and is analyzed in Sections 2.1 and 
2.4 as part of my analysis of Tooley's model. 
In 2010 David Cameron gave a speech in which he outlined his concept of 
society. In this speech he stated that a major "technique" for creating such a society 
was decentralization. He did not explicitly mention schools, but he did state his 
intention "to open up public services to new providers like charities, social enterprises 
and private companies" (Cameron, 2010[a], p. 4). 
In a speech entitled "Join us to help bring the change Britain needs", given on 15 
February 2010, Cameron began to incorporate references to "co-operative, bottom- 
up partnership" which led many commentators at the time to believe that he was 
advocating co-operatives (Cameron, 2010[b], p. 3). Initially, within Cameron's policy, 
co-operatives would be possible for primary schools only. They would be funded by 
the state so long as they met national standards, but would be free from control by a 
centralized bureaucracy and from political micro-management. They would be not- 
for-profit organizations, any profits being re-invested into the service rather than being 
distributed to external shareholders. In Section 1.1.2 it was noted that Section 11 of 
the Education Act 2002 allows not-for-profit schools to form companies which 
can invest in other companies which are profit-making entities. In this process money 
paid by the state to run the services is transformed into private profit. The economic 
problems connected with such a model are discussed in more detail in Section 2.4. 
Given the comment from Cameron above, it is likely that he has a similar concept 
of co-operatives to that of Nozick (see Section 4.9). That is, within Cameron's model, 
co-operatives would be operating within the conditions and social relations which 
make up a capitalist society based on minimal state intervention and a form of 
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decentralization (Cameron, 2009). Therefore, I maintain that Cameron's concept of 
co-operative ownership of property is another variant of capitalist private property 
relations which has the same alienating relations as those analyzed in Chapter Four of 
this thesis. In Chapter Five I extend this analysis of alienation to markets in school 
provision and schooling, and argue that extending marketization to school provision 
and schooling objectively contributes to the break-down of social relations. Although 
Prime Minister David Cameron showed concern about the break-down of `society' in 
his speeches entitled "The Big Society, " given in both 2009 and 2010, he failed to 
take into account the fact that the marketization of school provision would necessarily 
result in objective relationships which would prefigure such a break-down (Cameron, 
2010[a], p. 4). 
This policy to increase the marketization of schools was endorsed in the 
Conservative Party's 2010 Manifesto. In that manifesto support was given to the 
hybrid of the Swedish Kunskapsskolan ( `Knowledge Schools'), and the Charter 
Schools in the USA (Conservative Party Manifesto 2010, p. 53). Kunskapsskolan's 
selling point is personalised, web-based, independent learning via a "knowledge 
portal. " Students have an individual tutor, whom they see weekly for about 15 
minutes to review work and to set a programme for the following week: some of this 
will include taught lessons in small groups, but much will be independent study. 
Rather than attend specialist teaching areas within each school, students would spend 
one week each term in a purpose-built centre run by Kunskapsskolan. Many of the 
`schools' are not purpose-built facilities but converted offices. The sponsors are not 
required to build libraries or sports facilities: instead students use municipal 
libraries and sports centres. 
Unlike UK schools, the Swedish schools have to follow a broader national 
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curriculum and the sponsors are not allowed to select pupils by ability. In Sweden the 
Kunskapsskolan schools are profit-making. Although Cameron has stated that such 
schools in England would be not-for-profit organizations, Michael Gove (Secretary of 
State for Education) has stated that the government has "no ideological objection" to 
school governors using for-profit companies to run their schools (Barkham and P. 
Curtis, 2010, p. 6). 
In their 2010 manifesto the Conservative Party supported new regulations 
which would make it easier for parents, charities and businesses to set up Academies, 
including downgrading building regulations so that schools could use different kinds 
of buildings, such as former banks and offices. The manifesto also allowed "good 
schools" to escape regular visits from school inspectors and also supported scaling 
back of the National Curriculum and reforms to Standard Attainment Tests (SATs) to 
move the latter from primary to secondary schools. It also included the scrapping of 
the Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency and extending the freedom 
Academies already had to set pay and conditions for teachers. In addition, in early 
March 2010, Gove announced that he intended to withdraw from LEAs and parents' 
bodies the power to stop schools becoming Academies (J. Shepherd, 2010, p. 6). 
In the following Queen's Speech (H. L. Debs. [2010-11] Vol. 719, No. 3, col. 5) it 
was announced that these policies would be included in an Academies Bill, enacted 
before the summer break. 
The Liberal Democrats had similar proposals to the other two parties for the 
involvement of private providers in schools and schooling. In the Liberal Democrat 
Party Manifesto 2010 it was stated that they would replace Academies with 
"Sponsored-Managed Schools": 
These schools will be commissioned by and accountable to local 
authorities and not Whitehall, and would allow appropriate 
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providers, such as educational charities and parent groups to be 
involved in delivering state-funded education (The Liberal Democrat 
Party Manifesto 2010, p. 37, GT's italics). 
A Conservative-Liberal Coalition government was formed on 12 May 2010. On 25 
May 2010, in the Queen's Speech, the new government made a commitment to 
increase the number of Academies and to allow new `providers' to enter the school 
system (HL Deb [2010-11] Vol. 719, No. 3, col. 5). 
In this section I have observed that, as is also argued by a former Secretary of 
State for Education (Estelle Morris, 2010, p. 3), support by all three major political 
parties has been made clear for the increased marketization of schools, In the next 
section, I show that this support is hardly surprising when policy-making moves 
are contextualized within the UK's international obligations since 1997. 
1.6 The modem global context of education policy-making in the UK. 
In this section I intend to outline the global context in which education policy is 
made. I argue that UK New Labour took an enthusiastic role in an agenda to create a 
global market in services such as schooling and school provision. It has been argued 
by Hirst and Thompson (1994) that, within both the European Union and World 
Trade Organisation treaties, nation states should "provide the domestic constitutional 
framework and policy support for effective regional governments". This means that 
the EU and WTO will consider as legitimate such national restrictions, including 
policy decisions of nation-states (Hirst and Thompson, 1994, p. 245). This is 
covered by Article 95 (4)-(6) (formerly Article 100a [4]) of the EU Treaty. Moreover, 
in theory, member states can withdraw from the European Union if they so wish 
(Article 49 A [1]) should any state consider membership conditions too onerous or 
inapplicable. Although such withdrawal might until the 2008 financial crisis have 
seemed very unlikely, in the last year or two since the crisis there has been at least 
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theoretical discussion as to the viability of membership of the EU's Euro-zone 
currency on the part of smaller and less industrialized states. In fact, of course there is 
the precedent of Greenland's withdrawal from the European Community in 1985. 
The fact that one member state chooses to place under public control an industry 
that another member state prefers to locate in the private sector is not of itself 
objectionable under EU law. What the member states are forbidden to do is to 
discriminate on the grounds of nationality within the same kind of trade. Therefore, a 
government could choose nationalization of a certain sector of the economy and still 
be within the letter of the EU law, provided that no section of that particular sector 
was already privatized. Therefore the fact that, within the UK, there exists a private 
sector within schooling and school provision means that the whole school sector must 
be open to competition. 
The EU, as a signatory to the WTO, is also bound by WTO agreements including 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Treaty, which came into being 
in 1995. The GATS Treaty has been described as a voluntary agreement because 
countries can decide which sectors of the economy they will agree to be covered by 
GATS rules. Lawyers Gottlieb and Pearson, however, have noted that there are 
aspects of the agreement that would question the voluntary nature of the Treaty 
(Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001): see Appendix Al of this thesis for further details. 
Importantly, I note that there is a built-in agenda committing signatories of the GATS 
Treaty to `progressive liberalisation'. GATS Article XIX states: 
In pursuance of the objectives of this agreement, Members shall enter 
into successive rounds of negotiations, beginning not later than five 
years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement and 
periodically thereafter, with a view to achieving a progressively higher 
level of liberalisation (CATS, 1995). 
New Labour chose to be at the forefront of the global development of markets 
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in areas such as educational provision and services. The enthusiasm of New Labour 
for the `marketization' of educational services can be shown by the fact that, since it 
came to office, the New Labour government continued the Conservative Party's 
programme (Kavanagh, 1997, pp. 334-5; Whitfield, 2001, p. 118). Indeed, New 
Labour has been at the forefront of the programme of the marketization of schooling 
and school provision, and requested that the `liberalisation' of such services be 
itemised in the CATS liberalisation agenda at a time when many other countries 
were content not to make such a request. 
Since 2003 a market in school provision has been developing into a major 
export industry. In 2003 Dulwich College, in south London, took the first steps to 
create an international franchise by opening three schools in China (Adi Bloom, 2008, 
p. 28). In 2007 Nord Anglia Education planned to raise £4.77 in. in order to help 
meet the demand for "British-style schooling" from an expanding expatriate 
community in Asia and the Middle East. Investec, a company broker, predicted that 
two-thirds of Nord Anglia's operating profits would come from its international 
school business by 2009 (Pan Kwan Yuk, 2007, p. 20). In 2008 Harrow School 
was also operating schools in Thailand and China. In the same year, the head of the 
City Academy in Bristol spoke of opening off-shoots of fee-charging schools in Africa 
( Gould, 2008, www. jzuardian. co. uk, last accessed 24 January 2010). 
Commentators began to see the potential trade in school services as a means of 
offsetting the losses experienced in manufacturing which had been occurring since 
1997. Kable6 was quoted in the Financial Times (N. Timmins, 2004, p. 6) as stating 
that education was a fast-growing sector of the UK economy, with sales of 
outsourcing and existing contracts expected to reach £10.3bn. by 2006-7, starting 
6 Kable is a firm specialising in information technology and public service `markets'. 
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from the estimated base figure of £4.5bn. in the financial year 2003-4. In this article 
Karen Swinden, head of forecasting at Kable, stated that this growth was likely to 
come from "foundation schools, responsible for managing their own assets, and the 
potential for support, administration and direct educational services" (Timmins, p. 6). 
In conclusion, in this chapter I have produced empirical evidence which I 
believe conclusively shows that what may appear to be a series of separate reforms 
is, in fact, a process towards the marketization of school provision which is 
influenced by economic policies generated at an international level. 
I believe that I have shown that this process of marketization has been advanced 
enthusiastically by successive UK governments since 1979, and that this 
marketization will be continued, with increased intensity, by the Conservative- 
Liberal Democrat Coalition. I consider that I have also shown that at present the 
difference between the three parties is mainly in the degree of government regulation 
which they support. A Conservative government would aspire to follow a model with 
less regulation than that used by the previous Labour government led by Gordon 
Brown. 
Similar policies to those aspired to by New Labour and the Conservative Party are 
echoed by some philosophers of education. James Tooley, especially in his early 
writings, supports a model which is similar to that espoused by the present-day 
Conservative Party and which has less regulation than the model used by New 
Labour. Although Harry Brighouse also supports a model which includes market 
relations, his model supports more specific regulation than that likely to be 
supported by the Conservative Party. 
In Chapter Two I compare Tooley's market model with that of Brighouse, and 
argue that Brighouse's regulations are not necessarily capable of modifying, to any 
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significant degree, less desirable market activities. Whether Brighouse's regulations 
modify market activities is entirely contingent upon the willingness of the markets to 
co-operate with governments: it may or may not happen. I leave until Chapter Five a 
consideration of the alienating relations which, I contend, are necessarily present in 
both of these market models regardless of whether or not they are government- 
regulated. 
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Part One 
Chapter Two 
A comparison of markets in school provision and schooling: regulated and 
unregulated markets. 
Introduction 
This chapter compares James Tooley's concept of a `lightly' regulated 
market 1 with Harry Brighouse's concept of a regulated market and shows why 
oppositional relations will still be present between the market and education, 
despite the presence of regulation. This chapter also notes that Tooley's 
epistemological argument in favour of the marketization of school provision and 
schooling rests on Hayek's concept of `tacit' knowledge and `spontaneous orders' 
(Tooley, 1994 [a], p. 197; 1995, pp. 78,81; 1996, pp. 106; 1998, pp. 273-4; 2000, 
pp. 166,208,215; 2010, p. 109). Tooley uses Hayek's concept of tacit knowledge 
and spontaneous orders to argue that the knowledge claimed by central planners (in 
any type of society) cannot be articulated and that, therefore, any model based on 
central planning is misconceived (Tooley, 1995, p. 81). The model of central planning 
which Tooley criticises is borrowed from that used by Hayek. Hayek used this model 
when debating the viability of market mechanisms in socialism with Oskar Lange in 
1935. I postpone a discussion of the Soviet model of the state until Chapter Seven. In 
Chapter Seven Soviet Marxism and the Soviet concept of alienation, as supported by 
some prominent supporters of the Soviet regime in the mid-twentieth century, is 
discussed. I now outline Tooley's model of the market in more detail. 
As noted in the introduction, minimal or 'light touch' regulation usually means regulation which 
preserves the rules enabling the enforcement of contracts, prevents coercion and enables 'free 
markets' to operate. 
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2.1 James Tooley's concept of a market 
In Reclaiming Education (Tooley, 2000, p. 11), James Tooley lists the 
defining characteristics which have to be present for a market to exist as a) no 
state involvement; b) no state funding (except perhaps for targeted funding for the 
poor); c) relatively minimal regulation; d) relatively easy entry for new suppliers 
(who, in 2000, he argued should be education companies: Tooley, 2000, p. 85), and 
e) a price mechanism to allocate goods. 2 Although these are the characteristics 
associated with the economic theory of a `perfect market', Tooley admits (Tooley, 
1994 [b], p. 139) that perfect markets " may or may not have a purchase in the real 
world" (Tooley, 2010, p. 110). 
I now deal with the market relations favoured by Tooley in more detail, starting 
with the absence of a state in the running of schools. In his Ph. D. thesis (Tooley, 
1994[a]) and in Disestablishing Schools (Tooley, 1995), Tooley envisages schools as 
being controlled either by community groups, businesses or by groups of families. 
Tooley maintains that businesses have a profit incentive when involved in 
schooling, and that his model would benefit producers who might be willing to 
provide schooling because they "would be able to tie-in their private goods with this 
public goods provision" ; for example, advertisers and producers of radio, television 
or computer hardware and software could be involved in providing materials for 
schooling (Tooley, 1994[a], p. 322 ). In this way his model is very similar to that 
supported by the Conservative Party under David Cameron (Cameron, 2010[a]). 
This model seems to have relations very similar to that found in the model proposed by Ivan Illich 
(outlined in Section 9.4.4). This is despite the fact that Tooley, in Reclaiming Education (Tooley, 2000, 
p. 26), seems to distance himself from the `de-schooling' model used by Illich. I surmise that, as a 
Hayekian, Tooley probably believes that it is necessary to have a state to provide the legal framework 
necessary for the capitalist system to function. 
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However, in Reclaiming Education (2000), Tooley's model is based solely on 
business providers whose main business is education (Tooley, 2000, pp. 18-19). In 
Reclaiming Education there is no mention of schools run by communities or groups of 
families and no explanation as to why such groups are not mentioned. Also, in 
Reclaiming Education, Tooley acknowledges that firms which sponsor schools 
(as opposed to firms whose only business is education) "subvert" education to their 
own ends (Tooley, 2000, p. 19). In this argument, Tooley supports Alex Molnar's 
argument that "corporations don't exist either to serve the best interests of children 
or to promote `family values' " (Tooley, 2000, p. 19, quoting Molnar, 1996, p. 47) 
because "they want to make profits to [sic] shareholders who are not particularly 
concerned about the educational impact of what they are doing" (Tooley, 2000, p. 19). 
In Reclaiming Education Tooley argues for "businesses whose only business is 
education (Tooley, 2000, p. 18, GT's italics) because he contends that: 
(For) real education businesses - the sort I will defend here - do 
exist `to serve the best interests of schoolchildren' and their families, as 
well as shareholders. If they are not serving the interests of children 
then they will go out of business. The only way they can make profits 
for their owners is if they provide high-quality educational services 
(Tooley, 2000, p. 19). 
In Section 2.4 I criticise the argument of Tooley which states that 
competition within the market for school provision would ensure that schooling 
would be of a good quality, arguing that Tooley fails to address some actual market 
practices. In Section 2.4 I also argue that even sponsors of businesses whose 
only business is education are still predominantly interested in making a profit. If 
this were not the case they would be engaged in philanthropy which, of course, is 
not predominantly a money-making activity. For example, Sunny Varkey, a 
businessman who does specialise in schooling and owns the GEMS firm, when 
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questioned about the money-making aspect of his `operation' said " It's my 
business so why should I do it as a charity? " (Jon Boone, 2005, p. 12). Therefore, I 
contend that, the observation of Tooley (Tooley, 2000, p. 19) that the ends of 
education can be subverted to the ends of the business people involved, still applies 
even where the business is solely school provision or schooling. 
Next I deal with the second characteristic of Tooley's model, namely, absence of 
state funding. Tooley argues that, for families on average incomes, private 
sources could fund the full cost of schools (Tooley, 2000, pp. 96-7 ). Tooley 
assumes that, if state provision were reduced, most people would be able to keep 
more of their money because of lower taxation, and thus would be able to put this 
towards the purchase of schooling (Tooley, 2000, p. 96). Tooley also argues that 
extra money could also be found by cutting down on alcohol, tobacco and luxuries 
such as `eating out' (Tooley, 2000, p. 96). In Appendix A3, in relation to a similar 
proposal is made by Harry Brighouse, I produce empirical evidence to show that if 
those in the lowest and second lowest quintile of the population were to have cut 
back on tobacco, alcohol and leisure goods, they would still not have been able to 
have afforded fees of £3,000 per annum for one child on a `pay-as-you-go' basis. 
Tooley acknowledges that a small number of people would need a form of 
safety-net to enable them to provide schooling for their children, and suggested that 
these families could be helped by several initiatives. Tooley lists such examples 
as: other families could sponsor such children for altruistic motives; schools could 
provide for poorer members of society by combining schooling with production 
(that is, making goods and selling them); schools could also provide services at a 
profit, and use this profit to fund poorer children, or some entrepreneurs could link 
the provision of schooling in a community to the purchase of a private good. Some 
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entrepreneurs might set up schools that are free or subsidised at the point of delivery, 
but where children purchase food, books, writing and sports equipment on the 
premises. Finally, Tooley suggests that schooling could be provided as a `public 
good' through private-financed radio, television and computer networks (Tooley, 
1994 [a], p. 322; 2000, pp. 118-123,134 ). In Reclaiming Education Tooley 
states that such subsidies would have to be administered skilfully in order to 
prevent them from being a disincentive to other families' saving . Tooley 
suggests that they should be administered by a committee, "made up of local 
people and the good and the great", who should be able to allocate funds sensibly 
(Tooley, 2000, p. 91 ). 
Next I deal with the third characteristic of Tooley's model. Tooley argues that 
there is no reason why providers of schools and schooling need to be answerable 
to the state (Tooley, 2000, p. 176 ). Tooley argues that there is no need for state 
regulation when the market puts `consumers' in charge of the curriculum, because 
consumers can `shop around', thus ensuring that school provision is appropriate to 
their children's needs (Tooley, 1994[a], p. 256 ). Tooley states that there is 
accountability in the market through the various forms of redress which individuals 
can obtain if not satisfied with goods. Firstly, there is the ability of the consumer to 
purchase from another competitor. Secondly, there is the ability to demand a refund 
for inadequate goods or services. Thirdly, Tooley argues that, if there is an 
adequate supply, the quality of education would be assured by competition 
between education companies (Tooley, 2000, pp. 84-85,176; 2003, p. 445 ). 
Tooley (Tooley, 2000) also argues for the use of `brands' as part of the 
process to use market mechanisms to ensure quality: 
Just as all parents can shop at their local Safebury's and know the 
quality of food and service will be the same in their locality as at 
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anywhere else around the country, so all parents could be able to send 
their children to excellent schools. If there were these competing 
education companies with strong brand names, there need be no 
more `sink' schools (Tooley, 2000, p. 85 ). 
Tooley, therefore, argues that, within a market, there is no need for a 
mechanism through which parents could appeal over school selection (Tooley, 
2000, pp. 15,176 -7). However, brands can be franchised to different firms and 
not all of them may operate according to the quality standards of the original firm. 
One can buy a product which is advertised as being manufactured by a particular 
`brand', only to find that another firm has brought the franchise, and that the quality 
targets of the new firm are not the same. 
I maintain that in Tooley's market model, `choice' is only applicable to those 
who can exercise effective demand, that is, those who have sufficient purchasing 
power for the `brand' they wish to purchase. Moreover, market processes ( both in 
Tooley's model and in a more regulated model such as that supported by Harry 
Brighouse) can involve schools in covertly selecting pupils in order to reinforce the 
school image (Ball, 2004, pp. 6-7 ). Children with special and emotional needs 
may well be disadvantaged under this system (Whitty, et. al., 1998, p. 117 ). 
2.2 Tooley's concept of autonomy. 
Tooley (Tooley, 1994, p. 182) argues for negative liberty on the basis of Hayek's 
later epistemology, in particular as is found in Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty 
(1960), New Studies in Philosophy, Economics and the History of Ideas (1978) and 
Law, Legislation and Liberty (1976). Tooley looks to John Gray's The Moral 
Foundations of Market Institutions (1992) for a "framework in which to explore" 
whether decision making about education for autonomy should be conducted at the 
level of governments. In The Moral Foundations of Market Institutions (1992), Gray 
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supports a moral justification of the market based on the support it provides for the 
exercise of autonomy (Tooley, 1995, p. 77). In The Moral Foundations of Market 
Institutions (1992), Gray defines the autonomous individual as one "who is self- 
possessed, who has distinct self-identity or individuality, who is authentic and self- 
directed and whose life is to some significant degree a matter of self-creation" (Gray, 
1992, p. 25). 
Like Tooley, Gray also argues that negative liberty should be valued, not in and 
of itself, but as an element of autonomy (Gray, 1992, p. 22). For Gray his concept of 
autonomy does "not rest on the contribution made to general or collective welfare by 
the markets, nor on their embodying any imagined system of rights (such as rights to 
negative liberty), but on their contribution to individual well-being" (Gray, 1992, p. 
2). Gray argues that markets enable individuals to live autonomously "in their 
personal knowledge - knowledge that is typically tacit and practical in form" (Gray, 
1992, p. 3, quoted by Tooley, 1995, p. 78), and which " by its very nature cannot 
be collected by a central planning board" (Gray, 1992, p. 7, quoted in Tooley, 1995, 
p. 78 ). I analyze this epistemological position in more detail in Section 2.3.1. 
Unlike Tooley, Gray acknowledges the need for life to contain "valuable 
options furnished by a common stock of inherently public goods" (Gray, 1992, p. 2, 
quoted in Tooley, 1995, p. 78 ). As a result, Gray argues for an enabling state to 
provide public goods when the market fails to do so (Gray, 1992, p. 58). Also as part 
of the conditions for this provision to work, Gray argues for the "obligation to pay 
taxes to support the minimum state" (Gray, 1992, p. 59). Tooley argues that under 
these circumstances "the great majority" of individuals and families would be able to 
provide the schooling which their children need (Tooley, 1995, p. 79). In Appendix 
A2 I produce empirical evidence to challenge this assertion. I do not comment on any 
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other political or philosophical positions which may have been taken by John Gray at 
other times, because I am not aware that any of Gray's other writings have been 
quoted by Tooley in support of the latter's market model. 
2.3 The influence of Friederich von Hayek's epistemology on Tooley's thought. 
2.3.1 Tacit knowledge and spontaneous orders. 
In this section I explore Hayek's concept of tacit knowledge, since Tooley 
claims that the Hayekian epistemology of tacit knowledge is fundamental to his 
own defence of the marketization of school provision and schooling (Tooley, 1995, p. 
78; 1998, p. 273; 2010, p. 109). Hayek argues that, within social processes, some 
aspects of knowledge remain hidden and so incapable of verification: 
While we are clearly often not aware of mental processes because they 
have not yet arisen to the level of consciousness but proceed on what 
are (both physiologically and psychologically) lower levels, there is no 
reason why the conscious level should be the highest level, and there 
are many grounds which make it probable that, in order to be 
conscious, processes must be guided by a supra-conscious order which 
cannot be the object of its own representations (Hayek, 1967, p. 61). 
In his lecture "Economics and Knowledge" (first given in 1936 and published in 
1948 in Individualism and Economic Order), Hayek applies this epistemology to his 
market theory. Hayek argues that, within the theory of economic equilibrium, both 
the conditions under which the tendency to equilibrium 
exists, and also the nature of the processes by which knowledge is changed, are 
unknowable and unverifiable (Hayek, 1948, p. 45 ). (General equilibrium is defined 
as "the set of interrelated markets when there is no excess demand or supply in any 
market" [Bannock, Baxter and Davis, 1992, p. 180]). 
From 1960 onwards Hayek refers to this type of knowledge as tacit knowledge. In 
his paper "Rules, Perception and Intelligibility", first given in 1963 and reproduced in 
Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (Hayek, 1967, p. 44), Hayek defines 
tacit knowledge as the capacity to act "according to rules which we may be able to 
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discover but which we need not be able to state in order to obey". For Hayek, tacit 
knowledge involves the capacity to perceive regularity or patterns in the actions of 
others through the interpersonal recognition of the particular conditions and 
relations within which these particularities are believed to form. For Hayek, these 
patterns form clues from which men recognise what to them, are significant aspects 
of a situation. Hayek argues that in most cases there will be "no specific clues in the 
sense of single events but merely a pattern of a certain kind which has meaning to 
them" (Hayek, 1967, p. 55). Hayek calls this process "rule perception" (Hayek, 1967, 
p. 56). Hayek claims that the process of rule-perception is based on "what 
eighteenth-century authors describe as sympathy "( Hayek, 1967, p. 58). [See 
Section 3.3 for a discussion of Smith's concept of "sympathy". ] 
For Hayek, the whole is more than the mere sum of its parts because it pre- 
supposes that the social elements are internally related to each other. This ontology 
informs Hayek's concept of spontaneous orders and tacit knowledge and provides a 
coherence to Hayek's philosophy. Although Tooley adopts Hayek's the concept of 
`tacit knowledge, ' he does not acknowledge Hayek's ontology. Yet Hayek's 
concept of `tacit knowledge' is based on internal relations. 
As was noted above, for Hayek, `tacit knowledge' involves the capacity to 
perceive regularity or patterns in the actions of others through the interpersonal 
recognition of the particular conditions and relations within which particularities 
are believed to form (Hayek, 1967, p. 54). 
Hayek has a mechanistic conception of the social relations between 
individuals which does not sufficiently take into account the subjective aspect of 
activity. Hayek does not acknowledge that associations of social individuals 
influence social processes through their thought and activities, and writes as if 
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social individuals are purely enabled, or constrained, by objective social structures. 
Consequently, for Hayek, society is not the product of conscious design but the 
unintended product of evolution making such processes transhistorical (Hayek, 
1967, pp. 96-105). 
The ontology of internal relations found in Hayek's writings differs from that 
found in Marx. Hayek's concept of internal relations removes social relations from 
their historical context and, in so doing, reifies them. For Marx, social processes as 
Hayek conceives them are alienating because they are a "force over and above" 
social individuals which dominates them, and over which they would have little or 
no control. This aspect of Marx's thought is considered in more detail in Section 4.2. 
For Hayek, prosperity and `civilization' depends on such capitalist structures 
and values. Consequently, Hayek maintains that those who champion liberation 
through the abolition of alienating relations "would destroy the basis of freedom, " 
which, for him, is capitalism ( Hayek, 1988, pp. 64-5,153 ). 
Both Hayek and Tooley define freedom as the absence of restraint and 
champion `freedom ' on the grounds of the relations found within capitalism 
(Tooley, 2002[a], p. 3 ). Therefore Hayek does not acknowledge the importance of 
alienation, although he does support the influence of objective social relations on the 
subjectivity of social individuals (Hayek, 1948[a], p. 44). 
Although Tooley occasionally mentions alienation, he never presents a 
systematic analysis or an explicit definition of the concept. In Education without the 
State and in his paper "Market Approaches to Education, Examples and Evidence " 
(2002[a] )Tooley equates alienation with estrangement which he implies is the 
result of a "separate youth culture" (Tooley, 1996, p. 12). In "Market Approaches 
to Education, Examples and Evidence " (Tooley, 2002[a] ), in the context of 
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discussing the UK Government's White Paper Schools Achieving Success, [DfES, 
Cm. 5230,2002 ], Tooley equates alienation with "disaffection" and "falling 
engagement" (Tooley, 2002, p. 5). This concept of Tooley's refers to a subjective 
individualist state and seeks to establish only if alienation has occurred as a 
result of personal experience within social relations. I maintain that such a 
description of a social situation is only partial and that such a description does not 
include the objective relations and conditions which necessarily give rise to 
"dissatisfaction". I also maintain that such a description does not provide the 
material relations and conditions necessary to provide an adequate solution to the 
problem of "dissatisfaction" or what Marx calls estrangement (entfremdet). This 
concept is discussed in Chapter Four. 
In part of his 2002[a] paper, Tooley states that alienation can be addressed 
through reform of educational delivery, that is, through increased "flexibility" in the 
curriculum and more "individualised patterns of learning" (Tooley, 2002[a], p. 5 ). 
This methodological approach does not consider the necessary relations in which 
schooling is embedded and the necessary influence which these relations have on 
social individuals. Tooley's methodology seeks to establish if alienation occurs as 
a result of personal experience within social relations: it cannot be used to analyse the 
alienating relations which necessarily occur as a result of objective relations such as 
those found in the market. I note in Appendix A2 that Hayek disagrees with formal 
models of the market such as that used by Tooley in his paper (Tooley, 2002[a] ) 
because he disagrees with the use of the rational constructivism, which is found in 
such models, to organize society. 
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2.3.2 Tooley's later market model. 
In his paper "Economics and Knowledge" (Hayek, 1948[a], pp. 35-45 ) 
Hayek argues against such formal economic models as those used in Tooley's 
model in "Market Approaches to Education" (Tooley, 2002 [a] and 2002 [b]). 
Firstly, Hayek argues that the propositions of such models are merely 
hypothetical because they are based on the actions of an individual, which by 
their ontological nature are, for Hayek, different from actual social interrelations 
(Section 2.3.1). 
Hayek also maintains that, in the type of market economics which Tooley 
subsequently used in his 2002 papers, the "supposed existence of the tendency 
towards market equilibrium" means that "....... under certain conditions, the 
knowledge and intentions of the different members of society are supposed to come 
more and more into agreement .... " (Hayek, 
1948 [a], p. 45, original italics). Hayek 
goes on to conclude that, because market equilibrium is "an assertion about what 
happens in the real world" it "ought, at least in principle, to be capable of 
verification" (Hayek, 1948[a], p. 45): 
The only trouble is that we are still pretty much in the dark about (a) 
the conditions under which this tendency is supposed to exist and (b) 
the nature of the process by which individual knowledge is changed 
(Hayek, 1948[a], p. 45, original italics). 
In Section 2.4 I outline some of the actual market practices which Tooley 
ignores in his argument that competition within the market for school provision would 
ensure that schooling is of good quality. Some of the problems resulting from 
Tooley's ideas about the viability of the voucher system as a pricing mechanism are 
outlined in more detail in Appendix A2. In the next part of this chapter I deal with 
other economic and social problems which I contend that Tooley's model fails 
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to address. 
2.4 Criticisms of Tooley's concept of a market in school provision. 
I maintain that, in order to set up schools within Tooley's early model (Tooley, 
1994[a]), local communities would need to raise finance either from the private 
banking sector or with specific sponsorship from firms. To successfully raise capital, 
schools would have to prove to banks that they could make profits. It is likely that 
schools in poor areas would have particular problems in making profits and therefore 
in raising finance. In any case, the price of entry to a market would often be high, 
making it difficult for small firms to enter without state funding. 
In the year 2000 it was estimated by the government that the capital cost of 
a secondary school building was £8-l Om. ( Cassidy, 2000, p. 5). At the time, the 
annual cost to run a comprehensive with just over 1000 pupils was estimated at 
£3.5m. year on year; the cost of buying or building a school being even higher. 
For Tooley, the alternative to government funding for secondary education 
would be to charge parents £3,000 per annum per child in 2000 prices (or £16,800 
over seven years, per child, after tax relief at 20%). According to the UK Office of 
National Statistics' Social Trends Volume 30 (2000, p. 68), approximately 40% 
of families did not have both parents at work. In Appendix A3, I argue that it is 
unrealistic to expect parents to cover fees probably of at least £3,000 per annum 
per secondary school place, at 2000 prices. 
In 2010 parents were encouraged by the Conservative-led government to form 
`free' schools. At the time it was estimated that the initial start-up cost of a small 
school (for 48 pupils aged 2-7 ) was £50,000 (Uzel, 2010, p. 9). Not 
surprisingly, some groups of parents found it difficult to start schools without state 
funding and the provision of an already existing school building (Abrams, 2010, p. 2). 
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I note that firms could form cartels to overcome market entry problems and that 
this would in turn make it even more difficult for new firms to enter the market. These 
cartels could allow affiliates working in the same area to use their resources to 
keep prices low by cross-subsidizing their schools. This would allow these firms to 
drive smaller competitors out of business and, when the latter had disappeared, to 
raise their prices. An example of this type of economic activity was uncovered in 
2003 when fifty leading independent schools, including Eton, Harrow, Winchester 
and Cheltenham Ladies' College were fined a total of £3.5 m. in a case involving 
the Office of Fair Trading (Clare, 2003, p. 8). 
There is, arguably, a tendency for the rate of school fees to be set by the most 
expensive school in an area, as no school would wish to be perceived as `second 
best' to the most expensive. There would also an incentive for many schools to 
appear exclusive and to turn away certain pupils, for example, disabled pupils, pupils 
perceived to be below a certain IQ, pupils with emotional difficulties, pupils from 
certain socio-economic groups or other pupils with special needs. Examples of how 
this could be done have been given in an article by David Starkie and Jessica Hunt 
(Starkie and Hunt, 2003, www. economics-12lus. co. uk, last accessed 18 May 2005) 
and in a report by Phillip Noden and Anne West (Noden and West, 2009, 
www. rise. trust. org. uk, last accessed 10 December, 2009). Moreover I note that 
within Tooley's system of a relatively unregulated market there would be no way to 
allow parents to appeal over school rejection and thus try to prevent the type of 
`cherry-picking' described in this report. 
It is (of course) a logical fallacy to say that all parents would be able to send 
children to `the best schools' within a system of unregulated market competition. I 
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also argue that standards in general just cannot be guaranteed to ensure the 
provision of good quality schooling for all without government regulation: the latter, 
of course, being objected to by Tooley. For example, if all the firms in a 
particular price-band were to reduce the breadth of the curriculum, and/or reduce 
access to extra facilities (such as swimming pools) and/or organize schooling to a 
particular standard, then parents would have to make a choice within the standards 
that the market would be willing to provide, irrespective of their own or their 
children's needs or desires. This would particularly be the case if cartels existed, 
especially bearing in mind that Tooley's system ensures only a "basic standard of 
schooling" (Tooley, 1995, pp. 117-9 ). 
These financial and economic problems do not appear to have been addressed by 
Tooley. Instead Tooley seems to rely on the assumption that, within a market, those 
whose main business is "education" will necessarily supply only what is best for 
pupils. He has not considered actual market practices like `fee-swapping' and the 
formation of cartels, which is often found in large markets. 
Neither has Tooley considered that sponsors of all types might not always be 
able to raise finance, especially in times of economic downturn, when certain 
sponsors might turn out to be particularly vulnerable. While money and 
investment might be available in times of boom, it becomes tenuous in times of 
slump 3. (There would likely therefore be a tendency for school entrepreneurs to plan 
for safer financial outcomes. ) Such a situation occurred at the beginning of 2009 
when many Private Finance Initiative projects involving school buildings, under 
which capital funding was provided by private companies, were badly hit because of 
the lack of credit available owing to the economic recession ( Hawkes, 2009). 
3 In 2008 it was said that Academies might be hit by the credit crunch because some sponsors made 
money through hedge-funds and so were vulnerable to the financial downturn (Polly Curtis, 2008). 
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In such a scenario, the failure of firms to raise finance might well cause 
discontinuity and dislocation of the provision of schooling, with potentially 
devastating effects on pupils. As a result of such discontinuity, pupils might have to 
enrol with different schools, potentially losing contact with friends and teachers. 
This is more likely to occur in poor areas where families would have less money to 
help schools, and so this would cause further disparity between schools in affluent 
areas and those in poorer ones. 
2.5 Harry Brighouse's model of a choice-based mechanism: a specifically 
regulated market in school provision. 
Harry Brighouse is another example of a philosopher of education who 
supports markets, as elements of his model of a choice-based mechanism of school 
provision. Unlike Tooley, Brighouse has a strong concern with justice and argues that 
regulated markets in school provision and schooling are possible means of achieving 
justice. Brighouse's concept of justice is based primarily on the support for 
autonomy. Brighouse defines autonomy as the capacity of individuals to be rationally 
self-governing, and argues that "justice requires that each individual shall have 
significant opportunities to live a life which is good for them" (Brighouse, 2000, pp. 
37,68-9). This concept of justice is discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.2 but 
briefly, for Brighouse, it entails having the equal opportunity to live according to 
the principle of rational autonomy. 
In the next section I show the similarity between Brighouse's philosophy and 
that of John Rawls. I begin this exploration by outlining the concept of autonomy 
supported by Brighouse and Rawls and that promoted by Immanuel Kant. 
2.5.1 Brighouse's ethical individualism. 
As with that of John Rawls, Brighouse's overall concept of autonomy is very 
similar to that of Kant. As with Kant, it is fundamental to Brighouse's philosophy 
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that moral principles are the object of rational choice. A synopsis of Kant's 
concept of autonomy is given by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 
1972, pp. 251-7 ). Rawls notes that Kant holds that a person is acting 
autonomously "when the principles of his action are chosen by him as the most 
adequate expression of his nature as a free and equal rational being" (Rawls, 1972, p. 
252, GT's italics). Rawls adds: 
The principles he acts upon are not adopted because of his social 
position or natural endowments, or in view of the particular kind of 
society in which he lives or the specific things that he happens to 
want. To act on such principles is to act heteronomously (Rawls, 1972, 
p. 253, GT's italics). 
Rawls, and Kant as Rawls interprets him, are arguing that " to express one's 
nature as a being of a particular kind is to act on the principles that would be 
chosen if this nature (as a free and equal rational being) were the decisive 
determining element of the principles which are acted upon" (Rawls, 1972, p. 253 
GT's italics). 
Like Kant, Brighouse argues that a good life is one that is endorsed from "the 
inside", in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to our lives 
(Brighouse, 2000, pp. 37,69 ). Like Kant, Brighouse argues that this makes 
persons the ultimate arbiters of what actions they take and what beliefs they hold. As 
does Kant, Brighouse argues that one's "sense" of living well should be an 
autonomous decision, guided by one's rationality ( Brighouse, 2000, p. 69 ). 
I now briefly consider the ontological implications of this concept. This concept 
of the rational autonomous individual, not being necessarily influenced by social 
relations, rests on a concept of society in which social relations are external. In this 
ontology, social relations are contingent, and therefore might or might not be 
present (Brighouse, 2000, p. 49 ). I contend that, because such an ontology is 
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based on contingent relations, it has led Tooley and Brighouse to conclude that 
the marketization of school provision has been merely a series of separate reforms 
rather than a continuous process. 
In contrast, within an ontology based on internal relations, an entity necessarily 
changes its form and function when one or more of its relations changes. 
Therefore, within such an ontology, possible changes are not entirely 
speculative but are prefigured in the relevant social relations. For example, if 
schools are privately owned by entrepreneurs, control over schooling becomes 
necessarily dependent on the will of the entrepreneur, and, therefore, happiness at 
work would not necessarily be the normal state of affairs. 
2.5.2 Brighouse 's concept of justice. 
I now briefly consider Brighouse's concept of justice, on which he bases two 
abstract principles: the principle of autonomy and the principle of educational 
equality. Brighouse claims that these principles are similar to Rawls' principles of 
liberty and equal opportunity (Brighouse, 2002, pp. 2,7 ). As was noted in Section 
2.5.2, for Brighouse, autonomy-facilitating schooling includes equipping the 
individual with the ability to analyze social situations rationally (Brighouse, 2000, 
p. 67 ). Both Brighouse and Rawls argue that governments need to ensure that 
"basic freedoms" exist if individuals are to have the opportunity to live well 
(Brighouse, 1996, p. 158; 2000, p. 162 ). 
Brighouse's principle of educational equality is akin to Rawls' principle of 
equal opportunity. For Brighouse, the argument for the principle of equal 
educational opportunity is based on two strands in the purpose of schooling. These 
are, firstly, the instrumental strand, that is, that schooling gives competitive 
advantages in the job market; and, secondly, the intrinsic strand, that is, that 
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education guarantees opportunities and resources to all pupils to fulfil life 
experiences regardless of their instrumental advantage (Brighouse, 2000, p. 116 ). 
In policy terms, the principle of educational opportunity translates into two 
broad principles for Brighouse. These are, firstly, that "children of different classes 
but the same level of natural talent should receive roughly equal educational 
resources". The second principle is that "more must be spent on the schooling of 
disabled students than on ordinary-able students, with the rider that significant 
resources must be spent on all" (Brighouse, 2000, p. 138 ). Brighouse concludes 
that mechanisms for choice have to be institutionalized in order to give assurance of 
justice (Brighouse, 2000, p. 162) . 
2.5.3 Brighouse's definition of a choice-based mechanism for schools. 
Brighouse is primarily concerned with a theory of justice which promotes 
choice, and argues that a market in school provision would likely enable parents to 
exercise such choice. Brighouse argues that the quality of schooling can be 
positively influenced in two main ways. These are, firstly, through the capacity of 
parents to withdraw a pupil from a particular school ( Brighouse, 2000, pp. 56-7 ); 
and, secondly, by demands being made through the democratic channels making 
up the "infrastructure" of schooling (Brighouse, 2000, p. 55 ). For Brighouse, these 
quality issues would include government regulation on staffing levels, the physical 
condition of schools, the curriculum (including the provisions of autonomy- 
facilitating schooling), admissions (especially the use of a lottery: Brighouse, 2006, p. 
91) and the publication of value-added tables, including the ratios of administration 
expenditure to classroom expenditure and to profit (Brighouse, 2000, p. 186 ). 
Brighouse argues that the publication of value-added tables could result in the 
indirect control by parents of the conditions of schooling, by informing their choice 
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of school (Brighouse, 2000, p. 55 ). Brighouse also believes that choice will 
"have the advantage of improving schools because less well-informed parents will 
identify and mimick (sic) the decisions of better informed parents" ( Brighouse, 
2000, p. 33 ). 
Brighouse's model of a choice-based mechanism is derived from some of the 
features found in the model of Bowles and Gintis (Brighouse, 2000, p. 182 ) 4. 
However, as is noted in Section 4.9, Brighouse rejects the Marxist ontology on 
which Bowles and Gintis base their model. 
Within the Bowles and Gintis model, Brighouse is particularly impressed with 
seven features. The first feature is that parents/guardians may choose the school 
that their children attend. The second feature is that schools may be established by 
private, or by for-profit or not-for-profit firms, or by public institutions or 
associations of teachers, or by local community groups. Therefore it can be seen 
that Brighouse is not adverse to a market in school provision. Interestingly, 
Brighouse supports Bowles' and Gintis' argument that the " profit-motive 
provides a mechanism where failing schools can exit the market of their own accord" 
(Brighouse, 2000, p. 188 ). The third feature of Bowles and Gintis model which 
Brighouse supports is that the participating schools should be publicly funded, the 
per-pupil amount of public subsidy being set according to the educational needs of 
pupils and the price level and competitiveness of the local market (Brighouse, 
2000, p. 184 ). In the model of Bowles and Gintis, schools are prevented from 
charging `top-up' fees, in order to ensure that they do not price themselves out of the 
reach of poorer parents and "thus become exclusive private schools for middle and 
4 
Brighouse notes that the Bowles/Gintis model is designed for a market in education in the United States 
(Brighouse, 2000, pp. 183,187). In his later works he acknowledges that, in some cases, this model 
results in educational policies that are inappropriate for the UK (Brighouse, 2002[a], pp. 24-25 ). 
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upper class children receiving a government subsidy" (Brighouse, 2000, p. 184 ). 
(See Appendix A3 for empirical data to support the assertion that schools which 
charge `top-up' fees would price themselves out of the reach of poorer parents). 
The fourth feature of the Bowles and Gintis model which Brighouse favours is that 
each school should be required to achieve heterogeneity in the school population. In 
order to achieve this Brighouse recommends both the use of a lottery ( Brighouse, 
2006, p. 91) and of an integrated housing policy, to prevent post-code advantages 
(Brighouse, 2000, p. 205). Brighouse maintains that this housing policy would 
attempt to integrate neighbourhoods by class and race, by placing mandates on new 
developments and designing appropriate subsidies and incentives for existing 
neighbourhoods to develop housing that is accessible to these groups. In this way, 
Brighouse hopes to open access to schools for disadvantaged pupils and to remove 
the effects of the so-called post-code lottery. 
The fifth feature of Bowles' and Gintis' model which Brighouse favours is the 
recommendation that public regulation should govern staffing levels, the condition 
of school buildings, curriculum levels and content, admissions, adequate funding and 
an adequate level of `autonomy-facilitating schooling' (Brighouse, 2000, p. 186 ). 
Brighouse assumes that, if this is done, schools will spend the maximum possible 
on teaching children. 
The sixth feature of the Bowles/Gintis model which Brighouse favours is the 
quantitative measures of the performance of participating schools made by 
government accredited independent bodies. This information would be disseminated 
to the public in a readily understandable form including retention rates, teacher 
accreditation levels and test scores, in addition to the ratio of expenditure on 
`bureaucracy' to classroom teaching. 
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The seventh feature of the Bowles/Gintis model which Brighouse favours is 
the use of increased competition among schools to attract parents, together with a 
"national certification of competencies". This latter, he argues, would insulate the 
system from the influence of those individual schools emphasising teacher-graded 
work in order to inflate the grades of their pupils (Brighouse, 2000, p. 187 ). In this 
section I hope to have shown that the model of Bowles and Gintis, which Brighouse 
favours, has market relations within it and could support the marketization of school 
provision if the political will existed to enable such a possibility. 
2.6 Comparison of the relations in the market model of Brighouse with 
the relations in the market model of Tooley . 
In this section I explore an interesting article by Tooley entitled "Why 
Harry Brighouse is Nearly Right about Privatization, " in which Tooley argues that 
Brighouse's work contains " the seeds of a defence of the privatization of 
schooling. " Tooley argues that this is so because Brighouse both allows "for a 
considerable degree of choice" and favours "features relating to privatization", as 
defined by Tooley (Tooley, 2003, pp. 429,445 ). 
In his article, Tooley notes that Brighouse recognises as strengths the 
efficiency, diversity and the profit motive of markets. On the question of efficiency, 
Tooley quotes Brighouse as arguing: 
Inefficiency is wasteful, and waste is bad, because it constitutes 
opportunity cost. If we could get exactly the same results under Plan 
A costing $100 as under Plan B costing $150, we are morally bound to 
choose plan A, since that will free up resources for expenditure on 
other socially valuable projects. If the same level of educational 
achievement as the status quo achieves could be achieved at half the 
cost under some set of reforms, thus freeing up resources for (other) 
expenditure... . then these reforms should 
be pursued ( Tooley, 2003, p. 
441, mainly quoting Brighouse, 2000, p. 31 ). 
Tooley also notes that Brighouse argues in favour of diversity in a manner which 
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shadows the argument that competition promotes innovation (Tooley, 2003, pp. 
442-3, quoting Brighouse, 2000, p. 31 ). 
Tooley notes that these arguments "seem to contain the kernel" of his 2000 
proposal outlined in Reclaiming Education (Tooley, 2003, p. 440 ), and correctly 
notes that Brighouse's model has three main features which would lead in the 
direction of privatization. Firstly, Brighouse's model would increase the number 
of pupils' funded places outside the state sector (Tooley, 2003, p. 429 ). Secondly, 
Brighouse's model would increase the amount of private funding within schooling 
and, thirdly, Tooley notes that Brighouse refers favourably to choice-mechanisms in 
the USA which involve schools that are privately provided and have a reduced 
regulatory "burden, " and so "have the features of privatization " (Tooley, 2003, p. 
429 ). As a consequence Tooley concludes that " Brighouse seems close to 
recognising the virtues of privatisation and the private alternative, even while 
ostensibly preparing a critique of educational choice...... " (Tooley, 2003, p. 440). 
Brighouse answered Tooley's arguments in his article "What's Wrong 
With Privatising Schools? "( Brighouse, 2004 [a]). Brighouse stated that, while he 
was not going to argue that full privatization is never wrong (Brighouse, 2004 [a], p. 
618) 5, his objections to full privatization of school provision come from his 
concept of social justice. 
Brighouse's concept of social justice has been outlined in Section 2.5.2 
of this chapter. Brighouse argues that the conditions (he does not mention social 
relations) needed for an adequate education cannot be guaranteed unless the 
state "is the ultimate guarantor of justice" (Brighouse, 2004[a], p. 618 ). 
s Full privatization is defined by Brighouse as complete withdrawal of the state from any role in 
funding, regulation or provision of education (Brighouse, 2004 [a], p. 617). 
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Brighouse aspires to a regulated market in schools6 but recognises certain 
problems with effective regulation are present in capitalist society ( Brighouse, 
2004[b], p. 19). Brighouse concludes that he could not agree with full privatization 
because this type of privatization would not allow for a sufficient amount of 
government regulation so as to ensure a good quality form of schooling 
(Brighouse, 2004 [a], p. 630 ). 
2.7 Inability of a regulated market to ensure quality provision. 
Next I intend to show that private education businesses do not necessarily 
provide a better service than the public sector, even if they are regulated. For 
example, in Southwark, a contract with the engineering firm W. S. Atkins was 
terminated two years early because a majority of headteachers were unhappy with 
the firm's performance and had refused to publicly support the firm's actions. In 
March 2003 Atkins announced it was terminating its contract with Southwark but 
did not have to pay termination costs because the contract was `weighted in its 
favour'. Rather than place Southwark's school management under government 
control, New Labour contracted it to another firm - Cambridge Education Associates 
(CEA), a subsidiary of Mott MacDonald, an engineering firm. However, CEA 
had a questionable track-record. In the same year, 2000, when Islington schools 
were taken over by CEA, the latter was fined by Islington council for failing 
to meet targets in five areas including failure to set up a complaints procedure, 
identifying systems to support schools in special measures and monitoring school 
budgets ( Patfield, 2000 ). In addition, the Ofsted report of 25 March 2001 stated 
that the CEA's targets in English were nine per cent lower than those set by the 
education authority in primary schools and five per cent below those set by the 
6 Tooley would agree to light regulation if it is needed to enable markets to operate smoothly. However, 
he would not agree to the specific form of regulation which Brighouse is arguing for (Tooley, 2000, p. 
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authority for GCSEs ( Inspection of Islington Local Education Authority, Ofsted, 
2001, paragraph 76 ). In 2003 Islington CEA had to forgo £518,645 of its annual 
management fee because of the lack of progress in primary schools and for failing to 
improve the percentage of pupils gaining five or more good GCSE's. Islington CEA 
missed seven out of eleven strategic targets and fell short of five out of 
twenty nine operational targets (Smithers, 2003, p. 5 ). 
A similar trend was to be found in Bradford where Serco, another 
engineering firm, failed to meet its targets. In 2003 Serco was allowed to re- 
negotiate its targets downwards rather than be fined. A similar situation occurred in 
2000 when New Labour was trying to establish EAZs (Section 1.3). I therefore 
contend that government regulation does not necessarily ensure that schooling is of a 
good quality, and cannot necessarily enable Brighouse's concept of justice. Next I 
consider the oppositional principles which John McMurtry argues are necessarily 
present between markets and education, regardless of whether or not the market is 
regulated. 
2.8 Oppositional principles and relations within a market system. 
In his article "Education and the Market Model" (1991), John McMurtry 
indicates why the aims of markets and education contain oppositional principles. 
Firstly, McMurtry points out that "the goal of commercial agents in the market place 
is to maximise private money profits" while "the over-riding goal of educational 
agents in schools is to advance and disseminate shared knowledge" (McMurtry, 1991, 
p. 211). Secondly, McMurtry maintains that "the determining motivation of the 
market is to satisfy the wants of whoever has money to purchase the goods that are 
wanted" while "the determining motivation of education is to develop a sound 
161). 
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understanding", that is, regardless of one's purchasing ability (McMurtry, 1991, p. 
212). Thirdly, McMurtry shows that there are differences between the methods 
employed in the market and education: 
The market by definition can only satisfy the motivations of those who 
have the money to buy the products it sells. The place of education, on 
the other hand, remains a place of education only in so far as it 
educates those whose motivation is to learn, independent of the 
money-demand they exercise in their learning (McMurtry, 1991, p. 
212, GT 's italics ). 
Fourthly, McMurtry notes that there are opposing standards of excellence and 
achievement in the market and in education: 
The measures of excellence in the market are: 1) how well a product- 
line is made to sell; and (2) how problem-free the product is and 
remains for its buyers. The measures of excellence in education are 
(i) how disinterested and impartial its representations are; and (ii) how 
deep and broad the problems it poses are to the one who has it 
(McMurtry, 1991, p. 213 ). 
Everything available in the market is acquired by being able to exercise effective 
demand, that is, to be able to pay for it. In markets for schooling only the means to 
achieve schooling can be bought. The ability to pay for schooling does not mean that 
education will necessarily take place. Education requires the active participation on 
the part of the student; the development of one's powers and capacities cannot come 
about through someone else's activity so , therefore, cannot 
be purchased as a 
commodity. 
McMurtry, correctly, in my view, concludes that these oppositional principles 
undermine the aims of education, arguing : 
.... the demand that the one 
[education ] operate in terms of the 
other's [the market's ] opposed requirements, as has been increasingly 
demanded of the educational process, implies the negation of 
education as such (McMurtry, 1991, p. 216 ). 
McMurtry's discussion of the oppositional principles found in a market in 
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`education' gives a further illustration of why market regulation alone cannot ensure 
quality of education. However, it is important to note that McMurtry's argument in 
his article "Education and the Market Model " (1991) rests on logical principles 
and external relations and, as such, gives only an abstract analysis of the social 
relations between markets and education. Consequentially, it does not adequately 
examine the social processes involved in marketization. 
I maintain that it is as a result of an ontology based mainly on external relations 
that Brighouse argues, in School Choice and Social Justice (2000), that 
commodification is not objectionable (Brighouse, 2000, p. 48). Ignoring 
ontological interrelations, Brighouse, takes an ethical position arguing that it is not 
wrong to buy or sell schooling. In doing so, he makes reference to two types of 
market: firstly, the market in school provision and, secondly, the market in labour 
power (Brighouse, 2000, pp. 49-50 ). Referring to teaching as a job, he argues that, 
as a matter of justice, teaching is a job which should be paid for in monetary terms so 
that society can obtain good teachers. There is, of course, `a sleight of hand' in this 
argument: what Brighouse is arguing for here is the need for the commodification of 
labour in a society where labour- power is only supplied as a result of monetary 
payment. It is a kind of tautology: teaching is a commodity in a system where 
teaching is a commodity. 
I argue that commodification is more than choice: it is the exchange of a 
good or service for exchange value, rather than the organization of production for 
human need. It is giving access to schooling only in exchange for exchange value, 
and is the necessary result of marketization. Likewise, in the case of labour power, 
the value of the teacher's labour predominantly is reduced to exchange value (for 
which the owner of the school pays) and not to the human use, which it addresses 
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in enriching the lives of pupils. (This process, with the consequential estrangement 
of pupils, is described in more detail in Chapter Five). 
Despite his stance on markets, in his article "Channel One, the Anti-Commercial 
Principle and the Discontinuous Ethos" ( Brighouse, 2005) Brighouse voices some 
concerns about the market in commodities concerned with the provision of 
information, namely, television programmes and text books. Brighouse argues that 
the commercialization involved undermines the school's capacity to deliver its 
mission, since commercial interests control what information pupils do have and how 
it is presented (Brighouse, 2005, p. 542 ). Brighouse particularly cites the use of 
the television programme Channel One in schools in America. The firm Primedia 
freely installed televisions and videos without charge in schools, in return for the 
schools' ensuring that pupils watched a daily 12-minute Channel One news 
broadcast which was accompanied by advertisements for `teen products' . The 
question has to be asked: how could Brighouse believe that such commercialization 
could be prevented within a political and economic system that supports the 
marketization of schools and schooling? 
In conclusion: In this chapter I have considered two different market 
models in school provision and schooling, one regulated and one unregulated. 
I have supported the argument of Tooley that the regulated model of Brighouse has 
`the seeds of privatization in it; ' and in addition shown that, although Brighouse's 
model of a regulated market would modify some of the worst excesses of the market, 
it does not necessarily ensure a good quality of schooling for all or necessarily 
prevent the oppositional relations which can distort the educational processes 
between the human needs of pupils and the needs of others who control schools. 
In this chapter I contend that Brighouse's conclusion is wrong where he says 
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that the results of social changes are merely speculative, and that Brighouse draws 
this conclusion because his ontology is based on external relations, which are 
contingent and arbitrary. I contend that Brighouse fails to appreciate that, 
when the internal relations in an entity change, that entity's appearance and / or 
function necessarily changes, and that the results of changes in relations are not 
speculative but prefigurative of future social relations. I maintain that, 
consequently, Brighouse fails to appreciate that when market reforms are introduced 
into schools and schooling the function of the school necessarily changes. I 
maintain that, under these circumstances, even a regulated market will not 
necessarily prefigure the conditions and relations which enable the possibility of 
an education mainly addressing the human needs of pupils which, in Brighouse's 
terms, should be an "autonomy-facilitating" education. 
An explanation of how the marketization necessarily results in alienating 
relations is given in Chapter Four, together with a discussion of why some liberal 
philosophers of education, such as Brighouse, have omitted to recognised the 
oppositional influence which alienating relations necessarily have on the process of 
education including the way in which marketization of schooling reduces the 
possibility of leading a life that is endorsed from "the inside", in accordance with 
our beliefs about what gives value to our lives (Brighouse, 2000, pp. 37,69 ). 
The next part of this thesis charts how alienating relations increased as a 
result of the development of market relations in England from the seventeenth to 
the nineteenth century, and considers the main ideological responses to these 
changes. The next chapter also analyzes how these changes, and their major 
ideological interpretations, have influenced Marx's analysis of alienation. 
78 
Part Two: The ideological context of the problem 
Chapter Three 
The historical and philosophical roots of market relations and alienation. 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the ideological context within which the development of the 
labour market took place, and gives a brief description of the main philosophical ideas 
and social relations, antecedent to Marx, which both influence him and against which 
he reacts. In particular, this chapter explores the influence of the ideas of Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679), Adam Smith (1723-1790), Georg Friederich Hegel (1770-1831) 
and Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872). 
This chapter begins by considering the historical roots of the market and of the 
ideological support that Hobbes' concept of abstract and possessive individualism gives 
to the development of markets in the seventeenth century. This chapter then shows the 
similarity between the abstract ontology of Hobbes and the ontology used by some 
modern philosophers both from libertarian positions and also from the so-called `left of 
centre. ' This chapter also explores Smith's description of alienation and shows why 
this description is a springboard for the analysis of the roots of alienation which 
Marx gives in his early writings (R. Lamb, 1973, p. 285). Finally, this chapter 
considers how Hegel and Feuerbach both support a concept of alienation which 
influences Marx, and against which he also reacts. 
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3.1 The historical roots of markets and their alienating relations. 
After the English Civil War, the main users of markets in consumer and capital 
goods were merchants and landowners. When Thomas Hobbes refers to individuals he is 
referring almost exclusively to merchants and "people of property", so not to all 
individuals (Macpherson, 1962, p. 64). Not surprisingly, working people and their 
communities were not included by Hobbes in his market model or in his theory of the 
social contract. (Indeed it was not until the late eighteenth century that working people 
were included in market models as consumers. ) 
Hobbes' ideas must be seen in their historical context of the abolition of feudalism 
de jure in England and its gradual de facto abolition as a result of industrialization. 
Prior to industrialization the majority of working people lived in rural communities. Most 
people were too poor to afford consumer goods and obtained the goods and services they 
needed from their communities. Within these communities social individuals often 
depended for their survival on a mass of social connexions. Although the bulk of 
production and appropriation was carried out individually, local bonds of solidarity were 
re-inforced through the use of communal land, the sharing of produce and through 
social traditions about ownership of land. 
Because transport was expensive, the vast majority of working people stayed in their 
localities all their lives and rarely went further than neighbouring villages: as a 
consequence, there was hardly any change in the social relations in these communities. 
Most of these had relatively static feudal structures in which individuals were defined as 
particular members of the community according to their objective relations with the 
conditions of production which in the case of these communities was, of course, land. 
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Marx analyzed feudal communities, and noted that the serf (still legal in England in 
early Tudor times) was merely regarded as being one of the natural, "objective 
conditions of production" (Marx, 1973[a], p. 500). In all these rural, pre-capitalist 
communities the productive activity of working people was divided between 
assigned functions, which social individuals then looked upon as `natural': 
natural presuppositions, natural conditions of the producer's existence just 
as his living body, even though he reproduces and develops it, is originally 
not posited by himself, but appears as the presupposition of his self 
(Marx, 1973[a], pp. 489-90, original italics). 
Marx also notes that, although the serf is estranged from his productive activity, he 
does not "alienate" (sell) his labour to an employer and therefore his estrangement is not a 
result of alienation (when alienation is defined as verausserung [selling]). Interestingly, 
Marx notes that these conditions and relations are similar to those which occur in the case 
of slavery. In the case of the slave there is a form of estrangement, and, like the serf, the 
slave's estrangement does not arise from alienating (selling his labour) to his over-lord. 
The slave cannot sell (alienate) his labour-power because his owner has the right, 
within a slave society, to dispose of the slave as he wishes. Although the slave is a 
commodity, which can be bought and sold, the slave can not sell (alienate) his labour- 
power (Marx, 1967, p. 21) because the slave, together with his labour-power, is sold 
totally to his owner. 
By the mid-seventeenth century (in Hobbes's time) the growth of the enclosure 
movement in England resulted in many agricultural workers being deposed from `their' 
land. As a consequence many working people were forced to sell their labour-power and, 
as a consequence, a market in labour-power began to develop. C. B. Macpherson in his 
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book The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1962) notes that, by the mid- 
seventeenth century, "very nearly half the men were full-time wage-earners; if the 
cottagers are counted as part-time wage-earners the proportion is over two-thirds" 
(Macpherson, 1962, p. 61)' . 
The resulting increase in individual appropriation and the possibility to create surplus 
value, which could be traded, resulted in the growth of markets and in social 
individuals confronting each other as competitors. By the mid-seventeenth century 
many merchants, landowners, artisans and market traders had become increasingly 
influenced by the ideology that each property owner was "so much a master of 
whatsoever he possessed, that it could not be taken from him upon any pretence of 
common safety without his consent" (Hobbes, Behemoth, written 1668, [ed. ] Tonnies, 
1990, p. 2). C. B. Macpherson calls this concept "possessive individualism" and 
describes its consequences in the following way: 
the relation of ownership, having become for more and more men the 
critically important relation determining their actual freedom and actual 
prospect of realizing their full potentialities, was read back into the nature 
of the individual (C. B. Macpherson, 1962, p. 3). 
This market activity supported the material functionality of competitiveness and 
acquisitiveness: precisely those dispositions which Hobbes, from his materialist point of 
view, mistakenly argues to be natural to the identity of the individual rather than 
being the result of human activity within structural relations. The interrelationship 
between objective structures and the acquisition of dispositions is discussed in more detail 
in Sections 4.1 and 9.4.2. 
'Macpherson seeks support for this from J. H. Clapham's A Concise Economic History of Britain: from the 
Earliest Times to 1750 ( Clapham, 1949, pp. 212-3). 
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By the mid-eighteenth century, the increased enclosure of land had forced more 
workers to sell their labour directly to employers and to migrate to the towns in search of 
the means to make a living. As a consequence of this movement of population, there was 
an increase in demand for food by urban populations, which encouraged many land 
owners, in order to increase supply, to experiment with new farming techniques and 
new forms of agricultural organization. As a result of these new farming techniques, an 
increasing number of landowners converted strips of common land into larger private 
holdings. 
Before 1780, many rural workers and their families engaged in the production of 
cloth from home in order to supplement their income. E. P. Thompson in The Making of 
the English Working Class (1968) gives a graphic description of the family life of 
weavers at the time: 
The young children winding bobbins, older children watching for faults, 
picking over the cloth, or helping to throw the shuttle in the broad-loom; 
adolescents working a second or third loom; the wife taking a turn at 
weaving in and among her domestic employments (Thompson, 1968, p. 
339). 
In his book, Thompson notes that there were three main kinds of "weaver-employer 
relationships" at this time. Thompson firstly considers the ".. `customer-weaver' ...... 
who lived in independent status in a village or small town, much like a master-tailor, 
making up orders for customers" (Thompson, 1968, p. 298, GT's italics). Thompson 
describes this weaver as having " the status of superior artisan, self-employed, and 
working by the piece for a choice of masters" (Thompson, 1968, p. 299). The skill 
involved in this work together with the means of production would have often been 
handed down through families, together with the means of production. This weaver would 
83 
have been able to afford to renew and modernise the means of production, through the 
income he could command as a master craftsman. Moreover as a proprietor of land he 
could provide himself and his family with food and as a skilled weaver he could make the 
clothes his family needed. As a consequence labour could still be "half-artistic, half end- 
in-itself. " Although this might seem to be a very idyllic life-style, such social individuals 
would not be able to fully exercise choice because they would be subordinated to 
prescriptive definitions of their activities. Consequently, the development of their 
abilities would still be very narrow and they would not be able to become fully 
developed social individuals (Marx, 1973[a], p. 497). 
Thompson's second category of weaver is the "journeyman weaver. " The 
"journeyman weaver" worked either in the shop of the master-clothier, or "more 
commonly, " in his own home. Thompson illustrates the nature of this work as follows: 
On the credit side, the journeyman considered himself to be a `clothier' 
rather than a mere weaver; his work was varied, much of it in the loom, 
but some of it out and about; he had some hope of obtaining credit to buy 
wool and of becoming a small master on his own account. If he worked in 
his own home, rather than the master's workshop, he was subject to no 
work-discipline except that of his own making (E. P. Thompson, 1968, 
p. 302). 
The "journeyman weaver" owned his own loom and worked for a single master 
who was usually a miller or a `putter-out. ' This category of weaver had less control 
over the conditions of his productive activity than the first category of weaver because 
he worked directly for an employer. As a consequence of this relationship, this 
category of weaver had to provide the type and amount of cloth that the master 
required and produce the finished product within a certain time-span. As with the 
"customer-weaver, " this work would have appeared alien and hostile to the weaver to 
84 
the degree to which he lost control over his activity. 
Finally, Thompson lists the "small-holder weaver, " who produced cloth part-time 
because of the need to subsidise his main income from farming. The small-holder 
weavers had a fairly varied week 2. As with the journeyman-weaver, all these activities 
were done by the small-holder weaver because he had to make a living. As a 
consequence he would have been constrained from taking part in activities he would 
have otherwise preferred. This small-holder weaver might have found his work 
meaningful but this would be have been a contingent, rather than necessary, result of 
the social relations and conditions within which he worked. 
Increased mechanisation of weaving took place after 1730, when John Kay 
invented `the flying shuttle'. The flying shuttle enabled one person to handle a wider 
loom and therefore to increase productivity, enabling cotton to be provided more 
cheaply. However, cotton production continued to take place mainly in workers' 
homes until the 1780's when the power loom was invented. The power loom was 
essentially a factory machine; it was too large to fit into people's homes and was too 
expensive for the average person to buy. As a consequence, more weavers and spinners 
had to work directly for employers in workshops or factories (Smith, 1976, Bk. I, p. 74). 
Marx notes that, in many cases, weaving workshops had as many as 200 workers. 
As a result of working directly for an employer, weavers lost substantial control 
over the conditions of their productive activity and as a result the alienating relations 
involved in their work increased. Unlike R. Blauner (Blauner, 1964), I am not 
contending that the root of estrangement lies intrinsically in the mechanisation of 
2 E. P. Thompson (Thompson, 1968, p. 338), quoting from T. W. Hanson (1916) Diary of a Grandfather, 
translated by Halifax Antiquities Society, publisher unknown. 
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work, but rather in the lack of control that the worker has over the conditions of his 
productive activity as a result of the need to sell (or alienate) labour-power. Chapter Four 
gives a Marxian explanation of these alienating relations and Chapter Five argues that 
the structural relations and the causes of alienation are the same today as in Marx's 
time, although the content of these relations is different. 
The following sections of the present chapter consider the ideological context 
which gives support to the historical development of market relations outlined in this 
section. This exploration begins with the seventeenth century and the Hobbesian 
concept of abstract and "possessive individualism". This concept, supported by the 
market relations which were developing in the seventeenth century, was a dominant 
concept when Marx was writing his "Manuscripts" (Section 4.4.1). 
3.2 Thomas Hobbes' concept of abstract and "possessive individualism" and its 
consequences for alienating relations. 
Hobbes is influenced by the materialist ideas of his time and bases his theory of 
human nature on psychological propositions. Hobbes defines a person as "he, whose 
words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions 
of another man" (Hobbes, 1996, p. 106). For Hobbes, the self exists prior to, and is 
independent of, the ends, aims and values it holds and the social relations into which it 
enters. For Hobbes possession is a function of freedom and is "found in the 
conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or 
capacities owing nothing to society for them" (Macpherson, 1962, p. 3 ). 
Hobbes also includes, in his concept of human nature, the psychological 
assumption that individuals wish 
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to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the 
voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the 
procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life (Hobbes, 1996, p. 
66, GT's italics). 
Hobbes' concepts of both human nature and freedom result in a perception of 
individuals who relate to each other only as proprietors of their own capacities and of 
what they acquire by their exercise of these capacities. For Hobbes, the social relations 
between individuals are external and, as such, contingent. Consequentially, in Hobbes' 
model of society, individuals are not perceived as an integral part of a larger social 
whole, and the range of possible social relations and activity open to individuals is 
not prefigured by existing social relations. 
As a result of his experiences of the Civil War, Hobbes infers that, in 
particular, the fear of scarcity gives rise to competition for "riches, honour, 
command, or other power", and this competition inclines " men" to "kill, subdue, 
supplant or repel the other " (Hobbes, 1966, p. 66). However, because of an ontology 
based on external, contingent relations, Hobbes fails to grasp how the necessary 
connections between private property relations, greed, exchange and competition, value 
and the devaluation of "man", all necessarily result in estrangement and, possibly, war. 
In Section 9.1 1 argue that scarcity is not necessarily a permanent condition and 
so, within the objective structural relations which support the creation of abundance, 
the normal psychological state would not be that of supporting individual acquisition. I 
argue that this is because the structural relations supporting abundance would be 
sufficient to discourage individuals from hoarding goods and wealth. If, within the 
objective conditions which support the creation of abundance, social individuals do not 
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feel economically secure all the time, this would be because of contingent circumstances 
and not as a result of the objective structural relations in society. 
Hobbes does not rely on religious ideas and structures to maintain social cohesion: 
instead he relies on a strong government to keep social order. Hobbes contends 
that such a government could be legitimised through a social contract: 
when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly 
of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all 
others. This latter, may be called a political commonwealth, or 
commonwealth by institution (Hobbes, 1996, p. 115 ). 
Hobbes argues that once such an agreement is made and a Commonwealth or 
Monarchy is initiated, then an absolute contract is made, giving sovereignty to the 
Monarch (Hobbes, 1966, p. 115 ). It is non-absolute contracts, in which the worker 
sells his labour power, that are more relevant to the conditions of capitalism. In Hobbes' 
theory, the individual signs away his rights to control over the product which he makes 
and the conditions of his productive activity (Hobbes, 1996, p. 87 ). Within these social 
relations, the worker has little power over the conditions of his productive activity 
because he needs access to the means of production, which the capitalist owns, in order 
to be able to make a living. In Hobbes' model, allowing workers to have a say in 
conditions of work is still contingent upon the will of the employer. Therefore, although 
such contracts give workers some rights, they do not necessarily remove the alienating 
relations which give rise to estrangement. Hobbes argues that the alienating 
relations to which workers are subjected do not necessarily oppose the relations 
needed for the good life because he was writing only about the elite in society and 
such people were sufficiently wealthy to realize their preferences. 
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3.3 The concept of abstract individualism in some twentieth-century philosophers. 
There are modern philosophers both from libertarian positions, and from the so-called 
`left of centre', who also employ the abstract ontology supported by Hobbes. Their 
arguments, with specific reference to alienation, are outlined in Section 4.9. A familiar 
case from the libertarian position is that of Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia 
(1974). In this book Nozick argues that individuals give meaning to their lives only 
when each is able to make choices "on the basis of abstract principles or considerations 
it formulates to itself' (Nozick, 1974, p. 50 ). This contention is based on an abstract 
conception that the individual is a sovereign agent who rationally chooses his own 
ends and seeks to possess, rather than to discover, them (Nozick, 1974, pp. 49-51 ). 
Nozick's concept of meaningful activity is supported by two main moral 
conclusions. Firstly, Nozick says that individuals must be regarded as ends and not means 
and, as such, they may not be sacrificed for others' ends without their own consent. 
Secondly, Nozick maintains that because "I am mine" I have the right to act in 
accordance with my own choices, unless these choices infringe the equal right of others 
to liberty. Asa consequence, Nozick concludes that individuals should be able to 
choose alienated work if it is their preference. This argument is analyzed in Section 4.9. 
Less obviously, I would argue that Brighouse's arguments for markets in school 
provision (see Chapter Two) also rest on an ontology of abstract individualism (cf. 
Nozick, 1974, p. 48; Brighouse, 2000, p. 12 ). However, it is noted that the political 
conclusions of Nozick and Brighouse are different. The main political difference 
centres on the role of the state. Nozick argues that the only role of the state is to protect 
the rights needed to conserve liberty: liberty here being lack of interference by the state 
89 
or other individuals. For Nozick, the main rights which protect liberty are: 
1) Each individual, so long as he does not violate the same rights of others, 
has the right not to be killed or assaulted; and 
2) Each individual has the right not to have his own property illegitimately 
taken, or the use of it limited (Nozick, 1974, p. 10). 
Nozick contends that in a free society there can be "no central distribution, no person 
or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled 
out" (Nozick, 1974, p. 235, original italics) - even if it has been decided democratically 
that this should be the case. Nozick contends that there is no role for a state in 
administering welfare services and education. Nozick notes that provision of these 
services would involve raising revenue through taxation, and maintains that this would 
violate the right to hold property because it would force some to help others and would, 
therefore, be a form of robbery. Instead, Nozick relies solely on a free market to allocate 
and distribute resources, believing that this would be the result of individuals making 
rational choices. Nozick favours this process in place of redistribution because he 
contends that, in allowing the exercise of negative liberty, the state does not violate 
individual rights. 
Rational choice is also a fundamental dimension of Brighouse's concept of justice 
(see Section 2.5.2). However, Brighouse contends that: 
from the point of view of justice it is not good enough that an individual's 
rights never happen to be violated: it is essential that we establish 
institutional forms which assure individuals that they can make and 
execute their life plans without fear of rights violation (Brighouse, 
2000, p. 162, original italics ). 
As was noted in Section 2.6, for Brighouse it is the state that is the "guarantor of 
justice" (Brighouse, 2004[a], p. 618) using a regulated market, as described in 
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Section 2.5, to ensure that each individual has significant opportunities to "live a life 
which is good for them" (Brighouse, 2000, pp. 37,68-9). Section 2.7 points out the 
reasons why a regulated market cannot necessarily support the conditions and social 
relations needed to ensure that individuals can execute their life plans, and therefore 
why regulated markets cannot necessarily enable Brighouse's concept of justice. 
Section 4.9 argues that, within an ontology based on social relations such as 
that supported by Nozick and Brighouse, social relations are contingent and therefore 
cannot necessarily be prefigurative of specific social relations such as those necessary 
for the `good life' in the model of Brighouse. In contrast, this thesis notes that, within an 
ontology based on internal relations the range of all possible developments is necessary, 
that is, each actual development has to have been inherent in the relevant social 
relations. 
The next section explores the ontology of Adam Smith (who has been cited by 
both Hayek and Margaret Thatcher as being the father of classical economics). 
Unlike Hobbes, Smith supports an ontology in which the social whole is more than the 
mere sum of its parts, because the whole comprises social relations which are interrelated 
to each other. The prominence of Hayek (who also used an ontology based on an 
interrelated whole [see Section 2.3.1]) and of Smith in market theory indicates that 
political ideas which support the market do not have to be based on an abstract, 
rationalist, ontology such as that supported by both Nozick and Brighouse. 
3.4 Adam Smith's ontology of the social individual. 
Smith's ontology is an amalgam of the Stoic interpretation of natural law 
theory and of medieval Christian thought, and is similar to that adopted by the pre- 
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capitalist rural communities described in Section 3.1. Stoicism is based on an ontology in 
which the individual "is a part, but practically an insignificant part, of a whole " (W. 
Watt, 1904, p. 204; Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments [ first published in 1759 ], 1984, 
pp. 140,275 ), the significant part of the whole being the Divine Being. Smith called 
the Divine Being "the Great Conductor and the Watchmaker" (Smith, 1984, pp. 87, 
166,236-7,274) or at other times Divine Providence or the Great Designer. 
For Smith, the Divine Being is an impersonal first cause and as such does not have 
personal contact with mankind. For Smith, this Deity mechanistically attempts to 
direct the affairs of men, including economic affairs, (Smith, 1984, pp. 235-6,276-7, 
289-290; Smith, 1976, Bk. IV, p. 477) in order to maximise happiness for individuals 
(Smith, 1984, pp. 235-6 ). 
It has been convincingly argued that Smith regarded the Great Designer as the same 
`invisible hand' which Smith argues influences the workings of the market 
(Raphael and Macfie, 1984, p. 8; A. Dennis, 2005, p. 2; Smith, 1984, p. 185; 1976, Bk. 
IV, p. 477). In this Deistic view, Smith relegates the structures made by "Man" to be of 
secondary importance to those informed by God: 
The administration of the great system of the universe, however, the care 
of the universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the 
business of God not man. To man is allotted a much humbler department, 
but one much more suitable to the weakness of his powers, and to the 
narrowness of his comprehension; the care of his own happiness, of that of 
his family, his friends, his country.. . (Smith, 1984, p. 
237) . 
In Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith refers to the "union of mankind" ( Smith, 
1984, p. 88) and maintains that it is composed of "connexions and dependencies of 
things" (Smith, 1984, pp. 227,236,275-6,290,293). As has been noted above, for 
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Smith, the organic link between the parts of the whole and the individuals is ultimately 
sustained by the activity of the Divine Being rather than solely through the activities 
and thoughts of social individuals within internal relations, as it is in Marx (Sections 
2.3.2 and 4.2). As a consequence, the interrelationships in Smith's model are more 
mechanistic and less volitional than those in Marx (see Section 4.2). 
It is a relation with the Deity which is of primary importance for Smith, and not 
objective conditions and social relations. Smith emphasises the need to develop belief in 
God and his commandments, particularly the commandment to love one another (Smith, 
1984, pp. 235-6) in order for society to flourish and be "happy": 
It is thus that man, who can subsist only in society, was fitted by nature to 
that situation for which he was made. All the members of human society 
stand in need of each others [sic] assistance, and are likewise exposed to 
mutual injuries. Where the necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded 
from love, from gratitude, from friendship, and esteem, the society 
flourishes and is happy (Smith, 1984, p. 85). 
For Smith, the role of science and rationality is mainly to discover the working of 
the Deity, or Providence, in nature and society; and to use this knowledge to inform the 
individual's perceptions of right and wrong. For Smith, the first perceptions upon which 
the rules of society are founded are the individual's sense and feeling: 
But reason cannot render any particular object either agreeable or 
disagreeable to the mind for its own sake. Reason may show that this 
object is the means of obtaining some other which is naturally either 
pleasing or displeasing and in this manner may render it either agreeable 
or disagreeable for the sake of something else, which is not rendered such 
by immediate sense and feeling (Smith, 1984, p. 320 ). 
For Smith, individuals are social only to the extent that they are capable of 
"sympathy", and "other generous and disinterested motives" (Smith, 1984, p. 86). 
Smith defines sympathy as "the sharing of any feeling" (Smith, 1984, p. 13). For Smith, 
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when the faculty of sympathy is destroyed, individuals become isolated and estranged 
(Smith, 1984, p. 86). 
Unlike Hobbes, Smith does not believe that all individuals are driven mainly by 
self-interest. As a result of being convinced of the ideas of Christianity and Stoicism, 
Smith concludes that individuals are essentially good ( Smith, 1984, pp. 236,315, 
318) and that human nature is something susceptible to the influence of "that great, 
benevolent and all-wise-Being who directs all the movements of nature" (Smith, 1984, 
p. 235, GT's italics). 
In Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argues that the source of "misery and disorders 
of human life" comes from "over-rating the difference between one permanent situation 
and another " (Smith, 1984, p. 149 ). As examples of negative dispositions Smith cites 
avarice, which "over-rates the difference between poverty and riches"; ambition, which 
over-rates the difference " between a private and a public station"; and vain-glory, 
which over-rates the difference between "obscurity and extensive reputation" (Smith, 
1984, p. 149 ). For Smith: 
the wise and virtuous man is at all times willing that his own private 
interests ... should be sacrificed to the greater 
interest of the universe, to 
the interest of that great society of all sensible and intelligent beings, of 
which God himself is the immediate administrator and director (Smith, 
1984, p. 235 ). 
For Smith, the prudent individual "... is not a bustler in business where he has no 
concern; is not a meddler in other people's affairs; is not a professed counsellor or 
advisor, who obtrudes his advice where nobody is asking it" because "in the bottom of 
his heart he would prefer the undisturbed enjoyment of secure tranquillity" (Smith, 
1984, pp. 215-6 ). 
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Although Smith notes that prudence is "regarded as a most respectable and even, 
in some degree, as an amiable and agreeable quality" it is not for him " either of the 
most enduring, or of the most ennobling of virtues" (Smith, 1984, p. 216 ). For Smith, 
the most ennobling virtue is universal benevolence. Smith argues that prudence should 
be combined with other virtues, and that benevolence is the most important virtue 
(Smith, 1984, pp. 235-7 ). This contention would seem to be contrary to the appeal to 
self-interest which Smith is believed to have made in Wealth of Nations. The next 
section shows that this apparent appeal to self-interest is not as fundamental to Smith's 
philosophy as is commonly assumed. 
3.5 The relationship between Theory of Moral Sentiments and An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (usually known as 
The Wealth of Nations and first published in 1776) is a treatise written about market 
activity within a capitalist society. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith argues that 
capitalist activity is needed to produce what are regarded as the necessities for all walks 
of life: 
Among civilised and thriving nations........ though a great number of 
people do not labour at all, many of whom consume the produce of ten 
times, frequently of a hundred times more labour than the greater part of 
those who do work; yet the produce of the whole labour of the society is 
so great, that all are often abundantly supplied, and a workman, even of 
the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and industrious, may enjoy a 
greater share of the necessities and conveniences of life than it is possible 
for any savage to acquire ( Smith, Introduction, 1976, p. 2 ). 
However, Smith notes that a market economy subsists from "a sense of utility, 
without any mutual love or affection"; and " no man in it should owe any obligation, or 
be bound in gratitude to any other" ( Smith, 1984, p. 86, GT's italics ). Smith notes that 
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self-interest is the dominant disposition within a market economy, and so he 
deduces that in a market economy it is "in vain" to expect help by appealing solely to 
benevolent dispositions, which he defines as pleasant feelings which come from the 
exercise of benevolence (Smith, Bk. I, 1976, p. 18). 
Although Smith argues that the capitalist system is necessary to produce the wealth 
needed for the standard of living which most people find acceptable, he is contemptuous 
of the acquisition of wealth, which he calls "contemptible and trifling " (Smith, 1984, p. 
183 ): 
We naturally confound it [wealth] in our imagination with the order, the 
regular harmonious movement of the system, the machine or oeconomy 
[sic] by means of which it is produced. The pleasures of wealth and 
greatness, when considered in this complex view, strike the imagination as 
something grand and beautiful and noble, of which the attainment is well 
worth all the toil and anxiety which we are so apt to bestow on it (Smith, 
1984, p. 183, GT's italics). 
Smith maintains that, within capitalism, one's imagination rarely regards wealth in 
the abstract and philosophical way which, he argues, is necessary in order to perceive 
its real nature. Smith notes that this " deception" is important to capitalism because it 
"rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind" (Smith, 1984, p. 183). 
To recapitulate, for Smith, the ideal state for social individuals is the state of 
tranquillity (Smith, 1984, pp. 149,216) which, Smith argues, is attained by living 
according to the commandments of God (Smith, 1984, p. 235 ). 
On the basis of this assertion by Smith, I dispute two aspects of Tooley's argument 
found in his article "From Adam Swift to Adam Smith" (Tooley, 2007). Firstly, I 
dispute Tooley's contention that the social "propensities" which Smith regards as 
most desirable are those that "promote successful capitalist activity" (Tooley, 2007, 
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p. 735 ). Although Smith acknowledges that the market activities inspiring utility, self- 
love and individual acquisition are functional to the provision of goods desired by the 
"majority in society" (Smith, 1976, Introduction, p. 2, Bk. I, p. 18; 1984, p. 187), he 
does not believe that such market activities support lasting happiness (Smith, 1984, 
p. 236). For Smith, lasting happiness can only come about as the result of activities 
motivated by the idea that : 
all the inhabitants of the universe, the meanest as well as the greatest, are 
under the immediate care and protection of that great, benevolent, and all- 
wise Being, who directs all the movements of nature" (Smith, 1984, p. 
235). 
For Smith, this relation between God and " man" necessarily occurs because 
God's nature is "determined, by his own unalterable perfections, to maintain in 
it, at all times the greatest possible quantity of happiness" (Smith, 1984, p. 236, 
GT's italics ). 
Therefore I contend that Tooley is incorrect to equate the observations which 
Smith made in Wealth of Nations with Smith's moral preferences. I note that Smith 
acknowledges that activities supported by utility, self-love and individual acquisition 
are those functional to the provision of abundance. However, I contend that Smith 
does not believe that these virtues necessarily support activities which are informed by 
the highest form of morality (Smith, 1984, p. 235 ). 
Secondly, I maintain that, contrary to the argument of Tooley in his article "From 
Adam Swift to Adam Smith" (Tooley, 2007, p. 736 ), Smith acknowledges the 
negative influence of alienating relations, and, in particular, argues for the need to 
change the "understandings" brought about through alienating productive activity. 
Smith argues that education is necessary to develop the "understandings" of those 
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whose work is confined to a few simple operations because: 
The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, 
of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the 
same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his 
invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never 
occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and 
generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human 
creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only 
incapable of relishing or bearing a part of rational conversation, but of 
conceiving any generous, noble or tender sentiment, and consequently of 
forming any just judgement concerning many even of the ordinary duties 
of everyday life (Smith, 1976, Bk. V, pp. 302-3). 
Smith argues that society cannot rely on working people to provide education 
for their children because such parents have to send their children to work in order to 
ensure that the family has sufficient sustenance. Therefore, Smith argues that, in order to 
ensure social cohesion, the public needs to facilitate education for the children of such 
families: 
but though the common-people cannot, in any civilised society, be so well 
instructed as people of some rank and fortune, the most essential parts of 
education, however, to read, write and account, can be acquired at so 
early a period of life, that the greater part even of those who are to be 
bred to the lowest occupations, have time to acquire them before they can 
be employed in those occupations. For a very small expence [sic] the 
public can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the 
whole body of the people, the necessity of acquiring those most essential 
parts of education (Smith, 1976, Bk. V, p. 305). 
The next section explores Robert Lamb's article "Adam Smith's Concept of 
Alienation" (R. Lamb, 1973), in which Lamb argues that Smith's description of 
alienation is "an important predecessor to Karl Marx's concept of alienation" (R. Lamb, 
1973, p. 275). 
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3.6 The influence of Smith's description of alienation on Marx's earlier writings. 
In his article "Adam Smith's Concept of Alienation" (R. Lamb, 1973), Lamb 
notes that many of Smith's descriptions of labour as productive activity, and, also, 
Smith's "more general analysis of the wage-labour relation to capital owners" are used 
in Marx's concept of alienation, particularly as found in " Manuscripts" 3 (Lamb, 1973, 
p. 85), and especially passages relating to "Wages of Labour" (Marx, 1975[fJ, pp. 282- 
295) and "Estranged Labour" (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 322-334 ). Lamb particularly notes 
that Smith describes alienation in terms of "isolation", "estrangement" and 
"powerlessness, " which are also similar to some of the terms used by Marx. Moreover, 
Lamb points out that, in Smith's system, "isolation", "estrangement" and "powerlessness" 
are interconnected (Lamb, 1973, p. 281 ). To briefly recall, it has been noted in 
Sections 2.3.1 and 3.5 that Smith's ontology is more mechanistic and less volitional 
than that of Marx (Lamb, 1973, pp. 281-2 ) and that the dynamic nature of Marx's 
ontology is outlined in Section 4.2. 
Lamb notes that Smith's concept of estrangement stems from his observations of 
pin-makers, weavers, metal, chemical and munitions workers. Lamb notes that, for 
Smith, estrangement is engendered through the division of labour: 
In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater 
part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, 
comes to be confined to a few very simple operations; frequently to one or 
two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily 
formed by their ordinary employments (Smith, 1976, p. 302, GT's italics). 
Smith also notes that workers are powerless in their disputes with employers, and have 
3 
Referred to as "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" by the Soviet writers of the early 1930's, also 
sometimes referred to as "1844 Manuscripts" or "Paris Manuscripts". 
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no control over determining the numbers of pieces in piece-work, the speed of their 
work, or the form of payment (Smith, 1976, Bk. 1, pp. 74-6). Smith's description of the 
worker as a commodity is more or less summed up in "Manuscripts" when Marx writes: 
From political economy itself, using its own words, we have shown that 
the worker sinks to the level of a commodity, and moreover the most 
wretched commodity of all; that the misery of the worker is in inverse 
proportion to the power and volume of his production; that the necessary 
consequence of competition is the accumulation of capital in a few hands 
(Marx, 1975[fj, p. 322, GT's italics ). 
Like Smith, Marx also notes that: 
The division of labour is the economic expression of the social nature of 
labour within estrangement. Or rather, since labour is only an expression 
of human activity within alienation, an expression of life as alienation of 
life , the 
division of labour is nothing more than estranged, alienated 
positing of human activity as real species-activity or as activity of man as 
a species-being (Marx, 1975[f], p. 369, original italics). 
Like Smith, Marx concludes that: 
This relationship is the relationship of the worker to his own activity as 
something which is alien and does not belong to him, activity as passivity, 
(Leiden), power as impotence, procreation as emasculation, the worker's 
own physical and mental energy, his personal life - for what is life but 
activity? - as an activity directed against himself, which is independent 
of him and does not belong to him (Marx, 1975[fj, p. 327, original 
italics). 
For Smith, estrangement does not necessarily arise because of the objective 
structural relations of capitalism, but as the natural consequence of separating work 
into simple operations. For Smith, it is as a result of work which mainly consists of 
"performing a few simple operations" that individuals degrade their physical, moral 
and intellectual faculties together with the ability to feel "generous, noble or tender 
sentiment[s]" (Smith, 1976, Bk. V, p. 308 ), and so become "in a still more essential 
part of the character of human nature mutilated and deformed" (Smith, 1976, Bk. V, p. 
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308). Moreover, Smith notes that the dispositions that are engendered as a result of 
alienating activity break the bonds keeping a "happy and agreeable" society together 
and lead to individuals becoming isolated from one another (Smith, 1984, pp. 85-6). 
To recall, it is noted in this section that Smith conceives estrangement to be the 
effect of division of labour on the ability of individuals to understand or comprehend 
social relations and cultural bonds. Smith argues that as a consequence, the individual's 
ability to sympathise or communicate with others is stifled, and he becomes estranged. 
Smith merely describes this process within the division of labour but does not explain 
how this occurs. The first systematic explanation of how this estrangement occurs 
within the market relations of capitalism was developed by Marx, and is discussed in 
Chapter Four. The development of Marx's concept of estrangement was significantly 
influenced by G. W. F. Hegel, and the next section briefly considers Hegel's ideas and 
shows which of these ideas Marx adopts and which he reacts against. 
3.7 Upside-down philosophy: G. W. F. Hegel's concept of alienation. 
3.7.1 Objectification in Hegel's philosophy. 
As with Adam Smith, Hegel has a concept of society as an organic whole, the 
latter being a partial aspect of an impersonal Deity. For Hegel, this Deity is 
conceived of as Truth in the form of Rationality: 
The objects of philosophy ..... are.... the same as those of religion. In 
both 
the object is Truth, in that supreme sense in which God and only God is 
the Truth ( Hegel, 1975, p. 3 ). 
For Hegel, history takes the form of an abstract and logical process which brings 
about the reconciliation of self-conscious reason with actuality as found in the 
Absolute or Rationality (Hegel, 1975, p. 128 ). In Phenomenology of Mind first 
101 
published in 1807 (Hegel, 1967), Hegel describes this process of reconciliation as 
entfremdung, defined as occurring when the "the natural self' becomes strange and 
alien to itself, resulting in a feeling of dissatisfaction. 
For Hegel, entfremdung always occurs during the process of objectification. The 
process of objectification occurs when individuals give material form to their own 
powers and intentions, but are constrained as a result of doing so. Hegel argues that 
individuals are constrained during objectification when they accommodate themselves 
(entausserung) to the properties of nature, or to other persons participating in practices 
and institutions inherited from the past. 
Hegel argues that individuals must pass from what he calls the realm of immediate 
experience to one in which, through the negation of existing appearances, individuals as 
the subject of history recognize themselves as able to mediate: 
For mediating is nothing but self-identity working itself out through an 
active self-directed process; or in other words, it is reflection into the self, 
the aspect in which ego is for-itself, objective to itself. It is pure negativity 
or reduced to its utmost abstraction, the process of bare and simple 
becoming (Hegel, 1967, p. 82). 
For Hegel, something can only become fully known after its opposite has been 
recognized. Therefore, for Hegel, in order to determine the essential relations between 
and within forms, all development hinges on alienation and the ability to become the 
opposite of what appears. 
Marx praises Hegel for his understanding of self-estrangement as part of the 
process of objectification: 
Hegel grasps man's self-estrangement, alienation of being, loss of 
objectivity and loss of reality as self-discovery, expression of being, 
objectification and realization (Marx, 1975[f], p. 395). 
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In particular, Marx supports the significance which Hegel gives to labour: 
man's act of self-creation and man's relation to himself as an alien being 
and the manifestation of himself as an alien being as the emergence of 
species-consciousness and species-life (Marx, 1975[f], p. 395, original 
italics )4. 
However, there are fundamental differences between the concept of self-creation 
and objectification in the writings of Marx and Hegel. In the "Critique of Hegel's 
Dialectic and General Philosophy, " Marx also produces two main criticisms of Hegel. 
Firstly, Marx criticises Hegel for defining human nature only "as abstract thinking 
being, as self-consciousness" ( Marx, 1975[f], p. 396, original italics). 
For Marx, "man" reproduces himself not only intellectually, in his consciousness, but 
actively and actually so he can contemplate himself in a world he has created (Marx, 
1975[fJ, p. 329). Secondly, Marx criticises Hegel for a formal and abstract concept of 
the process of " man's" act of self-creation and objectification (Marx, 1975[fJ, p. 396 ). 
In his introduction to Marx Early Writings Lucio Colletti notes: 
The realm of empirical truth is transformed into an internal moment of 
the Idea. Hence, the particular, finite object is not taken to be what it is, 
but considered in and as its opposite (the universal, thought): it is taken 
to be what it is not ( Lucio Colletti, Early Writings, Marx, 1975, p. 19, 
original italics ). 
In other words, for Marx, Hegel argues that all experiences of consciousness have no 
validity of their own because their validity lies with the Absolute. 
3 . 
7.2 Hegel's "On Love". 
For Hegel, "love" is a positive consequence of re-experiencing the primordial 
4 
The concept species-life and species-consciousness were, of course, initially formulated by Ludwig 
Feuerbach (see Section 3.8). 
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existence of unity. For Hegel, this experience results in finding what is right in oneself, 
and the ability to transcend negative separations. In "On Love", written in 1798 and 
re-published in Early Theological Writings (Hegel, 1948), Hegel discusses love (a 
concept which also appears in Marx's "Manuscripts") and shows that "love" is the 
opposite of estrangement. Hegel describes love as a genuine living bond, a true 
unity of opposites which results in commitment to the Other ( see the Introduction to "On 
Love" by Richard Kroner, in Hegel, 1948, p. 302). For Hegel, love results in the 
finding of what is right in oneself through the experience of a higher unity, and a 
transcendence of negative separations. Hegel argues that in this situation, because all 
oppositions are excluded, partners are not treated as objects by others, and neither 
individual is restricted by the other (Hegel, 1978, p. 304). This concept of love is based 
on the following ontology: 
In fact, nothing is unconditioned; nothing carries the root of its own being 
in itself. [Subject and object, man and matter] each is only relatively 
necessary; the one exists only for the other, and hence exists in and for 
itself only on the strength of a power outside itself; the one shares in the 
other only through that power's favour and grace (Hegel, 1948, p. 304, 
original brackets ). 
In "On Love" Hegel argues that the experience of love also results in 
harmony of thought, being, conscious existence, reason and emotion: all of which, he 
argues, can only be fully experienced when entfremdung (estrangement) is fully 
overcome. In "On Love, " Hegel contrasts this experience of unity with the alienated 
consciousness engendered as a result of private property relations because, 
the one who sees the other in possession of a property must sense in the 
other the separate individuality which has willed this possession. He [the 
individual - GT] cannot himself annul the exclusive dominion of the other, 
for this once again would be an opposition to the other's power, since no 
relation to an object is possible except mastery over it; he would be 
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cancelling one of the other's relationships, namely his exclusion of others 
from his property (Hegel, 1948, p. 308). 
The concept of "love" is used by Marx towards the end of Marx's Excerpts from 
James Mill's Elements of Political Economy (written in 1844 simultaneously with 
"Manuscripts"). Briefly, in Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economy, 
Marx states that one would only be confirmed in the love of another as a result of taking 
part in unalienated activity (Marx, 1975[e], p. 277). Marx maintains that a state of 
unalienated consciousness could not necessarily be achieved within capitalism (Marx, 
1975[f], p. 386) because the conditions and social relations needed to support unalienated 
consciousness do not necessarily exist within capitalism. If such conditions and relations 
do exist they are contingent and might or might not exist. Therefore I support the 
contention of Marx, that "love" could only be generally exercised within the conditions 
and social relations within his "realm of freedom", outlined in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
3.8 The influence of Ludwig Feuerbach's concept of alienation on Marx. 
Between 1841 and 1843 Marx became attracted by attempts to translate Hegelian 
metaphysics into a materialist form of humanism. In the 1844 "Manuscripts" Marx 
described Feuerbach as "the only person who has a serious and critical attitude to the 
Hegelian dialectic and who has made real discoveries in this field. He is the true 
conqueror of the old philosophy" (Marx, 1975[f], p. 381). 
Feuerbach set out to demonstrate how the content of the Hegelian absolute 
spirit could be derived from sensuous existence. As a result Feuerbach eliminates the 
Absolute, and rewrites Hegel in less metaphysical terms. Central to Feuerbach's 
philosophy is the contention that all human beings are conscious of their species. 
Feuerbach calls this sense species-being. Feuerbach argues that, as a result of this 
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"sense, " social individuals are able to relate to each other, and to the environment, in a 
manner appropriate to their species. Feuerbach calls this activity species-life. Feuerbach 
contends that species-life results in the full and conscious participation in collective 
fulfilment of the possibilities of the species, while simultaneously acknowledging the 
limitations of social individuals as part of the whole. Feuerbach argues that the 
essential difference between " man" and animals is that " man " is able to attain this 
self-consciousness of the nature of species-being, while animals merely respond to their 
environment and are not conscious of the nature of their species. For Feuerbach, this 
sense of species-being has the potential of coming to full realization only through living 
in an ethical community. Feuerbach contends that, in such a community, individuals 
would have the possibility of realizing the fulfilment of their human potentialities as a 
consequence of relations with others as species-beings. For Feuerbach, human existence 
as self, as subject, or as `I', becomes objective in relation to another T. It is important to 
note that Feuerbach is not arguing that the individual becomes "engulfed" in the species- 
being to which he belongs. Feuerbach recognises that individuals are conscious of other 
individuals who are both like and unlike themselves. Marx developed Feuerbach's 
concept of species-being by situating the development of species-life within objective 
social relations, which are both prefigurative and dynamic in nature ( see Sections 4.1 
and 4.2). 
In conclusion: this chapter has explored the ideological context within which the 
development of the labour market has taken place, and has given a brief description of 
the main philosophical ideas and social relations, antecedent to Marx, which both 
influence him and against which he reacts. In particular, this chapter explored the 
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influence of the ideas of Hobbes, Smith, Hegel and Feuerbach on the development of 
Marx's thought with particular reference to the development of Marx's concept of 
alienation. This chapter noted that, although Marx took positive philosophical 
influences from Smith, Feuerbach and Hegel, most of his work on alienation is 
based on criticisms of these thinkers. It is the development of these criticisms into a new 
theory which is explored in more detail in Chapter Four. 
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Part Two 
Chapter Four 
Marx's theory of alienation applied to productive activity in private property 
relations. 
Introduction 
This chapter shows the way that Marx adapts the philosophical positions held 
by both Hegel and Feuerbach and, in so doing, creates a new theory of alienation that 
for the first time systematically considers the alienating relations of capitalist 
markets. Although this chapter emphasises the philosophical dimension of Marx's 
work prior to 1845, it does not ignore Marx's later work. In Section 4.6 I contend 
that there is a considerable degree of continuity between Marx's analysis of 
alienation in his earlier works and that found in his later works. Before one can fully 
understand Marx's theory of alienation, it is important to understand the ontology 
which informs this concept. Therefore this chapter begins by exploring Marx's 
concept of species-being. 
4.1 Species-being: a theory of human nature. 
As is noted in Section 3.8, the concept of species-being was initially formulated 
by Feuerbach and developed by Marx, using and developing Hegel's concept of 
labour. To briefly recall, Marx argues that Hegel recognised that objective man was 
the result of his own labour (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 385-6,395), as more fully discussed 
in Section 3.7. In "Manuscripts" Marx defines species-being as "conscious life 
activity, " arguing that it is within conscious life activities with others that social 
individuals refine their possible functions, abilities and faculties. Marx notes that it 
is by virtue of "man's" ability to consciously shape his environment that he shows 
himself to be different from animals (Marx, 1975[fJ, pp. 328-9). Like Feuerbach, 
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Marx defines those powers specific to "man's" species-being as willing, 
consciousness (Marx, 1975[fJ, p. 328), thinking, awareness, wanting and loving 
(Marx, 1975[f], p. 353 ). 
In "Manuscripts, " Marx notes that these powers are enabled by relations that 
are both natural and social. For Marx "man" is not only a natural being; he is a human 
natural being" (Marx, 1975[f], p. 391, original italics); that is, he realizes his species- 
powers in social relations with others: 
The human essence of nature exists only for social man; for only here 
does nature exist for him as a bond with other men, as his existence 
for others and their existence for him, as the vital element of human 
reality; only here does it exist as the basis of his own human 
existence. Only here has his natural existence become his human 
existence and nature becomes man for him (Marx, 1975[fJ, p. 349, 
original italics). 
By "natural", Marx means the "real, sensuous objects as the object of [" man's"] 
being and of his vital expression" (Marx, 1975[f], p. 390, original italics). In this 
section I support the argument that things contain, as part of what they are, relations 
with nature and other social beings (Oilman, 2003, p. 13). In the next section, I deal 
with the arguments put forward by G. A. Cohen, who supports the ontological 
existence of external relations. 
In the meantime I note that, for Marx, purely `natural' or `biological' needs are an 
abstraction, and only a partial explanation of the human condition. Marx draws 
attention to the relations between natural objects in the following quote: 
The sun is an object for the plant, an indispensible object which 
confirms its life, just as the plant is an object for the sun, an expression 
of its life-awakening power and its objective essential power (Marx, 
1975[fj, p. 390, original italics). 
Marx notes that, for "man", objects "outside of themselves" are necessarily 
mediated by conditions and social relationships. For Marx, it is the nature of "man's" 
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needs, and the manner of satisfying them, that result in these interrelated relations: 
it is only when objective reality universally becomes for man in society 
the reality of man's essential powers, becomes human reality, and thus 
the reality of his own essential powers, that all objects become for him 
the objectification of himself, objects that confirm and realize his 
individuality, his objects, i. e. he himself becomes the object (Marx, 
1975[fJ, pp. 352-3, original italics) 
For Marx, social relations and social conditions also provide the content of 
"man's" natural needs and powers, and mediate the development of such 
needs: 
Hunger is hunger, but the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten 
with a knife and fork is a different hunger from that which bolts 
down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail and tooth (Marx, 1973 [a], p. 
92). 
Marx argues that the way in which species-powers become objectified 
depends both on the nature of the object and the nature of the essential power 
that corresponds to it (Marx, 1975[f], p. 353). Marx notes that, although the 
"objects of his ["man's"] drives exist outside of him, " these "objects are 
objects of his need, essential objects, indispensible to the exercise and 
confirmation of his essential powers" (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 389-390, GT's 
italics). I maintain that Marx argues that there are internal relations between 
objects and social relations. During the course of objectification, the social 
individual's powers become " `vehicles' carrying a mutual effect between 
the individual and his object (joined together in an internal relation).. " 
(Oilman, 1976, p. 87). Marx states that it is the particular influence of this 
relation that shapes the particular, real mode of affirmation (Marx, 1975[f], p. 
353). The process of objectification is dealt with in more detail in Section 4.3. 
Within this process of objectification, both social and natural relations 
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provide the content of social individuals' powers. When social individuals 
accommodate themselves to the properties of nature and other social relations, 
these internal relations become constitutive of their human nature. 
It is as a result of this process that Marx, in "Concerning Feuerbach", calls 
the essence, or nature, of "man" an "ensemble of social relations" (Marx, 
1975[d], p. 423). In this section I maintain that Marx's analysis of human 
nature differs from that which Norman Geras, in his article "Human Nature 
and Progress" (1995), represents as Marxian 
The notion of an enduring human nature served Marx as a standard of 
normative judgement...... Regardless of what he might have envisaged 
in his idea of self-actualization or the free development of the 
individual...... the principle he espoused of distribution according to 
need was to cover at least those fundamental material needs 
consequent upon the common make-up of human beings (Geras, 1995, 
p. 154, GT's italics). 
This argument is the result of Geras' assumption that 
while it is true that to evaluate particular forms of self-realization one 
may well need to make reference to culturally specific standards of one 
kind and another, it is equally the case that in evaluating and in 
positively valuing as an instance of human self-realization [original 
italics] any activity or cultural form whatsoever, one will have to rely 
[GT's italics] upon some generally applicable limit-concept of the 
constituent conditions.. (Geras, 1995, p. 157). 
For Geras, there is throughout Marx's writings a "transhistorical evaluative 
standard" which is defined by "man's" human nature. This standard is informed, but 
not influenced, by historical circumstances (Geras, 1995, p. 154). As a consequence, 
in both the article written in 1995 and his famous book Marx and Human Nature: 
Refutation of a Legend (1983), Geras omits to analyze the internal relations which, I 
maintain in Section 4.2, are fundamental to Marx's ontology. 
4.2 Dynamic internal social relationships. 
I now consider the nature of internal social relations. Although Marx 
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frequently refers to internal relations as "essential", "necessary", "inevitable" or 
"active", he does not, to my knowledge, define them. This lacuna has been filled by 
Bertell Oilman, who has defined and described internal relations in a way that, I 
maintain, is commensurate with Marx's ontology: 
The relations in which anything stands as essential parts of what it is, so 
that a significant change in any of these relations registers as a 
qualitative change in the system of which it is a part (Oilman, 2003, p. 5) 
Within an ontology based on internal relations, relations and conditions are 
defined as being "necessary" when an actual range of possibilities is inherent in their 
internal ties with other social relations and conditions. In this ontology, all social 
relations are prefigured, that is, they are the coming-to-be of what potentially existed 
within previous social relations. 
In contrast, within an ontology based on isolated and external relations, the 
elements in `A' are not prefigurative of `B. ' As a consequence of this ontological 
assumption, the establishment of a single exception to `if A then B' means that `if A 
then B' cannot be true. Within an ontology based on external relations, any such 
exception is a reason for denying the prefigurative nature of social relations. For 
example, here it would be denied that an increase in marketization would necessarily 
result in increased alienation if one person could be found who claimed to be 
unalienated at work. 
However, an ontology based on internal relations denies that, should a social 
individual feel unalienated within market relations, such a feeling could correspond to 
the actual situation. Within an ontology based on internal relations, such a 
psychological state would be contingent and would not necessarily continue because 
the structural relations of the market do not enable an unalienated society. 
In the next part of this section I explore the nature of internal relations in more 
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detail. Within an ontology based on internal relations, the whole is only a whole by 
virtue of the interdependence of its internal relations; and the parts are what they are 
by virtue of being members of the whole. For Oilman this results in a whole which is 
composed of interdependent internal relations which are sometimes structured, that 
is, rooted in relatively stable connections (Oilman, 1973, p. 496). 
Oilman argues that these structural relations comprise four processes. Firstly, he says 
that "the whole shapes the parts to make them more functional within this particular 
whole". Secondly, for Oilman, "the whole gives meaning and relative importance to 
each part in terms of this function (laws in capitalism are only comprehensible as 
elements in a structure that maintains capitalist society, and are as important as the 
contribution they make). " Thirdly, Oilman argues that "the whole expresses itself 
through the part, so that the part can be seen as a form of the whole" and, fourthly, he 
says that the process of change of internal relations will "forge the contours and 
meaning of the whole, transforming it into an ongoing system with a history, a goal, 
and an impact" (Oilman, 1973, p. 496). 
I now intend to explore the nature of social processes in more detail. The 
influence of surrounding conditions on the function and/or appearance of an entity is 
illustrated in the following example provided by Ollman: 
[It] is only because a machine is owned by capitalists that it is used to 
exploit workers. In the hands of a consumer or of a self-employed 
operator, that is, conditioned by another set of factors, operating under 
different imperatives, it would not function in this way (Ollman, 2003, 
p. 16). 
When the social relations within a school change, and it becomes owned by a private 
owner, then it becomes an education business and subject to the law of profit 
accumulation, as James Tooley has acknowledged (Tooley, 2000, p. 18-9). 
For Marx, conditions may be twofold. On the one hand natural conditions such as 
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land and raw materials are important. On the other hand social conditions, such as 
other social individuals, the existing form of social relations and subjective conditions 
such as consciousness, language and skills must be considered. Objective conditions 
and internal relations are also influenced by how they are perceived. Institutions, 
people and processes may be viewed in a variety of ways by different social 
individuals under changed conditions and this may produce a different, and in some 
cases, opposite conclusion or effect. For example, when a school is owned by 
capitalists it is used to exploit workers. In the hands of a democratic socialist state, 
that is, conditioned by another set of relations and conditions and operating under 
different imperatives, the degree of exploitation would not be so great and it would 
not function in the same way as when owned by capitalists. When people conditioned 
as capitalists look at a school, they see capital in which they have invested, and 
something that is going to make them a profit. When teachers conditioned as workers 
look at the same school, they see only an instrument that will determine their labour 
movements during the schooling process. 
Within social processes, it is the range of possibilities which are necessarily 
prefigured by internal social relations, rather than a particular outcome within the 
range. This is because internal relations contain relations which, as part of what 
they are, have " ties with other relations" (Oilman, 2003, p. 13), both material and 
social (Marx, 1975[f], pp. 329,349,353,390). Within this ontology, all social 
change is therefore a coming-to-be of what potentially was as well as what is. Social 
change is, therefore, the further unfolding of an already existing process in which 
past and present relations are internally related rather than being separate or 
contingent. 
During the process of social change, there is a build-up and slow-down of 
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"qualities" or properties which involves a transfer of "qualities" to other 
constitutive relations of an entity. Initially this process takes the form of a 
quantitative change. At a certain point, a qualitative transformation takes place which 
is indicated by a change in the appearance or function of an entity. When this has 
occurred the entity has become something else. This is the nature of the processes 
which I explored in Chapter One, where I described the development of the process 
of marketization of school provision, and in particular the gradual influence of private 
property relations from 1998, when private sector providers were enticed into the 
financing and management of schools through the establishment of Education Action 
Zones. In 2002 this process of private ownership was complete when private sector 
sponsors were allowed to own and control `their' own school. Although such schools 
were funded and loosely regulated by the State, they were almost exclusively within 
the control of private providers. In this process one can see the conscious attempt by 
successive governments to construct the relations which necessarily comprise the 
market, as defined in Section 1.1. 
Within social processes there is sometimes the incompatible development of 
oppositional relations: 
paths of development do not only intersect in mutually supportive 
ways but are constantly blocking, undermining, otherwise interfering 
with, and in due course transforming one another......... The future 
finds its way into this focus (Ollman, 2003, p. 17). 
These relations influence the development of processes by either enabling goals to 
be realized or by undermining their development. Within this materialist philosophy, 
it is as a result of these relations that social processes remain dynamic. In the absence 
of oppositional relations, Marx's system would require a vitalistic spirit to initiate 
change as, for example, did the system of Adam Smith (see Section 3.4). 
Within an ontology based on external relations, entities are a collection of 
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externally related elements which exist in and by themselves, as was noted in 
Sections 2.5.1 and 3.2. Because within this ontology relations do not stand as 
essential parts of internal social relations, a significant change in any external 
relations does not necessarily change the function/appearance of an entity. 
Therefore, within an ontology based on external relations, social change is perceived 
to occur as a sequence of events perceived as causal change based on a linear logic. I 
argue in Chapter Two that perceiving social change in this linear way caused both 
Harry Brighouse and James Tooley to perceive the social changes outlined in 
Sections 1.3-1.6 as a series of events which are contingently related, rather than as 
an unfolding process in which the social relations and conditions are internally 
related. 
An ontology based mainly on external relations can be found in G. A. Cohen's 
book Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (1978). In this work Cohen states 
that his aim is to construct a theory of history "which is in broad accord with what 
Marx said on the subject", using both the tools of twentieth-century analytical thought 
(Cohen, 1978, p. ix) and a form of materialism in which "history is fundamentally, 
the growth of human productive power, and forms of society rise and fall according as 
they enable or impede that growth" (Cohen, 1978, p. x). 
As a consequence of using analytical thought, Cohen analyzes the whole into 
component parts, separating and isolating different elements and aspects, so defining 
them in isolation. This excludes the possibility of structural relations which are 
internally related within an organic whole and as a result, I contend, is fundamentally 
opposed to Marx's ontology. 
I also contend that Cohen also differs from Marx in arguing that a force or power 
is not a relation (Cohen, 1978, p. 28). For Cohen, a force or power "is not something 
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which holds between objects, but rather a property of an object" (Cohen, 1978, p. 28). 
For Cohen "no social characteristics may be deduced from their material 
characteristics" (Cohen, 1978, p. 91). To make this point Cohen appeals to the 
concept of a `relational property': 
A husband is a man related by marriage to a woman: he is not also a 
relationship of marriage. Being a husband is a property of that man, 
one he has in virtue of that relationship, and commonly styled a 
relational property. Being capital and being a slave are, similarly, 
relational properties of means of production and men. More 
specifically, they are social relational properties, whereas being means 
of production and being a man are not. The latter are possessed 
independently of the social form. Remove the social form in thought 
experiment and those properties persist (Cohen, 1978, p. 90, original 
italics). 
For Cohen, the character of the productive forces only functionally explains the 
character of relations: 
the production relations are of kind R at time t because relations of 
kind R are suitable to the use and development of the productive forces 
at t, given the level of development of the latter at t (Cohen, 1978, p. 
160). 
Cohen argues that, for Marx, the development of productive forces, (which are only 
contingently related to social relations), is the primary force for historical change. For 
Cohen historical change occurs when a "society adjusts itself to nature" (Cohen, 1978, 
p. 285): 
The material description captures a society's underlying nature. In this 
sense of `nature', nature is of course a product of history, changing in 
and as a result of social forms. Humanity in social organisation thrusts 
itself against its environment, altering it and its own nature, for it 
develops its own powers and needs in the course of the encounter 
(Cohen, 1978, p. 96, original italics). 
Cohen argues that the economic structure is the primary determinant of the character 
of the political superstructure. For Cohen the economic relations and political forms 
are the mere effects, the outcome of a particular level of development of the 
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productive forces. The relations of production and the superstructure are thus regarded 
as inactive results, with no independent life or internal dynamic of their own (Sayers, 
1984, p. 11). 
In this section I have showed that, as a result of an ontology based on external 
relations, Cohen perceives society and nature, form and content to be exclusive 
opposites; and social relations to be entirely external to and logically independent 
of, material content. 
In his paper "Marxism and the Dialectical Method" (1984), Sean Sayers criticises 
Cohen's analysis, arguing that as a consequence of relying on an analytical 
methodology, Cohen 
insists on analysing the whole that he is considering into its 
component parts. He insists upon separating and isolating the different 
elements and aspects of the given concrete totality, and considering 
and defining these in isolation (Sayers, 1984, p. 4). 
Sayers criticises Cohen's ontology by arguing, like Ollman, that all properties 
are relational and exist within internal relations (Sayers, 1984, p. 8). Productive 
forces are productive forces only in the context of the necessary relations of 
production - in the absence of these they are mere useless objects. A spinning jenny, 
therefore, is a machine for spinning cotton only given certain relations of production: 
transferred to the stone age it would be a mere physical object of no productive use 
(Sayers, 1984, p. 7). In this section I support the argument proposed by Sayers and 
Oilman, namely, that for Marx, in both his early and later works, this context of 
relations is internal and essential to the nature of things, and not external and 
accidental (Marx, 1973 [a], p. 84). 
Marx perceives concrete things in the context of their interconnectedness with 
other things situated within a wider whole.. According to Marx : 
The conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each 
its 
other ......... are conditions appertaining to their individuality, in no way 
external to them; conditions under which these definite individuals 
living under definite relationships, can alone produce their material life 
and what is connected with it, are thus conditions of their self-activity 
and are produced by this self-activity (Marx, 1970, p. 87). 
In this section, I therefore support the argument of Sayers, that the ontology of 
Marx is "quite distinct from the abstract and metaphysical views propounded by 
Cohen" (Sayers, 1984, p. 12). Moreover, I argue in this thesis that an ontology 
based on external relations, such as that propounded by Cohen, would have been 
rejected by Marx because the social relations found in Cohen's ontology result in 
alienating and dehumanising activity: 
This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we 
ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of 
our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our 
calculations (Marx, 1970, p. 54). 
The rest of this chapter is an analysis of Marx's concept of alienation. An important 
dimension of Marx's concept of alienation is objectification which I consider in more 
detail in the next section. 
4.3 Objectification in Marx's philosophy. 
I begin this section by briefly recalling Hegel's concept of objectification, 
because of its substantial influence on Marx. In Section 3.7 it is noted that Hegel 
defines objectification as the process of self-realization which occurs when 
transforming objects, and that Hegel recognises that, during the process of 
objectification, a social individual accommodates himself to the properties of 
nature and/or other social individuals. It is also noted that, for Hegel, objectification 
always results in a change in the subjectivity of the social individual and so results 
in a loss of self, that is, in alienation. 
In Chapter Nine it is argued that only when objectification occurs within 
unalienating conditions and social relations does it necessarily support self. 
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realization. When this type of objectification occurs, products confront agents not 
as something other but as something which is their own. This concept will be 
explored in relation to education in Chapter Nine. Before I consider the necessary 
structural relations in Marx's concept of unalienated activity, I explore his concept of 
alienation and its necessary relations. 
4.4 Marx's concept of alienated labour. 
I now consider Marx's concept of alienated labour in more detail. For Marx, 
alienating relations occur in a set of social relations where: 
the means of my life belong to another and that my desire is the 
inaccessible possession of another, but also in the fact that all things 
are other than themselves, that my activity is other than itself, and that 
finally - and this goes for capitalists too - an inhuman power rules 
over everything (Marx, 1975[f], p. 366, original italics). 
The predominant form of property relations which existed when Marx was writing 
was based on the concept of possessive individualism (see Section 3.2). Briefly, to 
recall, this is the contention that "man" is "an exclusive owner whose exclusive 
ownership permits him both to preserve his personality and to distinguish himself 
from other men" (Marx, 1975[e], p. 266). Marx argues that if we assume that 
"man's" personal, distinguishing and essential capacities and powers are his 
private property, as did classical economists at the time, then it necessarily follows 
that "loss or sacrifice of that private property signifies the alienation of the man as 
much as of the property itself' (Marx, 1975[e), p. 266). 
In Marx's day, such relations were found within an early form of capitalist 
production. Marx defines capital in the following way: 
But capital is not a thing, it is a definite social relation pertaining to a 
particular historical social formation, which simply takes the form of a 
thing and gives this thing a specific social character. Capital is not the 
sum of the material and produced means of production. Capital is 
the means of production as transformed into capital, these being no 
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more capital in themselves than gold or silver are money. It is the 
means of production monopolized by a particular section of society, 
the products and conditions of activity of labour-power, which are 
rendered autonomous vis-ä-vis this living labour-power and are 
personified in capital through this antithesis. It is not only the workers' 
products which are transformed into independent powers, the products 
as masters and buyers of their producers, but the social powers and 
interconnecting form of this labour also confront them as properties of 
their product. Here we therefore have one factor of a historically 
produced social production process in a definite social form, and at 
first sight a very mysterious form (Marx, 1981, pp. 953-4 ). 
The next section considers the fundamental structural relations that result in 
alienated labour within capitalism. Although alienated relations are necessarily 
interconnected, for ease of analysis I describe these structural relations separately. I 
begin with the relations involved in verausserung (alienation through selling) which 
results in entfremdet (estrangement) and entausserung (relinquishment). 
4.4.1 Verausserung (alienation throu hg selling, ). 
Marx notes that, within capitalism, there are two fundamental structural 
relations which result in alienated labour. These relations are necessarily 
interrelated, and are those necessarily involved in the act of verausserung (alienation 
through selling the product of labour), and those necessarily involved in entfremdet 
(estrangement). Marx argues that these relations necessarily entail relinquishment 
(entausserung). For Marx, relinquishment (entausserung) occurs when individuals 
accommodate themselves to something which exists outside and independently of 
themselves, such as a hostile owner, or the properties of nature, or to other persons 
participating in practices and institutions inherited from the past (Marx, 1975 [f], p. 
324). In the case of private property relations, this relation occurs as a necessary 
result of selling one's labour-power to the owners of private capital. 
Marx argues that private property and alienated labour are oppositional. 
However, both are "forms of the world of private property" and, as such, "they form a 
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single whole" (Marx, 1956, p. 51). For Marx private property is "the product, result 
and necessary consequence of alienated labour... " (Marx, 1975[fJ, p. 322, GT's 
italics ), and within these relations "the worker exists as a worker only when he 
exists for himself as capital, and he exists as capital only when capital exists for him" 
(Marx, 1975 [f], p. 335, GT's italics ). In other words, private property relations are 
prefigured by the act of alienation [verausserung] (Marx, 1975[fl, pp. 331-3). 
I now deal with Marx's analysis of "man's" relation to private property and 
productive activity. Within the structural relations of capitalism the worker's 
productive activity will not necessarily enable the worker's essential powers to be 
manifested (Marx, 1975[f], p. 326 ) because, by virtue of verausserung, this activity 
belongs to another. For Marx, within capitalism, the productive process is " the 
subjective manifestation of the fact that capital is man completely lost to himself, just 
as capital is the objective manifestation of the fact that labour is man lost to himself' 
(Marx, 1975[f], pp. 334-5 ). As a consequence, self-estrangement results and the 
worker may well ask "what is life but activity? - as an activity directed against 
himself, which is independent of him and does not belong to him" (Marx, 1975 [fl, p. 
327). 
Moreover, although a social individual's needs stand in an inner relation to 
the products of the labour of others, the system of private property turns this internal 
relationship into an external relationship through the use of currency as a medium of 
exchange (Marx, 1975 [e], pp. 274-5 ). Marx continues by arguing that "the thing 
that gives your need for my possessions a value, a worth and an effect..... is simply 
and solely your possession, the equivalent of my possession" i. e. exchange value 
(Marx 1975[e], p. 276, original italics). 
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4.4.2 The capitalist and alienation. 
It was noted in Section 4.4 that the workers and the capitalists are both 
necessary aspects of private property. Therefore, Marx argues that capitalists 
as well as workers (Marx, 1956, p. 51; 1975 [fJ, p. 334) are alienated by the capitalist 
system. For Marx, it is the relation of the capitalist to the product of the worker which 
places the capitalist in the situation of alienation. For the capitalist, the object of a 
worker's life activity is only to produce something to sell at a profit. The capitalist 
needs to do this in order to buy the goods and services which he himself does not have 
the means to produce. 
As Marx notes " the human properties of man as a worker -a man who is 
nothing more than a worker - exist only in so far as they exist for a capital which is 
alien to him" (Marx, 1975[fJ, p. 335, original italics ). As a consequence, the 
worker cannot necessarily have human relations with the capitalist and the capitalist 
cannot necessarily have human relations with the worker. This argument is 
summarised in the following passage: 
He [the capitalist] looks upon the slave labour of others, their human 
sweat and blood, as the prey of his desires, and regards man in general 
- including himself - as a futile and sacrificial being. He arrogantly 
looks down upon mankind, dissipating what would suffice to keep 
alive a hundred human beings, and propagates the infamous illusion 
that his unbridled extravagance and ceaseless, unproductive 
consumption is a condition of the labour and hence subsistence of the 
others (Marx, 1975[f], 366, original italics). 
As a consequence of this process both the capitalist and the worker both become 
" physically and spiritually dehumanized being[s]" (Marx, 1975[f], p. 336, ). Marx 
argues that, although the capitalist is not dominated by products in the same way as 
the worker, he is influenced by the same social conditions in which his products are 
produced and distributed. Marx systematically presents his view on the alienated 
relationship between the `non-worker' and the worker at the end of the first section 
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of "Manuscripts". Here he states: 
The first thing to point out is that everything which appears for the 
worker as an activity of alienation, of estrangement, appears for the 
non-worker as a situation of alienation, of estrangement. Secondly the 
real, practical attitude of the worker in production and to the product 
(as a state of mind) appears for the non-worker who confronts him as a 
theoretical attitude. Thirdly, the non-worker does everything against 
the worker which the worker does against himself, but he does not do 
against himself what he does against the worker. (Marx, 1975[fJ, p. 
334, original italics ). 
In The Holy Family, written in 1845, Marx also notes that alienation for the capitalist 
differs from that of the workers because capitalists find in their alienation 
"confirmation, " of their "own power" (Marx, 1956, p. 51 ). 
As a result of the processes outlined in this section we can see that, within 
capitalism, the expression of the life of both the capitalist and the worker is the 
alienation of their life (Marx, 1975[f], p. 351 ). 
To recall, it was noted in Chapter Three, within capitalism, human powers are 
reduced to having and possessing. As a consequence social individuals view 
everything they come into contact with as essentially a form of private property, 
including their own essential powers. As Ollman notes, in order for workers to be 
able to sell their essential powers all social relations which might inhibit such a sale 
have to be reduced (Oliman, 1976, p. 229). As a result the "sensuous appropriation 
of human essence and of human life, of objective man and of human works, by and for 
man" becomes understood " only in the sense of direct, one-sided consumption, of 
possession and of having" (Marx, 1975[f], p. 351) . 
4.5 Marx's concept of unalienated activity. 
Marx argues that it is only in a situation which allows for fully human activity that 
one can confirm one's "authentic nature" in the thoughts and love of another 
( Marx, 1975 [e], p. 277 ). A discussion on love in Hegelian thought is given in 
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Section 3.5. To briefly recall, within Hegelian thought, love is the opposite of 
alienation and it will be recalled that love is a genuine living bond, a true unity of 
opposites, which results in commitment to the Other (Hegel, 1948, pp. 304-5 ). 
Within these Hegelian relations, one is disposed to consider the other individual 
not as a means, nor as an external imposition on the satisfaction of our own ends, but 
as a fellow human being who has value qua a human being. Marx accepts this aspect 
of Hegelian thought when he describes the subjective aspect of unalienated labour as: 
In your use or enjoyment of my product I would have the immediate 
satisfaction and knowledge that in my labour I had gratified a human 
need, i. e. that I had objectified human nature and hence had 
procured an object corresponding to the needs of another human 
being. In my production I would have objectified the specific 
character of my individuality and for that reason I would have 
enjoyed the expression of my own individual life during my activity 
and also, in contemplating the object, I would experience an 
individual pleasure, I would experience my personality as an objective 
sensuously perceptible power beyond all shadow of doubt (Marx, 
1975[e], p. 277, original italics). 
For Marx, such productive activity is meaningful and worthwhile because 
through it are developed, exercised and actualized human essential powers which 
are worthwhile and meaningful for social individuals. 
4.6 Continuity in Marx's concept of alienation. 
Although I place particular emphasis on the philosophical dimension of Marx's 
work prior to 1845, I do not ignore his later work, and I am persuaded that the 
philosophical ideas found in Marx's early works are also echoed in later works. 
Concerning alienation, I am persuaded that the concepts concerning productive 
activity and alienation found in Marx's earlier works are embedded in Marx's 
later works. I support the argument that Marx's later works merely emphasise the 
objective social and economic structural relations that give rise to the more subjective 
concept of alienation described in the "Manuscripts". I therefore consider that there 
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is a continuation of argument between Marx's earlier works and his later works, 
rather than there being a fundamentally different philosophy, as such Soviet 
theorists as T. I. Oiserman have argued (see Section 7.4.2 ). 
Echoes of "Manuscripts" can also be found in Wage-Labour and Capital, first 
published in 1849. For example, in "Manuscripts" Marx writes: 
Firstly, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i. e. does not 
belong to his essential being; that he therefore does not confirm 
himself in his work, but denies himself, feels miserable and not happy, 
does not develop free mental and physical energy, but mortifies his 
flesh and ruins his mind. Hence the worker feels himself only when he 
is not working; when he is working he does not feel himself (Marx, 
1975[fj, p. 326 ). 
In Wage-Labour and Capital Marx writes: 
But the exercise of labour-power, labour, is the worker's own life- 
activity, the manifestation of his own life. And this life-activity he sells 
to another person in order to secure the means of his subsistence. Thus 
his life-activity is for him only a means to enable him to exist. He 
works in order to live. He does not even reckon labour as part of his 
life, it is rather a sacrifice of his life. It is a commodity which he has 
made over to another. Hence also, the product of his activity is not the 
object of his activity ( Marx, 1967, p. 20, original italics). 
One can also see similarities if one compares the concept of alienation as 
outlined in "Manuscripts" with "The Results of the Immediate Process of 
Production" (written in 1863-1866). In "The Results of the Immediate Process of 
Production" Marx writes : 
Within the production process labour is transformed into capital. The 
activity of labour-power i. e. labour, objectifies itself in the course of 
production and so becomes value. But since the labour has ceased to 
belong to the worker even before he starts to work, what objectified 
itself for him is alien labour and hence a value, called capital., 
independent of his own labour-power. " (Marx, 1979 [a], p. 1016, 
original italics). 
In the same article Marx notes the lack of control of labour in the above process: 
In the labour process regarded also as a capitalist process of 
production, the means of production utilize the worker, so that the 
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work appears only as an instrument which enables a specific quantum 
of value i. e. a specific mass of objectified labour, to suck in living 
labour in order to sustain and increase itself...... Capital utilizes the 
worker, the worker does not utilize capital...... (Marx, 1979[a], p. 
1008, original italics ). 
4 .7 Marx after 
1845: new methodology, same philosophy. 
I now specifically consider how Marx developed his arguments after 1845, with 
particular reference to the arguments having a bearing on alienation. Gradually, 
between 1845-6, Marx began to repudiate the metaphysical elements in Feuerbach's 
philosophy, arguing that Feuerbach's concept of human essence was ahistorical. 
Marx adds that, as a consequence, Feuerbach conceived of "essence" only as a 
"genus", as "an internal, dumb, generality which naturally unites the many 
individuals" (Marx, 1975[d], p. 423, original italics). 
Marx argues that, because Feuerbach is satisfied with postulating "man" as an 
abstract and imaginary subject, Feuerbach has no compulsion in finding the 
concrete causes that make real men act the way they do. This results in an uncritical 
acceptance of average conditions, in which social inequalities and human sufferings 
are treated as chance differences between individuals. 
Furthermore, in the treatise "Concerning Feuerbach", written in 1845, Marx 
argues that human nature is influenced by material activity or practice ( which is 
sometimes referred to as praxis), and that "in its reality it [human essence GT] is the 
ensemble of the social relations" (Marx, 1975[d], p. 423 ). 
In German Ideology (first published in 1846) Marx begins to systematically 
develop a conception of history based on the development of the social relations 
which emerge around particular processes of production : 
This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the 
production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a 
definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form 
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expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As 
individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, 
coincides with their production, both with what they produce and 
with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the 
material conditions determining their production (Marx, 1970, p. 42, 
original italics ). 
Using this materialist methodology, Marx outlines in Grundrisse (written 
1857-8) that four " historical presuppositions" are needed before alienation can 
occur in productive activity (Marx, 1973 [a], pp. 497-8 ). Firstly, he argues that what 
has to occur in "man's" relation to nature is the dissolution of "man's" original 
natural condition in which both production and property are solely communal. 
Secondly, Marx considers the dissolution of relations in which the producer appears 
as proprietor of his instruments of production. This presupposes a specific 
development of manufacture, for example, craft and artisan work (see Section 3.1 for 
a brief outline of the actual historical development ). Marx notes that, with craft and 
artisan work, "labour still as his own; definite self-sufficient development of one- 
sided abilities etc. " (Marx, 1973[a], p. 497 ). Thirdly, Marx notes that as proprietor 
of land and instruments of production the artisan inherits the mode of his work, 
together with many of the instruments involved in his trade (Marx, 1973 [a], p. 497 ). 
This allows the artisan to have the means of consumption in his possession before 
production which allows for him to live as a producer (Marx, 1973[a], p. 497) [see 
Section 3.1 for examples from the textile industry ]. At this stage the capitalist is the 
"master journeyman" and, labour is part artisan and part `end-in-itself '. Importantly, 
Marx notes that labour at this stage still results in the development of "one-sided 
abilities" and therefore does not lead to the development of all of the capacities and 
powers of the social individual (Marx, 1973 [a], p. 497 ). Fourthly, Marx notes that 
there is a fundamental change in social relations, from those in which workers are 
treated as an objective condition of production (for example, in the case of a serf or 
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a slave), to those in which the worker sells (alienates) his individual labour-power to 
the owner of capital (Marx, 1973 [a], p. 498) [see Section 3.1 for examples from the 
textile industry]. In the next part of this section I describe how this economic `base' 
is linked to the ideological superstructure and consciousness. 
4 . 7.1 
The concept of base and superstructure. 
In German Ideology, written between 1845-6, Marx begins to formulate the 
concept more commonly known as the "base" and "superstructure" to describe the 
inter-connection between the material process of production and the "theoretical 
products and consciousness" (Marx, 1970, pp. 57-8 ). In this theory, it is within the 
objective social relations found in the economic base of society that the social 
relations which necessarily result in alienation as the `normal' state of affairs. 
For Marx, the economic base has a predominant influence because it gives 
unity to other aspects of the movement in society. In a passage from " The 
Preface" (to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, first written 1857 
(Marx, 1975[a]) and intended as the first section of Grundrisse), Marx states that in 
the base there are the forces of production, the relations of production and the means 
of production. The means of production are the instruments of production and the raw 
materials while the forces of production are the means of production plus labour 
power. It is within the relations of production that the alienating relations described 
above occur. Marx notes that in the social production of the conditions of their 
existence, men inevitably enter into definite social relations, which are independent 
of their will, because they are reliant on the use of the means of production, which 
others own, to make a livelihood. 
For Marx, the totality of the relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure, being the real foundation on which arises a legal and political 
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superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. In the 
Preface (to "A Contribution to the Critique of the Political Economy"), Marx 
develops the ideological nature of the superstructure (which, for Marx, includes 
legal, political, religious, artistic, and philosophical forms ). Schooling belonged to 
this aspect of society in England after the 1944 Education Act, when the state first 
began to directly intervene in the schooling of all pupils in order to address the 
needs of the economy (see Section 5.2). 
Although Marx gives primacy to the economic base, he does not regard it 
as always the most evident determinant (Marx, 1970, pp. 57-8 ). In 
"Manuscripts, " Marx argues that: 
productive life is species-life. It is life-producing life. The whole 
character of a species, its species-character, resides in the nature of its 
life activity, and free conscious activity constitutes the species- 
character of man. Life itself appears only as a means of life ( Marx, 
1975[f], p. 328, original italics ). 
Even in Capital, which concentrates more on the material forces in society than 
do "Manuscripts", Marx argues that man's relationship to the economic base does 
not merely correspond or reflect economic structures but, more precisely, that the 
social individual's relation to the economic base involves social and economic 
relationships which change partly as a result of the ideas and conceptions held 
about economic activity: 
The same economic basis - the same in its major conditions - from 
displaying endless variations and gradations in its appearance, as the 
result of innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural 
conditions, racial relations, historical influences acting from outside, 
etc., and these can only be understood by analysing these empirically 
given conditions (Marx, 1981, pp. 927-8). 
Engels, who worked closely with Marx, in his letter to Bloch of 21 September 
1890, makes the dynamic nature of the relationship between the economic structure 
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and superstructure even clearer: 
According to the materialist conception of history the determining 
element in history is ultimately [GT's italics] the production and 
reproduction in real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever 
asserted. If therefore somebody twists this into the statement that the 
economic determinant is the only [ Engel's italics] determining one 
he transforms it into a meaningless, abstract and absurd phrase [GT's 
italics] (Engels, 1934, p. 474). 
In the same letter, Engels adds that the "political, legal, philosophical theories, 
religious ideas and their further development......... also exercise their influence upon 
the course of the historical struggles and in many cases (GT's italics) preponderate 
in their determining form" (Engels' italics ). Engels notes the dynamic interactions 
which shape social relationships when he added : 
There is an interaction of all these elements, in which, amid all the 
endless host of accidents (i. e., of things and events whose inner 
connexion is so remote or so impossible to prove that we regard it as 
absent and can neglect it) the economic movement finally asserts itself 
as necessary (Engels, 1934, p. 475, original italics ). 
4.7.2 Marx's labour theory of value. 
Marx began to develop a more economic concept of alienation and exploitation 
after 1845 (Marx, 1979 [a], p. 271). As I state in my Introduction, I do not intend to 
give a systematic analysis of exploitation in this thesis because, although I recognize 
that the relations involved in exploitation are linked to alienation, exploitation is 
different from alienation. However, in this Section I give a brief explanation of labour 
theory of value, which is the concept which informs Marx's concept of 
exploitation, because it is a theory which recurs in debates about the viability of 
Marx's analysis of the market. 
After 1845, as part of the process of developing a more economic concept of 
alienation, Marx continued to develop Smith's ideas about the labour theory of value 
in a systematic way. This systematic account first appears in Capital, written in 1867. 
131 
In Capital Marx argues that, in all types of market economies, every commodity 
has a double-value: use-value, because of its material qualities, and exchange value, 
because a portion of social labour has been expended upon it. Exchange value 
presupposes use-value: the qualities which give a commodity use-value, in such a 
system, are the "material carriers of exchange value". Marx argues that the exchange 
value of a commodity is nothing but a fraction of "abstract human labour". As 
exchange value it has mainly quantitative significance, namely, as its amount itself 
can be measured by the "minimum socially necessary labour time" embodied in the 
production of the commodity. Socially necessary labour-time can be defined as "the 
labour time necessary to produce any use-value with the normal conditions of social 
production and social average degree of skill and intensity of labour". Marx argues 
that labour itself has no separate use-value if it is merely the expression of exchange 
value. In terms of schooling, the teachers' labour-power becomes mainly a means to 
create extra value for the entrepreneurs who own and control the schools, rather than 
being of maximum use-value for pupils (see Chapter Five). 
Marx argues that the commodity reflects the social character of labour. Under 
the market economy goods must have use-value but, for the producers, goods have 
only exchange value. A good only has use-value when it leaves the hands of the 
producer and is received by a consumer. In the process of exchange commodities, 
therefore, goods have exchange value and use-value. In this process the relation is a 
double one - of exchange value and use-value. Although exchange value is the 
equivalence of things which are embodiments of the same quantities of labour-time, it 
must also be related to specific use-values. 
A commodity, therefore, is something in addition to the limited capacity of a 
specific-value; it is also the carrier of exchange value and its universal equivalent is 
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money. Marx notes that exchange value is merely an abstraction that masks the nature 
of the social relations, and therefore also the alienating relations, involved in the 
market economy. Marx regards labour-power as a commodity which, as well as the 
means of production, the capitalist buys. After workers have produced a 
commodity, with the help of the means of production, the capitalist normally sells the 
produced commodity for more money than he advanced. The additional money is the 
surplus-value which, in capitalist terms, equals gross profit. 
4.8 The relevance of Marx's account of alienation to the twentieth century. 
In this section I examine the charge that, as the exact conditions of production 
which Marx described are now very rare in Western Europe, there is the argument 
that his theory of alienation is consequently no longer relevant (J. Wolff, 2002, p. 
110). In this section I note that property relations have remained fundamentally the 
same, even though the content of capitalism has changed from entrepreneurial 
capitalism to monopoly or corporate capitalism. 
To recall from Chapter Three, I note that entrepreneurial capitalism began to 
emerge at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Within the relations of 
entrepreneurial capitalism, it was relatively easy to identify the capitalists and 
workers. The capitalist legally owned the means of production and controlled labour- 
power quite directly. He personally bought the raw materials and was physically 
present to supervise labour-power and finished products. During the middle of the 
nineteenth century joint-stock companies began to replace family firms. Today almost 
all large firms have the legal form of joint-stock companies, with large amounts of 
money being invested in firms directly by means of shares or lent by way of bonds. 
Under this system there is often no single owner of a firm: ownership or control tends 
to lie with corporations and many of the `owners' (in the form of shareholders) may 
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have no other significant connection with the firm. The function of the capitalist 
therefore no longer rests with an individual: it is often performed collectively on a 
national or global basis. 
Moreover, economic control of large firms tends to be centred upon senior 
managers and directors of corporations, while day-to-day control of labour-power 
tends to be in the hands of junior managers or supervisors closer to the point of 
production. Nevertheless, the owners of the firms still retain ultimate control and can 
sack senior managers. Despite this change in these social relations, the organization 
of the economy is still based on the interests of private property. 
The means of maximising profit changed dramatically at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. These changes began in America, in response to a labour shortage 
which caused wages to rise dramatically. Because of this increase in wages, 
industrialists were persuaded that there was a large potential market for mass- 
produced goods. This form of production led the American F. W. Taylor to 
formulate a systematic theory of production based on a planned flow of processes, 
which in turn allowed for the `scientific management' of labour. `Taylorism', so- 
called, paved the way for the re-organization of entire production processes 
(sometimes by means of a moving assembly line) and their standardization. 
One of the first areas of production where this was applied was in the American 
car industry. Henry Ford initiated a production process organized around moving 
assembly lines. This modification of Taylorism became known as `Fordism'. It had 
four key elements: firstly, the separation of different work tasks between different 
groups of workers; secondly, the standardization of spare parts; thirdly, the 
arrangement of machines in the correct sequence required by a particular 
manufacturing process, and, finally the linking of the various parts of the production 
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process together by a conveyor belt or assembly line to facilitate the quick and 
efficient fulfilment of tasks. From a socio-psychological perspective some would no 
doubt argue that Taylorism and Fordism must increase alienation because working 
all day on a production line is boring (R Blauner, 1964). I argue in this thesis that it 
is not such practices in themselves which necessarily increase estrangement and 
alienation, but rather the structural relations of capitalism. 
There was a general post-World War II decline in Britain's share of the world 
export market for manufactured goods, which fell, for example, from 16.2% in 1961 
to 8.8% in 1981. The rate of capital investment in machinery and factories in the 
UK during this period was well below that of Japan and some other European 
countries, reflected in the then `productivity gap' between the UK and other major 
capitalist countries (S. Pollard, 1992, pp. 301-2 ). This process of decline was 
exacerbated by the ferocious competition to which British manufacturing was 
exposed after Britain was finally admitted to the European Economic Community in 
1973. This in turn led to large-scale restructuring of capital, resulting in mergers and 
acquisitions. It also led to firms, particularly large corporations, looking to diversify 
into other potential markets, including service areas such as education. 
In Chapter One I pointed out that, since 1979, successive governments have 
tried to develop external trade in UK services, including in education, by being at 
the forefront of creating a market in these services. The means by which this 
marketization has been attempted is outlined in Chapter One. 
By the 1970's the introduction of new computer-controlled technology enabled 
capitalists to employ fewer people, resulting in a fall in the cost of production. As a 
consequence many work processes have been restructured: they are now often 
divided into more specialized tasks which can easily be automated. For example, 
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during the 1980's and 1990's, such former white-collar jobs as messengers and 
typists became redundant or transformed as a result of word-processing and e-mail. 
Many of the new jobs created, therefore, demand more technical skills, schooling 
and flexibility than the old manufacturing or office jobs they often replaced. 
In modem times investment in technology means that white-collar jobs are no 
longer to be worked solely from `nine to five'. Under the pressure of global 
competition, many offices are now open twenty-four hours a day and many large 
firms use call-centres for low-level administrative tasks. Many white-collar workers 
are expected to undertake shift work, and many also use computers to work from 
home outside office hours. Therefore, for many, the number of hours at work is still 
quite high and as a further consequence of technology more speed, productivity and 
flexibility is expected from most workers. Therefore I conclude that Marx's concept 
of alienation is still as relevant as when he was writing. In the next section I consider 
some of the philosophical arguments made by some twentieth-century philosophers 
against the claim that Marx's analysis of alienation is still relevant. 
4.9 Criticisms of Marx's concept of alienation by some modern philosophers. 
Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia (Nozick, 1974) and Harry 
Brighouse, in his article "Should Marxists Care About Alienation? " (Brighouse, 
1996), have asserted that, since Marx was writing in the mid-nineteenth century, 
people have become more content at work on account of more congenial work 
conditions. For example, some individuals have been able to work from the alleged 
comfort of their own home. It has also been pointed out that real wages, and 
consequently living standards, are much higher for most workers than in Marx's time, 
thus allowing workers to buy more leisure activities. In this thesis I contend that, even 
when this is the case, the same economic relations are present as those in Marx's day 
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so that even though the contents of these relations are different, the structural 
relations of capitalism necessarily result in alienation. Even were these relations to 
appear to be favourable, the worker could not necessarily rely on such conditions 
continuing because of the nature of capitalist relations already outlined in this 
Chapter. Importantly, most workers still have had no choice but to sell their labour- 
power in order to survive. 
Nozick (1974) and Brighouse (1996) also argue that individuals should be 
able to choose alienated work if that is their preference. They argue that individuals 
may wish to undertake alienating work for a high remuneration. As was noted in 
Section 3.2, Nozick's concept of a meaningful life is informed by two main moral 
beliefs. Briefly, these are firstly, that one is regarded as an end (and not means), 
which may not be sacrificed for others' ends without one's consent; and that 
consequently one has the right to act in accordance with one's own choices unless, 
secondly, these choices infringe the equal right of others to liberty (Nozick, 1974, p. 
48 ). Moreover, Nozick also contends that if unalienating work is regarded as 
sufficiently important, it can be achieved by voluntary means through the market 
without the means of state intervention (Nozick, 1974, pp. 248-9). Nozick argues 
that, within "a free society" (Nozick, 1974, p. 252 ), powers of ownership could be 
extended if there were a sufficient number of individuals willing to form their own 
democratically-run co-operative firms (Nozick, 1974, pp. 250-3). However, Nozick 
acknowledges that within his system there would probably be a problem in 
"gathering" sufficient resources to set up such enterprises (Nozick, 1974, p. 253 ). 
In the next part of this section I concentrate on Brighouse's arguments against 
the Marxist concept of alienation, which are outlined in his article "Should Marxists 
Care About Alienation? " (Brighouse, 1996). In this article, Brighouse is 
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particularly exercised by the values implicit in Marx's concepts of both species-being 
and unalienated labour. Brighouse notes that alienation from species-being mirrors 
the traditional liberal concern with the preference that individuals should be, or be 
able to be, self-governing; and that lack of self-understanding and/or an 
understanding of "the network of social relations within which we act" (Brighouse, 
1996, p. 159 ) are barriers to self-governance. Moreover, Brighouse objects to the 
substantive concepts that Marx has of both species-being (Brighouse, 1996, pp. 
158-9 ) and of self-realization. 
Like Nozick, Brighouse starts from the position of accepting the existence of 
capitalist society. Within such structures he argues that, not to make available to 
everyone a variety of options about the kind of work to do and also to organize this 
work more rewardingly, would result in a loss of productivity and "a significant 
cost" which some would be unwilling to pay (Brighouse, 1996, p. 154). To recall, 
Brighouse argues that some individuals should be able choose an alienated form 
of labour if they so wish. However, in the same article Brighouse acknowledges that 
alienated labour is involuntary under capitalism, because alienated labour is often 
forced on individuals out of necessity. This situation, therefore, also raises the 
question as to whether or not individuals can exercise a high degree of autonomy 
within the capitalist system. 
Brighouse argues that, in the economies with which we are familiar, the 
preference for satisfying work is an expensive one, the fulfilment of which also has 
costs for those who do not share it. As a result, Brighouse concludes that within 
capitalist relations it is wrong to accord unalienated activity high priority in the 
design of social institutions simply because we think alienation is a bad thing 
(Brighouse, 1996, p. 156-7 ). 
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Next, I turn to Brighouse's observations about Marx's concept of species-being. 
Brighouse argues that Marx's concept of human nature gives precedence to 
creativity and production (Brighouse, 1996, p. 158 ) and, therefore, argues that 
" the particular notion of species-being [no hyphen in original] is unacceptably non- 
neutral" (Brighouse, 1996, p. 158 ). That is, Brighouse argues that Marx's concept is 
not compatible with his (Brighouse's) "value-neutral" form of liberalism. I maintain 
that this form is in fact based on a specific set of values: it is a form of liberalism 
which gives precedence to individual autonomy and choice (Section 2.5.1). 
Nevertheless, Brighouse argues that " the idea that we should not be alienated 
from our species being, [sic] whatever that is.... " (Brighouse, 1996, p. 159) is 
unacceptably non-neutral if it implies, as he believes it does, that alienation is 
morally wrong. Brighouse argues that it is only if Marxism did not claim that 
alienation was morally wrong, but merely gave a description of the content of 
structural relations, that he [Brighouse] could support it as a form of `liberal 
Marxism': 
On this kind of account [of Marxism, GT ] it would not be claimed 
that alienated lives are to be considered intrinsically inferior to 
unalienated lives. But, it could be said, capitalist social institutions 
systematically deprive everyone (or nearly everyone) of the 
opportunity to live unalienated lives (Brighouse, 1996, p. 155). 
However, Brighouse acknowledges that, if Marxism made choice for alienated 
or unalienated activity optional, it could not necessarily aim to eliminate the 
evils of capitalist society, which is one of the main reasons for its existence 
(Brighouse, 1996, p. 155). I consider that this results in rendering implausible 
Brighouse's argument about the viability of his criticisms. Brighouse is rejecting 
Marx's proposals for overcoming alienation and would prefer to have alienation 
within his system than to embrace the substantive values which, I contend, are part of 
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Marx's theory. I maintain that because Brighouse's conclusion results in an 
acceptance of capitalism, this conclusion narrows choice to only those activities 
which are enabled by the structures and conditions found within capitalism. For 
example, because the structures of Brighouse's model do not support unalienated 
activity, it necessarily results in the inability of individuals to necessarily choose 
unalienated activity. 
I note that Marx has never held unalienated activity to be possible for working 
people within the conditions and relations of capitalism because, for Marx, the 
conditions and relations of capitalism are oppositional to unalienated activity and 
consequently cannot prefigure it. Therefore, I maintain that Brighouse is in fact 
criticising Marx's concept of a fully-fledged communist society, and not merely 
Marx's ethical ideas. This is because Brighouse is aware that, for Marx, alienated 
activity would not be possible within the structures and conditions found in a 
capitalist society. Importantly, Brighouse argues as he does despite his recognition 
that the conditions and social relations which give rise to alienation, also 
compromise the ability to be rationally self-governing (Brighouse, 1996, p. 159 ). 
As is noted in Section 2.5.2, this ability to be self-governing is, of course, 
fundamental to Brighouse's concept of justice. 
In conclusion: in this chapter I argue that Marx never held that unalienated 
activity was possible for working people within the conditions and relations of 
capitalism. For Marx, the conditions and relations of capitalism are oppositional to 
unalienated activity and therefore dehumanising. For Brighouse to accept Marx, 
Marx would have to argue both a) that it is possible for working people to opt out 
of alienated labour within capitalism, and b) that it should be also possible for 
alienated labour to exist within a fully-fledged communist society. In this Chapter I 
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have argued that Brighouse is in fact criticising a fully-fledged communist society, 
and not merely Marx's ethical ideas, because he is aware that, for Marx, alienated 
activity would not be possible in such a society. This is also despite Brighouse's 
recognition that the conditions which give rise to alienation would also 
compromise the ability to be self-governing (Brighouse, 1996, p. 159 ). 
In this chapter, I note that Nozick and Brighouse do not make the option for 
unalienated labour available. Importantly, the inability to make alienated activity 
available to those who would choose it is one of the main reasons which Brighouse, 
in his 1996 article, uses to criticise Marx's definition of alienation. In this chapter I 
argue that Brighouse fails to make unalienated activity available because he 
supports a system based on a specific set of values, which gives preference to 
individual autonomy and choice. I therefore argue that, because his theory is not 
value-neutral and, on Brighouse's own terms, political theories should be value- 
neutral, his main argument against Marx's theory of alienation fails. In the next 
chapter I explore the alienating relations found in schooling since the time of Marx, 
with particular emphasis on how the marketization of school provision and schooling 
has increased these relations from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. 
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Part Two 
Chapter Five 
A Marxian analysis of alienation applied to schooling in England in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. 
Introduction 
Marx did not write a systematic treatise on education, and does not appear to have 
directly applied his concept of alienation to any of the comments that he did make 
about schooling. At the time Marx was writing, politicians and industrialists maintained 
that schooling was increasingly necessary for the development of the economic base of 
society and, as a result, politicians gradually supported the schooling of the children of 
working people. Marx was against either the state or the church controlling schooling 
(Marx, 1974[b], p. 357), supporting the argument favoured by the General Council that 
education could be national without being governmental (S. Padover, 1973, p. 114 
[quoting from the minutes of the General Council of the First International, 10 August, 
1869]). Importantly, Marx realised that a change of both conditions and social relations 
was necessary for there to be an unalienated system of education (S. Padover, 1973). 
The conditions and relations Marx considered to be important are explored in Chapter 
Nine. 
In the present chapter I attempt to apply Marx's concept of alienation to schooling 
in England in, and since, the nineteenth century. I begin this chapter by considering the 
alienating relations that existed within the type of school provision in Marx's time. I then 
consider why alienating relations exist in schooling in England today, and show how they 
have been intensified by the marketization of school provision. I do this within the 
context of the two representative market models of school provision, analyzed in 
142 
Chapter Two. I maintain that the `lightly regulated' model of a school market and a 
specifically regulated model are different ends of a market spectrum which is subject to 
the fundamental social relations of capitalism, and therefore which is necessarily subject 
to the same alienating relations. 
5.1 The development of schooling between 1830 and 1879. 
In the early nineteenth century there was a limited demand for literate labour and 
consequently the state did not intervene to enable schooling. Schooling in England was 
entirely controlled by private people and organizations. E. G. West in his article 
"Resource Allocation and Growth in Early Nineteenth Century British Education" argues 
that lots of very poor families paid for schooling in the early nineteenth century. ' 
H. J. Kiesling (1983) in his critique of E. G. West's article argues that this was not so 
because, of those working-class parents paying fees, the overwhelming number would 
have been paying a proportion of fees of less than 50% of the cost. Kiesling notes that 
64% of working class pupils attended religious monitorial schools, the cheapest schools 
and those which were mainly interested in teaching morals and catechism (Kiesling, 
1983, p. 423). 
There were areas of dispute between Kiesling and West over the accuracy of statistics, 
the difference in statistics from different decades, the relevance (or not) of Scottish 
comparisons, the difference between `not [currently] receiving instruction' and `not 
instructed' (i. e. relating to pupils attending school for a few years only) and also the 
implication of family size (West, 1983). West appeared to concede that parental finance 
would have normally been less than half the cost of schooling in the case of most 
1 In his Ph. D. thesis, James Tooley (1994[a], pp. 328-339) argued that if E. G. West's arguments were 
correct households in the twentieth century could afford private schooling if they `cut down' on luxuries. 
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(working-class) parents. Following Hobsbawm (E. Hobsbawm, 1999, Diagram 8a), I have 
assumed that the working class would likely have been about four times the size of the 
lower middle class, and that the upper working class referred to would have been of the 
order of the top 10-15% of those classified as working class. West also stated (West, 
1983, p. 432) that the fact that many pupils were excluded from the market in school 
provision (presumably by poverty) was not an `inefficiency' of the market, but was 
instead a `prior constraint'. It was also noted that at some points the debate neglected the 
problem of parents affording the schooling of more than one child at once. As a result, I 
do not consider that West's arguments on the affordability of schooling prior to 1870 
have been proved to the extent claimed by Tooley (Tooley, 1994[a], pp. 328ff). 
5.2 Base and superstructure, related to schooling. 
As was noted in Section 3.1, by the end of the eighteenth century less and less land 
was given to agricultural use and as a result Britain came to rely on imports for 
foodstuffs, especially grain. Britain paid for these imports by exporting industrial 
products and `invisible' exports such as shipping, insurance services and financial 
services, within a market which became increasingly international from the 1850's. The 
trend towards the creation of international markets in heavy manufacturing, textiles and 
invisible services increased in the mid-nineteenth century as a result of the growth in 
world trade. Several European countries, especially Germany, began to increase their 
technical competence and investment and British industrialists believed that Britain's 
position as a multinational trader was under threat. 
Industrialists began to realise that schooling for the artisan and lower middle classes 
was important if British industry were to compete in both technique and cost with 
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industrialists in Europe. Endemic crime, social unrest and fear of social disintegration 
also prompted the state to directly intervene in schooling (Stephens, 1998, pp. 77,101). 
In early 1870 W. E. Forster presented his Elementary Education Bill, arguing that: 
Upon the speedy provision of elementary education depends our industrial 
prosperity. It is of no use trying to give technical teaching to our artisans 
[sic] without elementary education; uneducated labourers - and many of 
our labourers are utterly uneducated - are, for the most part, unskilled 
labourers, and if we leave our work-folk any longer unskilled, 
notwithstanding their strong sinews and determined energy, they will 
become overmatched in the competition of the world (H. C. Debs., 1870). 
The `Forster' Act of 1870 made schooling compulsory for 5-12 year olds, and stated 
that a primary school should be within the geographical reach of every child in England. 
It also enabled grants to be given to the voluntary sector in areas where schooling was not 
already provided. All but the very poor paid fees so the reform cost little, but there was 
increased state funding for the public inspection of schools. School Boards made grants to 
existing Church schools or, where no schools existed, erected their own elementary 
schools. Such schools were managed by School Boards that were answerable to either 
Parish Councils or Borough Councils. These Boards gave some communities an 
incentive to become actively involved in the education in their areas (W. B. Stephens, 
1998, pp. 79,101). 
In 1902 the government decided to bring schooling under government control and 
in the same year the `Balfour' Education Act created Local Education Authorities 
(LEAs), thereby bringing education under the direct control of local government, and 
thus ultimately under government control (W. B. Stephens, 1998, p. 101). This brought 
schools directly into the superstructure of society (as defined in Section 4.7.1) although in 
practice LEAs did not exercise much control over schools, and especially not over the 
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Church schools. Although from the late nineteenth century governments had considered 
state elementary schools as places where future workers were trained in the skills, 
attitudes and values needed by capital, it was as a result of the `Butler' Education Act 
1944 that secondary schooling became universally available. After the Education Act 
1944, almost all the expenditure on public-sector schooling came either from the national 
exchequer or from local taxation (the `rates'/council tax), bringing schools under the 
direct control of the state. Because schools were not directly generating surplus-value 
for the capitalists, a growing portion of educational expenditure was regarded, by many 
owners of capital, as being consumed unproductively (in economic terms); and so was 
regarded as a drain on their profits. 
As was noted in Section 4.8, towards the end of the long post-World War II economic 
boom, schooling gradually began to be regarded also as a potential export, particularly 
when the rate of capital investment in machinery and factories in the UK was well below 
that of Japan and of many other European countries. This latter factor had resulted in 
the `productivity gap' between the UK and these other countries. As Kevin Harris (1982) 
noted: 
since capitalism is firmly stuck with its ideological commitment to and 
political need of compulsory schooling, and possibly with lengthening the 
average period of schooling, the only possibility open is to turn some 
aspects of educational expenditure towards counteracting the drain on 
surplus value (K. Harris, 1982, p. 68). 
Towards the end of the 1970's, this `productivity gap' led to the start of large scale 
restructuring of capital in the UK, resulting in many mergers and acquisitions. This 
economic move was supported by the followers of Hayek and Friedman, who also 
sought to reduce government funding for public services, including schooling. This 
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process gradually led to the call for the privatization of public services, including school 
provision. This meant that public services, including schooling, became more tightly 
incorporated into the economic life of society, or what Marx calls the "base"; and 
subject to economic rules and relations of the market. 
Even in David Cameron's speech on "The Big Society" (Cameron, 2010[a]), where 
communities are supposed to be more empowered, the control of schools still lies 
substantially with private companies (Cameron, 2010[a], p. 4); with communities taking 
over the running of parks, libraries and post offices (Cameron, 2010[a], p. 5). 
5.3 The relevance of Marx's analysis of alienation to the marketization of school 
provision and schooling, since 1979. 
In Chapter One I show how, since 1979, successive governments have tried to 
develop schooling in a direction that will assist the success of the UK trade in 
services (Baker, 1993, p. 177; DfES, 2004, pp. 5,73). Although at the start of this 
period the state was the main employer in schooling, there were moves to make many 
areas of school provision and schooling not then directly controlled by commercial 
interests nevertheless subject to the rules and relationships of the market. In Chapter 
One, I also show how as part of this process governments have sought to involve 
business and industry in the running and funding of schools (Baker, 1993, p. 177; DfES, 
2004, pp. 5,10,73). In this chapter I aim to show how within this process the economic 
relations involved in the production of goods and services remains similar to those of 
Marx's day. In Marx's day most education in England was provided by private schools. 
In these profit-making schools the aim was to produce profit over and above the value 
represented by teachers' wages, leading Marx to compare teachers, in these schools, 
with productive workers who produced surplus-value for capitalists: 
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If we may take an example from outside the sphere of material production, 
a school master is a productive labourer, when in addition to belabouring 
the heads of his pupils, he works himself into the ground to enrich the 
owner of the school. That the latter has laid out his capital in a teaching 
factory, instead of a sausage factory, makes no difference to the relation 
(Marx, 1979[a], p. 644). 
Marx clearly implies that teachers in such schools experienced alienation in the same 
way, and for the same reasons, as other workers situated within private property relations. 
I discuss these relations in more detail in Sections 5.3.1 to 5.4. 
From World War II until the later part of the twentieth century most teachers in 
England alienated (verauseerung) their labour-power to the state and not to a private 
employer. I maintain that as a result of verauseerung, such teachers were still necessarily 
subject to the alienating relations discussed in Section 4.4.1 although the employer was 
the state. As Harris (1982) points out, such teachers work for a wage and are contracted 
to perform agreed-on activities in return for agreed-on remuneration. As a consequence, 
teachers "have little occupational independence, little control over their labour process, 
and little access to the means of production" (Harris, 1982, p. 70). In Chapter One, I note 
that the trend is recently towards more teachers being employed by the private sector 
and I predict in Section 1.5 that this trend is likely to increase. Whether employment is by 
the state or private firms, teachers still alienate their labour-power, resulting in a lack of 
control over their activities. As a result of increased control by the private sector over the 
process of schooling, the work of teachers and consequently the subjective life of 
teachers, becomes directly subject to corporate values and goals. In the next part of this 
chapter, I explain why such a process necessarily results in relinquishment of control and 
estrangement (Section 4.4.1, to the detriment of the education of pupils. 
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5.3.1 Alienation when schooling is provided within private property relations. 
To recall briefly, in Chapter Four I note that according to Marx's analysis the 
alienating relations which result from verauseerung (selling one's labour-power ) 
within private property relations (which would include a private provider of schools) 
are a) lack of control of productive activity; b) instrumentality of productive activity, 
and c) the inability of labour to objectify itself in a way which confirms itself (Marx, 
1975[fJ, pp. 327-8). 1 now intend to describe these relations in the context of the 
marketization of school provision, and to show how alienating relations subvert and 
distort the educational process. 
Within private property relationships, labour-power is of value to the owners of 
capital in so far as it creates surplus-value (Section 2.1). In the present chapter I show 
that, in the search to create profits, both the concern with results in terms of league tables 
and the image of their particular school in the market place become major pre- 
occupations of teachers. They consequently perceive their job security to rest, at least 
partly, on projecting a `good' image of the school. Moreover, pupils in this process 
become instrumental to the needs of the school and so exist, in the eyes of the school 
sponsors, for the school rather than the school for them. Therefore pupils become mainly 
`things' which have value in the market (S. Ball, 2004, p. 6), and therefore schools 
would seek to attract pupils who are perceived to be the easiest and cheapest to teach 
and, plausibly, more likely to attract other like pupils. 
As an essential part of such processes, grades and examination passes become the 
main indicators of success, and parents and pupils perceive good grades as merely 
tradeable assets in the job market. Importantly, successive governments have used 
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GCSE passes and SAT grades to decide on grants for particular schools and, in some 
cases, whether or not the schools concerned should stay open. 
Because the GCSE A*- C band is a key indicator, teachers are encouraged to prioritize 
situations which will ensure that the maximum number of pupils' results are GCSE A*- 
C passes. Because pupils with potential A* to B grades fall in the same band as pupils 
with potential Cs, many pupils in the A*- B band are marginalized in favour of those 
who are in the D band, especially if the latter are borderline Cs. As a result, the 
educational needs of many pupils are sacrificed to the measurement of a school's success 
in the terms laid down by the government's market reforms. 
The drive towards gaining good results in league tables also affects the way the 
curriculum is delivered. Already, some teachers have been required to use 
computer technology in order to assist major corporations to design teaching programs, 
which will then be the exclusive copyright of these firms, with many teachers receiving 
no extra payment or recognition for this (Hallgarten, J. 2003). The result is the 
production of a program over which such teachers have no control, and which is 
commodified solely to make a profit for computer firms. As a result, teachers will not 
necessarily be enabled to exercise their powers and abilities in a `fully human' way or 
to enter into positive social relations with their pupils, and as a consequence both the 
teachers and the pupils become dehumanised. 
I maintain that the internal relationships entailed in schooling in a market situation 
necessarily result in estrangement (entfremdet) between teachers and pupils, since both 
see each other in instrumental terms rather than as partners in the learning process. As a 
result, for many pupils, meaning in general lies outside school: and as a consequence a 
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significant number of pupils will truant or be excluded from school. 
5.4 Alienation in the market models of Tooley and Brighouse. 
The alienating relations outlined above can be found in the process of the 
marketization of schools which I describe in Chapter One, regardless of whether the 
market is specifically or lightly regulated. To briefly recall, in Chapter Two I note that 
within a lightly regulated market, the control of schools and schooling resources is 
exercised mainly by those entrepreneurs who fund the schooling. This removes control 
from those who use schools and work within them, and delivers it to those whose main 
aim is to create wealth. Even if the latter have some interest in education they are 
involved qua business people. I note in Section 2.5.3 that a more regulated market in 
school provision was argued for by Harry Brighouse as a means for supporting quality 
of provision. However, in Section 1.3 1 produce empirical evidence to show why, to 
date, this type of regulation has not worked in England. For example, in Section 1.3 I 
note that in June 2000 Capital Strategies issued a report entitled The Business of 
Education (Capital Strategies, 2000) in which they recorded that businesses threatened 
not to invest in schooling unless regulations were changed about the length and 
complexity of the bidding process, the constraints of the National Curriculum and the 
time allowed to reach targets. Capital Strategies also noted that these education 
businesses demanded more strategic control of schools and the ability to control 
governing bodies. 
In this section I specifically explore the alienating relations which are found in both 
the `specifically regulated' and `lightly regulated' markets in school provision as 
illustrated by Harry Brighouse and James Tooley respectively and argue that, because 
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these models are towards opposite ends of the market spectrum within the capitalist 
system, they point to conclusions for capitalist markets as a whole. In this exploration I 
employ similar conceptual categories to those employed by Marx in "Manuscripts" 
(Marx, 1975[fj, pp. 327-328). 
The teachers working within the models of both Tooley and Brighouse have to sell 
(alienate) their labour to the owners of the schools (or the state) in order to acquire the 
goods and conditions needed to live. To recall, as a result, the control of the teacher's 
productive activity is handed over to the owners of the school. These owners will control 
the conditions of work of the teachers, the curriculum and the ethos of the school. As a 
result teachers, as workers, have to work within the structures, goals and values set by 
the owners. As a consequence, productive activity does not necessarily satisfy the 
teacher's needs, but is merely instrumental to satisfying needs outside of himself or 
herself, thus dehumanising the teacher as a worker (Marx, 1975[f], p. 326). I maintain 
that this alienation occurs regardless of whether the market is `lightly regulated', in the 
case of Tooley, or `specifically regulated' as in the case of Brighouse. Interestingly, 
Brighouse does not mention the regulation that could be used to protect workers: his 
regulation is specifically in order to ensure that pupils have an education which would 
allow them to lead autonomous lives. Even if such regulation for teachers and other 
school staff as workers did exist within Brighouse's model, it could not mitigate the 
alienating relations which necessarily exist within capitalism. 
Within Tooley's model, schooling is provided by business men/women as primarily 
a means to generate profit. Indeed Tooley acknowledges that, although the business 
people in his model would be specialists in education, their predominant aim as business 
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people would be to generate a profit (Tooley, 2000, p. 19). In the case of Tooley's model, 
parents are paying customers and so, the greater the perceived quality of a school, for 
example in terms of examination passes, the larger the number of parents who would 
want to send their children to a particular school. Because of the lack of government 
regulation within Tooley's model, if particular pupils are felt to be detrimental to the 
reputation of the school, or if the cost of their schooling is likely to be relatively high, 
they could be refused entry or could even be asked to leave a particular school. 
To recall briefly, Brighouse's model is also based on choice-based mechanisms 
which may be situated within a market. Within this model, social individuals are put in 
competition with others and pupils as a consequence are taught to perceive other pupils as 
adversarial to them. This form of education is, therefore, corrosive to both social cohesion 
and to an appreciation of social interdependence. In Brighouse's model the government 
pays subsidies to a particular school according to the number of parents choosing to send 
their children there. Brighouse acknowledges that, in the case of oversubscribed schools, 
the schools choose the pupils and not vice versa. As an alternative to overt choice by 
schools, Brighouse recommends the use of a lottery as a solution to oversubscription 
(Brighouse, 2000, p. 52). Later, in On Education, Brighouse argues that such a 
method would not be applicable in the UK, both because of political opposition and also 
because of the different laws on religious schools (Brighouse, 2006, p. 91). 
Instrumentality can be found in the market models of both Tooley and Brighouse. 
This results in estrangement (entfremdet) between teachers and pupils, as both perceive 
each other in instrumental terms, rather than as partners in a learning process. Teachers, 
because they have sold (alienated) their labour-power to the sponsors of the schools, have 
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to implement the goals of the sponsors, which will be primarily concerned with making a 
profit: this is the case even when the main business of the sponsor is schooling (see 
Section 2.1 for a discussion of this argument). To recall, this could result in conditions 
and relations which are adverse to the pupil's learning such as large classes or a narrow 
curriculum (see Section 2.1). These conditions and relations would result in many pupils 
finding it difficult to get the schooling that they need. If pupils demand a change in these 
conditions and relations, but teachers could not effect such a change, a breakdown in trust 
and respect would result, and schooling would become perceived as something alien to 
the needs of both pupils and teachers. 
Moreover, the lack of control which comes from selling one's labour-power to a 
private sponsor within Tooley's model means that teachers cannot necessarily be 
assured that they can teach in a way which they believe to be meaningful. This lack of 
control must necessarily result in alienation. This alienation will also occur in 
Brighouse's model, whether teachers alienate their labour-power to private sponsors or to 
the state. However, I contend that alienating relations will be greater within Tooley's 
model because schools will be owned mainly by entrepreneurs in education whose 
purpose as entrepreneurs will be primarily to make a profit (Tooley, 2000, p. 19). 
Because pupils will be educated within a system in which schooling is valued even more 
as something instrumental to employment or to making a profit, the processes of 
schooling within the systems of both Tooley and Brighouse increasingly distort and 
devalue the processes of education. As a consequence, education becomes redefined and 
changes its meaning, becoming something more akin to commodity production. 
Within Tooley's model the only possibility of parents influencing their children's 
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schooling is through the market. Within market structures, pupils who cannot gain access 
to schools of their choice are individuals with unsatisfied economic demands, not 
individuals with unsatisfied human needs. Therefore, within such a model, the economic 
relations which are necessarily created are those that enable private possession to be 
satisfied at the expense of human need ( Section 2.1). In this process pupils and 
teachers are valued mainly as commodities and, as a consequence, pupils are 
encouraged to perceive other social individuals as mainly instrumental to their goals. 
In conclusion: I have argued in this chapter that, as a consequence of marketization 
of school provision and schooling, the productive activity of teachers has become more 
alienated ( entfremdet) and the process of education more distorted. This is because both 
`specifically regulated' and `lightly regulated' markets are models within capitalism, 
albeit at opposite ends of the spectrum of market relations. 
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Part Three: Market socialism and alienation 
Chapter Six 
An analysis of market socialism as an `end-state', with reference to school 
provision and alienation. 
Introduction 
This chapter explores some of the attempts made to escape alienation, as 
defined by Marx, within various forms of market socialism. This exploration begins 
by examining the concept of market socialism proposed by David Miller in his 
article "Socialism and the market" (1977) and further developed in Market, State and 
Community (1999). The application of Miller's ideas to schooling was undertaken 
by Patricia White in Beyond Domination (1983). The term `market socialism' was 
used in the 1930's to refer to the concept used by writers such as the Polish economist 
and diplomat, Oskar Lange. Although Lange's model has been labelled as a form of 
market socialism, it is fundamentally different in form and content from that of David 
Miller, as is discussed separately in Chapter Seven. 
Briefly, Lange supports classical markets in consumer goods and labour-power and 
uses an adaptation of a planned economy with quasi-market mechanisms, for heavy 
industry. Miller makes a more extensive use of markets than does Lange (Miller, 
1999, p. 9, n. 15). In Market, State and Community, Miller argues for the use of 
markets and contends that, given certain conditions (discussed in the next section), 
it is possible to counter alienation within markets. In this chapter I show why it is not 
possible to counter alienation using the methods that Miller suggests. 
1 In these industries managers are allowed to adjust inputs and outputs according to the indicators 
found in models of `markets' (such as pricing), together with agreed pre-set criteria. 
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6.1 David Miller's model of market socialism. 
6.1.1 Miller's rationale for the market. 
Miller gives five reasons for supporting the existence of a regulated market 
as a fundamental structure of his model (Miller, 1999, p. 18). Firstly, Miller 
argues for the presumed efficiency of the market; secondly, for the ability "to 
confine the economic role of the state in a way that makes democratic government 
feasible"; thirdly, for the ability "to protect the autonomy of workers"; fourthly, for 
the ability to "to bring about a much more equal distribution of primary income 
(rather than relying entirely on secondary distribution)" (Miller, 1999, pp. 9-10 ), and 
finally, says Miller, the development of the individuality of each individual is 
thereby potentially enabled (Miller, 1999, p. 213). The first two reasons cited 
above concern the regulation of markets. The weakness of regulation in the market in 
school provision is illustrated in Sections 1.3.1 and 2.7. 
Miller argues that the individuality of workers is protected by the market in four 
main ways. Firstly, Miller argues that market structures, by supporting exchange 
value, enable an individual to develop both his individuality and his individual 
powers (Miller, 1999, p. 213). Miller argues that this is because market structures 
confer a kind of negative freedom, which enables the individual to have "a certain 
kind of independence from material and social ties" (Miller, 1999, p. 210), and a 
"degree of autonomy" (Miller, 1999, p. 211). The impossibility of having a high 
degree of autonomy within capitalist markets is discussed in Section 4.9. 
Secondly, Miller argues that when markets supply goods and services to 
consumers they "circumvent judgments about the intrinsic goodness or badness of 
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what is supplied" (Miller, 1999, p. 74 ). Miller goes on to argue that markets are 
"neutral with respect to the relationships that people choose to establish for the 
purpose of carrying on economic activity " (Miller, 1999, p. 74). Miller defines 
neutrality in terms of effects rather than in terms of the rationale that lies behind 
institutions. For Miller, neutrality is defined as "when, as far as can reasonably be 
foreseen, it does not favour any particular conception of the good at the expense of 
others" (Miller, 1999, p. 77). 
Thirdly, Miller argues that the relationships involved in market exchange 
support a kind of equality. This is because individuals and individual legal entities 
who meet in the market simply do so as bearers of exchange value, and so are 
necessarily equals in the legal sense (Miller, 1999, p. 212). Fourthly, Miller argues 
that the mobility of labour, forced upon the individual by the law of supply and 
demand, has forced the worker to develop many skills; and hence to develop himself 
further (Miller, 1999, p. 212). 
Miller argues also that the properties of a market should be preserved, provided 
that the alienating "properties" outlined by Marx (Miller, 1999, pp. 207-8) can be 
"countered" (Miller, 1999, p. 223). Miller defines alienation as "a condition where 
a subject finds himself separated from some feature of his context, this separation 
being regarded as damaging in human terms" (Miller, 1999, p. 203). However, unlike 
Marx, Miller does not outline the causes of alienation. Despite the fact that Miller 
does not analyze the causes of alienation, he argues that capitalist alienation can be 
countered if market conditions become the expression of collective will, based on 
humane and co-operative dispositions within the structures of a "democratic" market 
economy (Miller, 1999, pp. 221-3). 1 explore this argument further in Section 6.2.2. 
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Next, I place Miller's argument in context by outlining Miller's model of the 
economy. 
6.1.2 An analysis of Miller's system of self-governing enterprises. 
In Miller's economy capital is treated as a social resource and "any worker who 
wanted to could readily obtain access to his own capital" (Miller, 1999, p. 196), with 
the following provisions: 
individuals can acquire resources only through engaging in productive 
activity, and these resources, once acquired, cannot be converted into 
private capital. People can save, receive interest on their savings that 
reflects a time discount, but they cannot lease their assets to other 
individuals on terms that represent a return to the assets themselves. 
Capital investment remains the prerogative of the public agencies 
(Miller, 1999, p. 197). 
This capital is distributed through state-funded investment banks, subject to 
stipulations laid down by the state (Miller, 1999, p. 312). Miller claims that this 
indirect form of leasing protects the autonomy of self-governing firms from direct 
state interference. This makes the form of political economy which Miller advocates 
fundamentally different from that advocated by Oskar Lange, and discussed in 
Section 7.2. In order to prevent direct interference from the state, Miller advocates a 
plurality of investment banks, which are allowed to decide what investments to 
make, within government remits which balance profitability against wider national 
and regional economic objectives (Miller, 1999, pp. 310-312). This mandate would 
include the duty to sponsor co-operatives by allocating capital to a) the expected 
profitability of enterprises; b) enterprise creation; c) employment needs; d) market 
opportunities, e) local needs, and f) environmental needs (Miller, 1999, pp. 310-11). 
Miller is not totally explicit about the conditions of leases for capital goods or for 
land, but he suggests that a) lessees agree to pay lease charges; b) that lessees 
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cannot sublet or transfer capital assets to anyone else, or c) use the initial capital to 
create further private capital (Miller, 1999, p. 197). 
Worker/producers are likely to have to report to investment banks (which are 
national banks) annually on the profitability of their businesses and to work within 
the stipulations the banks lay down .2 Although 
banks are at `arms length' in Miller's 
model, they are partly funded by tax revenues and partly by savings. Miller argues 
that this protects the autonomy of the banks and also protects particular business 
enterprises from direct political interference (Miller, 1999, p. 310). Miller argues that 
it is possible that the banks' performance might be reviewed by an appropriate 
representative body, who would decide how successfully each bank had fulfilled its 
various objectives over a large number of cases (Miller, 1999, p. 311). 
However, Miller argues that, irrespective of such governmental mandates, the 
goals of `a socialist state' would be best achieved "by, for instance, creating an 
appropriate incentive system and then allowing markets to operate; or by 
establishing semi-autonomous bodies acting under policy guidelines" (Miller, 1999, 
p. 319 ). As a result of both state mandates ( "semi-autonomous bodies acting under 
policy guidelines" and of market decision-making), decisions would be made with 
no direct input from worker/producers or consumers. 
6.1.3 An exploration of Miller's political system. 
I now consider the type of state which would support Miller's economy. In his 
book Market, State and Community (1999), Miller outlines three main functions of 
his state. He says the first function of his state would be to safeguard the 
2 The revenue from leasing capital from investment banks goes to a social fund which is allocated 
according to principles of distributive justice (Miller, 1999, p. 197), based on shared standards (Miller, 
1999, p. 265). 
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resources and benefits that accrue to individuals (Miller, 1999, p. 295). The second 
function would be to allocate resources to meet the standards of distributive justice, 
that is, each individual would receive on average the exchange value that he has 
created (Miller, 1999, p. 175 ). 3 The third function that Miller recognizes is one of 
regulating the economy so that it satisfies the criteria of efficiency. This must include, 
for example, operating anti-trust legislation (thus ensuring that most industries remain 
competitive); encouraging the creation of new industries, and managing those parts of 
the economy (he mentions health and education) in which, for Miller, a private 
competitive solution is not applicable. Miller suggests choice-based mechanisms 
could be appropriate instead for health and education services. (Miller, 1999, p. 317). 
These structures would need to enable the dissemination of information to allow 
consumers to make effective choices, and to allow enterprises to plan their future 
activities with a maximum chance of success. In Miller's model, the state would 
provide training to allow people to switch skills, and to provide or enable public 
goods such as recreational facilities, public transport, and environmental 
protection (Miller, 1999, pp. 296-7). 
For most people, Miller envisages political activity mainly taking place in local 
assemblies, where individuals would act as representatives on a rotational basis 
(Miller, 1999, p. 301). These representatives would make ground rules and 
administrative priorities but would not become involved in the day-to-day 
management of resources (Miller, 1999, p. 236). The latter would be carried out by 
full-time salaried officials. In Miller's model, the higher levels of government would 
basically operate according to the principles of representative democracy, with an 
3 Here Miller does not seem to address such issues as disability or retirement. 
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election every five years between which powers would be given to operate without 
necessarily any recourse to the electorate. 
Miller argues that a constitution would be needed which would demarcate 
democratic citizenship from the sphere which, he argues, is rightfully occupied by 
specialists and administrators (Miller, 1999, p. 301 ). These specialists would be 
permanent, salaried officials appointed by the state because of their expertise and 
also their willingness to support constitutional guidelines (Miller, 1999, pp. 299, 
309 , 311,312,319 ). For Miller, such administrators would not be accountable to 
the electorate. This is because Miller argues that the electorate would not 
necessarily have the knowledge, or the time to acquire the knowledge, necessary to 
make informed decisions on technical matters (Miller, 1999, pp. 299-300,312). 
For Miller, the state would also be funding `expert' organizers and assigning full-time 
salaried officials to deliver a vast range of programmes. This would be expanding 
the role of the state, which would direct economic activity and social services, such 
as schooling, as a result of decision-making at a national level. In Section 6.2.1 I 
argue that such structures result in reified social relations over which social 
individuals have no control. In Section 6.2.1 also, I maintain that such reified 
social relations would be oppositional to the objective collective and co-operative 
relations needed to support the subjective co-operative and collective relations 
which Miller argues are necessary to overcome alienation (Miller, 1999, pp. 220-3 ). 
6.1.4 Miller and schooling. 
Miller does not write systematically about school provision in Market, State 
and Community (1999). However, he does "tip in favour" of a "public system" 
which incorporates "a substantial element of consumer choice" (Miller, 1999, p. 317) 
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and which he later acknowledges does create quasi-markets (Miller, 2000, p. 50 ). 
Miller is not, in principle, adverse to regulated markets for the distribution of public 
goods, provided that the state ensures that everyone has the ability to purchase the 
goods they need, whether through provision of income or by vouchers (Miller, 1999, 
p. 316 ). 
In England in 2009 a Trust Schools model of schooling (backed by the Co- 
operative movement) was proposed which would seem to be commensurate with 
schooling within Miller's model. In Section 1.3 I noted that Trust Schools were to 
be government funded and could join forces with business, charities and other 
public-sector organizations. By joining the Trust, members became part-owners of 
the school and could take part in choosing school trustees. Two of the people 
representing the wider community could sit on the board along with trustees from 
partner organizations. 
Trusts were to have powers to employ staff, own buildings and set their own 
admission policies. Trust schools could apply for `additional flexibilities' both for 
curriculum provision, and for pay and conditions of work for staff. Although Co- 
operative Trusts were to be free to set their own admissions policies, they were 
instructed to work with LEAs to ensure that they were complying with the 
framework set by the national admissions policy. 
Miller argues that "public welfare can contribute to egalitarian aims only in 
conjunction with a broader policy aimed at reducing inequalities in primary incomes" 
(Miller, 1999, p. 315 ). This raises an interesting debate, but it is one in which I 
have not engaged in this thesis because it is not central to my analysis of alienation. 
As noted in the previous section, in most areas of public sector Miller tends to 
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favour a "public system" which incorporates "a substantial element of consumer 
choice". He favours a market in housing (Miller, 1999, pp. 19,317) and does not rule 
out the use of a market mechanism in health and education (Miller, 1999, p. 314). 
However, Miller has two main reservations about markets. Firstly, he argues that 
efficiency is hard to assess in markets in the absence of a pricing mechanism (Miller, 
1999, p. 316): presumably he believes this will be the case in health and education. 
Secondly, Miller says that in markets consumer sovereignty is difficult to implement 
in a situation where recipients may not be competent to judge between various 
providers (Miller, 1999, pp. 316-7). It was noted in Chapter One that, in England 
since 1999, a pricing mechanism has been implemented which enables demand, in 
terms of the number of entrants, for particular schools to be rewarded by the 
government in terms of cash grants. (The problem of "product" information is, of 
course, being addressed continually by successive UK governments and, so far, has 
been addressed by the institutionalization of league tables and school testing). I now 
consider some criticisms of Miller's model. 
6.2 Criticisms of Miller's model. 
6.2.1 Oppositional relations in Miller's model of `non-exploitative capitalism'. 
It was noted in Section 6.1.2 that, in Miller's model, capital is socialized and 
situated within what he claims to be `non-exploitative capitalist relations' (Miller, 
1999, p. 196). I maintain that the leasing of capital to individual collectives of 
producers would necessarily result in the fragmentation of production and 
competition between co-operatives. As a consequence, social individuals seem to be 
independent of each other and `free' to exchange goods and services within this 
system. I also contend that such social relations would necessarily be oppositional to 
objective collective and co-operative relations needed to support the subjective co- 
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operative and collective relations which Miller argues are necessary to overcome 
alienation (Miller, 1999, pp. 220-3). In Miller's model, the co-operatives would 
operate in a similar mode to pre-capitalist artisans or journeymen, as considered in 
Section 3.1. Marx's position is that such an artisan relates to the instruments of 
production and the land "as an owner" (Marx, 1973 [a], p. 499). In the following 
section I consider the alienating relations which result from this. 
6.2.2 Alienating relations in Miller's model. 
In this section I argue that capitalism, even the `non-exploitative capitalism' of 
Miller, consists of relations which are necessarily alienating. Estrangement from 
collective activity, in Miller's model, is acknowledged by Miller himself for three 
main reasons. Firstly, Miller accepts that, within market economies, goods are 
primarily produced as commodities, and producers `have to be' concerned about what 
exchange value they receive if they are to remain in business. Miller observes that the 
need to create exchange value comes between producers' work and directly catering 
for human needs, and so must result in the dehumanization of the producer. (Miller, 
1999, pp. 205-6). Secondly, Miller notes that "partners to an exchange transaction 
are at best indifferent to one another's interests; at worst there is an active conflict of 
interests between them, and each will seek to benefit at the expense of the other", 
resulting in mutual suspicion and possible hostility (Miller, 1999, p. 206 ). Thirdly, 
Miller argues that alienation "from the collective results of human activity seems to 
be a feature of all market economies merely in [sic] virtue of the fact that they are 
unplanned" (Miller, 1999, p. 207, GT's italics). Miller acknowledges that "in this 
sense man is, in Marx's terms, `the plaything of alien powers' [Marx, 1975 [g], p. 
220] in a way that he seems not to be in an ideal planned economy, where every 
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outcome is directly related to a human decision, and social relations become [again in 
Marx's words] `transparent' " (Miller, 1999, p. 207, GT's italics ). 
I maintain in this chapter that, although co-operatives in Miller's model would 
not have full rights of ownership of the means of production, they would have 
full, exclusive rights of the use of capital for their own productive activities 
(Miller, 1999, p. 10). Therefore although worker/producers would not be `owners' of 
capital, in a market economy, they would operate as if they were capitalists. Indeed, 
Miller maintains that it is possible for capitalist relations to predominate within a 
system of `non-exploitative capitalism': 
The condition for this would be that any worker who wanted to could 
readily obtain access to his own capital - presumably from public 
sources - so that capitalist employment would represent a genuine 
choice (Miller, 1999, p. 196) 
Therefore, I contend that, although the private property relations of classical 
capitalism would have been taken over here by a form of collective control, the 
collective in which worker/producer act has a property relation with the rest of 
society as if it were a private possessor of property. 
Within this situation, the Marxian category of worker would not be abolished; 
workers would still alienate (sell) their skills and goods to other members of the 
community in return for money. As such, the economy is still primarily based on 
commodity production and exchange value. Within this situation, private property is 
still the relation that the community has to the world of things, and the community 
acts as if it were the `freehold' owner of capital. Consequently, the alienating relations 
outlined in Section 4.4 are still present. 
Within Miller's model, worker/producers have the right to autonomous control 
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over the goods produced, the productive process and the management structures [as 
long as they are democratic] (Miller, 1999, p. 10). The restriction on creating fresh 
capital assets is not as onerous as it might seem because many co-operatives would 
not usually use assets to create new capital. For example, a co-operative using a 
machine for, say, packing would not necessarily be likely to have the wherewithal 
to make another such machine. Importantly, however, Miller's model gives no 
indication as to how new capital would created. 
Miller acknowledges that, although workers no longer have to sell their labour- 
power (Miller, 1999, p. 198), there would still be a labour market. Although workers 
who both invest and work in the same firms are not selling their labour-power to an 
employer, they are still subject to the `market' which occurs as a result of workers 
having a free choice of which enterprise to join, and of the co-operative enterprises 
choosing how many worker/producers to take on (Miller, 1999, p. 198). 
Miller argues that the economic relations of market socialism will eliminate some 
aspects of alienation as diagnosed by Marx. In particular Miller states that "where 
work is organized co-operatively and the profits of enterprises are shared among all 
the members", workers will not be estranged from their products "given that they 
benefit directly from the sale of these products in the market place" (Miller, 1999, p. 
205). I contend that while it is true that, within Miller's model, workers have more 
control over productive activity than within classical capitalism, they are still subject 
to the market relations outlined in Sections 4.4 to 4.4.2. I also contend, however, 
that it is questionable whether alienating relations can be eliminated while 
investment banks are controlling the flow of capital within economic relations which 
are fundamentally capitalist. Importantly, Miller also acknowledges that, if 
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alienation cannot be adequately `countered', then this lack provides a strong 
objection to his model of a market economy (Miller, 1999, p. 223 ). 
I now turn to how Miller himself proposes to negate alienation (which, for Miller, 
is defined in Section 6.1.1). Miller bases his proposal on the example of a game of 
tennis to illustrate the possibility of the dual nature of economic relations. For 
Miller, these relations are instrumental, competitive and spontaneous as well as co- 
operative and humane within the same structure (Miller, 1999, p. 223 ). In his game 
of tennis Miller argues that, although on the surface the relationship between the 
players is competitive, under the surface in fact it can be co-operative. Miller argues 
that because both parties understand the co-operative character of the relationship, it 
is able to survive the apparent competitive nature of the game. 
In the above scenario, Miller ignores the effect of objective relations and argues 
that, within market socialism, social relations might not be alienating if their deeper 
co-operative character were to be understood and actively supported. From this 
argument, Miller concludes that "economic relations may take on a dual character, at 
one level instrumental, competitive, and spontaneous, but at another level human and 
co-operative" (Miller, 1999, pp. 221-3, GT's italics). However, Miller fails to show 
why social individuals should be human and co-operative within this situation in the 
first place. Moreover, Miller is also acknowledging that such non-alienating relations 
are contingent and therefore might or might not occur. Therefore, in his own analysis, 
Miller's method of overcoming alienation might or might not bring his desired result. 
To briefly recapitulate, Miller acknowledges that if alienating relations were to 
still exist in his system, then they would remain a powerful argument against market 
socialism (Miller, 1999, p. 223). Miller relies on a thought experiment based on a 
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tennis match to show how consciousness can overcome alienation. In this section I 
note that Miller's method advocates only a subjective means of overcoming 
alienation: the objective relations which support such alienating relations still remain; 
and, on Miller's view, the ability to overcome alienation is not guaranteed. 
6.3 Patricia White's model of a political economy. 
A model of democratic schooling which claims to be situated in the type of 
political economy advocated by Miller (Miller, 1999) is supplied by Patricia White 
in Beyond Domination (White, 1983). White argues that a "modified form of it 
[Miller's political economy] may be essential for the realization of some democratic 
values" (White, 1983, p. 48, GT's italics). White comes to this conclusion because 
she contends that it is "basic to the idea of the market that decisions to produce 
goods or services are made not by some authority but by the producers themselves 
with a view to selling to customers who have no obligation to buy from them" 
(White, 1983, p. 48). She goes on to argue that "such a market allows for 
individual initiative, flair and ingenuity in producing goods in a way in which non- 
market public ownership systems [presumably of a non-democratic type - GT] do 
not" (White, 1983, p. 49). White also contends that: 
The market system in the participatory democracy allows for the 
exercise of imaginative business flair extolled by businessmen in our 
present society but without the morally obnoxious motivations often 
associated with that in practice - the desire for individual 
aggrandizement, for instance, or the desire to exercise power over 
others .... (White, 
1983, p. 49 ). 
White contends that, in a participatory society, the motivations are 
different and include "the desire to make a profit for the community generally, 
to enhance the quality of life in it and the satisfaction of working with others 
on a project which has been jointly planned, developed and organized" 
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(White, 1983, p. 49). I now consider White's political economy in order to 
show the similarities between her model and that of David Miller. Like 
Miller, White supports an economy based on self-governing workers' co- 
operatives, within which worker/producers make their own decisions about 
production and prices, and which lease their capital from the state (White, 
1983, p. 48). 
White supports a broad system of community regulation as a means to ensure 
that the needs of the wider community are addressed. For White, this regulation 
would be decided by an elected National Forum. This National Forum would be a 
representative, rather than a participatory body; and members would be elected on a 
one- member-one-vote basis. Members of the National Forum would not be present 
as delegates and would not be subject to recall even if its policies proved unpopular 
with the electorate ( White, 1983, pp. 40-1). White argues that a National Forum is 
necessary for three main reasons: firstly, to ensure that constitutional rights are 
protected; secondly, to provide a monitoring/co-ordinating role outside the network of 
local groups, and thirdly to arbitrate where preferences in society are divided (White, 
1983, pp. 82-3). 
White does not debar decisions being made by specialists, but stipulates that such 
specialists should be accountable to fellow members of the workforce (White, 1983, p. 
52). In this way her model of democracy differs from Miller's. White's rationale for 
this structure is that the monitoring/co-ordinating of policy needs to be performed by 
some `accountable' authority standing outside the network of local groups. However, 
she does not say how such a body would be made accountable. 
White maintains that, because workers' groups would be self-governing, it is not 
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possible to determine in detail the internal machinery of management. However, she 
does outline some details of the internal machinery which are necessary to support her 
concept of democracy. Next I consider how White applies her ideas to schooling. 
6.4 White's approach to schooling. 
In White's model schools are treated like other workplaces and have the same 
structural relations on issues relating to work (White, 1983, p. 92 ), so she believes 
that control of how subjects are taught and of how the school is organized should 
be under the control of those affected by such structures and conditions, including 
senior pupils. However, in her model, the community is not directly consulted in the 
way the school is run. For White, community control is exercised through 
representatives acting on national bodies, which exercise power over and above the 
wider community. 
Although White has no objection to a market in school provision, in the model 
outlined in Beyond Domination schools are funded, regulated and inspected by 
employees of the National Forum acting on behalf of the state (see Section 6.4). 
White argues that schools should be more heavily regulated than the economy for 
three main reasons. Firstly, she posits that national guidelines should ensure that 
there is a reasonable uniformity of learning objectives and training of teachers, so that 
pupils and teachers can transfer easily between schools. Secondly, she argues for the 
necessity of ensuring that educational machinery and policies deliver to pupils the 
schooling which is reflective of their constitutional right. Finally, she says, a National 
Forum is necessary to ensure that those policies which affect the well-being of the 
whole community are undertaken in the public interest (White, 1983, pp. 82-3). 
For White, schooling should support the principles, attitudes and values 
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underlying participatory democracy. For example, equality in the exercise of political 
power should be made explicit and available for critical consideration (White, 1983, 
pp. 90-1). In addition, White argues that schooling for democratic activity should 
form an important part of schooling. 
White argues that what is taught formally can be undermined if the organization of 
the school does not support the message given formally. White contends that 
"simply by being within the educational structure one acquires, implicitly, and by 
degrees, and not necessarily in logical order, some understanding of the political 
structure of society, particularly as it bears on education" ( White, 1983, p. 89). 
White concludes that the democratic principles and values which apply to other work 
places should also apply to schools (White, 1983, pp. 81,92). White, therefore, 
concludes that the roles and status assigned to staff in any school should be those 
appropriate in a democratic society (White, 1983, p. 93). 
For White, the decision-making arrangements of a school have an important 
impact on pupils' schooling in three main ways. Firstly, they influence the 
acquisition of political attitudes. Therefore, she argues that, although individuals 
can learn abstractly about the rules of democracy, they also need to experience 
democratic decision making in order to develop the appropriate skills and 
dispositions needed to support a democracy (White, 1983, p. 95 ). For White, 
these are the dispositions to care about freedom ( which she discusses under the 
concept of autonomy), equality, justice and fraternity; with the predominant 
disposition being towards autonomous activity (White, 1983, pp. 49,70-2,140). I 
explore how she intends to develop these dispositions later in this section. 
Secondly, White says, guided experience of decision making in school would 
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provide a yardstick against which to measure authority structures and would enable 
people to make some contribution to the organization of democratically-organized 
work places (White, 1983, p. 96). Therefore White argues that, thirdly, properly 
planned school experience in decision making should provide opportunities for 
everyone to feel that they could be politically effective and could contribute to 
decision making in the wider society (White, 1983, p. 96). White concludes: 
This means concretely that all those working in a school should be 
able to participate in decisions which affect their work and be 
accountable to their colleagues for their delegated responsibilities in 
the running of the institution (White, 1983, p. 92). 
Although White argues in favour of markets in Beyond Domination, she states that 
she is opposed to an entrepreneurial form of management. Importantly, White 
acknowledges that an entrepreneurial form of direction would necessarily be anti- 
democratic (White, 1983, pp. 89,126). I contend that any structures involved in an 
entrepreneurial style of management would not necessarily support the development 
of fraternal attitudes in one's fellow citizens. Such a development would be contingent 
and might or might not happen. 
White believes that "there are no moral experts on the good life for individuals" 
(White, 1983, p. 10). She argues that "the only authority on the good life is therefore 
the individual himself or herself who has had the chance to reflect on possible lives" 
(White, 1983, p. 10). White argues that the conditions supporting this are best 
protected through a political system based on participatory democracy because, for 
her, participatory democracy rests on the "basic principle of justice as impartiality" 
(White, 1983, p. 14). 
I now explore the dispositions which White has argued are needed to support 
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democracy. Firstly, I consider autonomy as outlined by White. White does not 
give a definition of autonomy: instead, she defers to Steven Lukes' discussion of 
autonomy in his book Individualism (Lukes, 1973). Lukes argues that an individual is 
autonomous: 
To the degree to which he subjects the pressures and norms with 
which he is confronted to conscious and critical evaluation, and forms 
intentions and reaches practical decisions as a result of independent 
and rational reflection (Lukes, 1973, p. 52 ). 
Secondly, I consider equality. White's concept of democracy also rests on "the 
fundamental moral presumption of the equality of all normal human beings as 
choosers" (White, 1983, p. 14 ). She is particularly keen to discuss equality in the 
context of "the access to the exercise, or control, of political power which must 
obtain in a democracy" (White, 1983, p. 30 ). For White, the exercise of power by 
a person or a group or an institution is always objectionable and so it would be ideal 
if power relationships could be completely eliminated from human life (White, 1983, 
p. 24). 
White's concept of justice has freedom as a twin principle of democracy (White, 
1983, p. 9 ). White argues that these principles are enshrined in the concept of 
democracy when it is interpreted as "each person must have access to an equal share 
in the exercise, or control of power, so that no conception of the good life is arbitrarily 
imposed on anyone, and no one is subject to arbitrary interference" (White, 1983, p. 
9 ). Next I consider White's concept of fraternity. For White, fraternity is outlined 
in the following way: 
Fraternity as I have outlined it, namely as feeling a bond between 
oneself and others as equals, as moral beings with the same basic 
needs and an interest in leading a life of one's own, is the necessary 
emotional attitude between citizens who hold that one of the basic 
principles of their society is that power must be exercised, or 
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controlled, equally by all moral agents who form the citizen body 
(White, 1983, p. 72, GT's italics). 
This concept of fraternity found in White differs from the concept of love found in 
both Hegel and Marx. In Sections 3.5 and 4.5 I noted that, for Hegel and Marx, 
"love" is based on a "genuine living bond" which is a recognition of the existing 
unity of opposites and a resultant commitment to the other. Within such a relation, 
one looks to the other person not as a means, nor as an external imposition on the 
satisfaction of our own ends, but as a fellow human being who has value qua a human 
being. For White fraternity is an "appropriate attitude" and not an ontological bond 
(White, 1982, p. 72, GT's italics). 
I contend that any structural relations involved in an entrepreneurial form of 
school management would not necessarily support the development of fraternal 
attitudes to one's fellow citizens. I argue that such process would be contingent and 
might or might not happen. For White, fraternity is not necessarily supported by 
structural relations. As White seems to acknowledge, such development is 
contingent: although social individuals might be fraternal in circumstances where 
social relations are alienating, this psychological state is contingent because, 
within alienating structural relations, fraternity is not necessarily supported by 
structural relations which are alienating: 
engagements in communal projects may not generate such feelings [of 
comradeship and togetherness - GT ], but feelings of competitiveness, 
envy, even hostility.... even if they do generate more positive feelings 
of, for instance, liking to be in the company of others, such feelings 
may not be sufficient or even necessary for the fraternal attitude 
(White, 1983, p. 70 ). 
6 .5 Oppositional and alienating relations 
in White's model. 
In Section 4.3 1 argue that when productive activity takes place within 
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alienating relations, an object confronts the agent as something other, as 
something which is not his own and which is alien to him. Only in unalienating 
conditions and structures is the confrontation of the object by the agent not as 
something other, but as something belonging and satisfying to the agent. Only in 
unalienating conditions are there structural relations which necessarily support 
harmony of thought, being, conscious existence, reason and emotion. In Chapter Nine 
I argue that the structural relations and conditions necessary to ensure the operation 
and development of fraternity can be found only in an unalienated society when 
unalienating structural relations will necessarily support the development of such 
bonds and the consequential accompanying dispositions. 
Although White acknowledges that people are educated through the structures of 
society (White, 1983, p. 87), she ignores the internal relations that, I maintain, occur 
within the structural relations of schools. For example, it was noted in Section 6.4.2. 
that White does not rule out a market in schooling. This is despite the fact that she 
acknowledges that a market model of education would result in an entrepreneurial 
style of management, which is necessarily anti-democratic, and to which she has to 
be opposed ( White, 1983, pp. 89,126). A philosophy including internal relations 
would have prevented such a mistake and possibly also indicated the alienating 
relations necessarily involved in the marketization of school provision and schooling. 
In conclusion: in this chapter I have shown why it is not possible to counter 
alienation in the way which Miller has suggested because, for Miller, overcoming 
alienation is primarily the result of changing awareness, rather than of changing the 
objective relations and conditions which are necessary to enable unalienated activity. 
I also note that, since the model of both Miller and White is embedded in 
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private property relations, it is subject to the objective alienating relations laid out in 
Chapters Four and Five. I also argue that the conditions and social relations in the 
model of White and Miller do not support their concept of justice, because the 
structural relations in their models cannot necessarily support the development of 
autonomy and freedom. I argue that by basing their economy on capitalist market 
relations, both Miller and White are supporting relations which are oppositional to 
the principle of freedom ( as manifest in autonomy and freedom of choice) and the 
development of fraternity, and, as such, cannot necessarily be prefigurative of the 
development of autonomy and freedom of choice as defined by both Miller and 
White. 
In Chapter Seven I analyze the model of a `socialist market' used by the Soviet 
Marxist Oskar Lange, in which the emphasis would appear to be on socialist 
relations rather than on market relations, in order to ascertain how far such a 
system could prefigure an unalienated society which would support a `meaningful' 
form of education. 
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Part Three 
Chapter Seven 
Oskar Lange's `socialist market' and alienation, within the Soviet context. 
Introduction 
In this chapter I analyze Oskar Lange's model of a socialist market, in order to 
ascertain how far such a system could prefigure an unalienated society and support 
education as an unalienated activity. In this chapter I note that, although within Lange's 
model the emphasis would appear to be on socialist relations rather than market 
relations, market relations and laws are fundamental to the operation of the 
`socialized' and non-socialized sectors of his economy. 
Unlike David Miller, Lange regards himself as a Marxist, and adopts many Marxist 
concepts and much Marxist terminology. In this chapter I show that the meaning which 
Lange gives to many Marxist concepts and terms is different from that given by Marx. 
For example, Lange has a different meaning for the concept `higher stage of socialism' 
from that found in the writings of Marx. In "The Critique of the Gotha Programme" 
(first published in 1875), Marx divides the relations of a socialist society into the "first 
phase of communism" and the "advanced phase of communism" (Marx, 1974[b], p. 
347). Marx notes that the first phase of communism develops out of the conditions 
and relations of capital and, particularly at the beginning, is consequently subject to 
the conditions, relations, ideological ideas and values, of capitalist society: 
We are dealing here with communist society, not as it has developed on 
its own foundations, but on the contrary, just as it emerges from 
capitalist society. In every respect, economically, morally, intellectually, 
it is thus still stamped with the birth-marks of the old society from 
whose womb it has emerged (Marx, 1974[b], p. 346, original italics). 
For Marx, there is not a sharp delineation between the first phase of communism 
and the advanced phase of communism: the advanced phase of communism can be said 
to exist when: 
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the subjugation of individuals to the division of labour, and thereby the 
antithesis between intellectual and physical labour, have disappeared; 
when labour is no longer just a means of keeping alive but has become a 
vital need; when the all-round development of individuals has also 
increased with their productive powers and all springs of co-operative 
wealth flow more abundantly...... (Marx, 1974 [b], p. 347) 
For Marx, the defining moment of the advanced phase of communism occurs when the 
means of production have become common property and where there are no markets 
(Marx, 1974[b], p. 345). In Capital (Marx, 1981), Marx calls the first phase of 
communism and the advanced phase of communism the "realm of necessity" and "the 
realm of freedom" respectively. These realms are considered in more detail in Chapters 
Eight and Nine. Briefly, the period of the realm of necessity has often been defined 
by other writers as socialism, and the realm of freedom communism. 
However, unlike Marx, Lange argues that markets should be used as part of 
the transitional process to what Lange calls the higher stage of socialism (thus often 
known as a version of communism). Lange does this for two reasons: firstly, because 
he assumes an element of scarcity even at the higher levels of socialism (Lange, 1938, 
p. 141); and secondly because he discounts the labour theory of value as a means of 
assessing value at the socialist stage (Lange, 1938, p. 133). 
In Section 7.1 I show that Lange's preference for market economics is ideological 
as well as instrumental. I begin Section 7.1 by showing why Lange preferred 
market economics, in particular Marshallian economics, to Marxian `economics' 
when choosing the analytical tools he maintains were necessary for developing the 
objective conditions within the Soviet Union (Lange, 1935, p. 191, n. 1). 
7.1 Lange's model of a socialist market and his use of neo-classical economics. 
In 1935, in his article "Marxian Economics and Modem Economic Theory" 
(Lange, 1935, pp. 189-201), Lange claims that economic (i. e. market theory) has 
a "universal significance" and that Marshallian economics offers more "for the 
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current administration of the Soviet Union" than does Marxian economics (GT's 
italics): specifically, on how to achieve economic equilibrium in an economy where 
the law of supply and demand operates. 
For Lange the "superiority" of Marxian economics lies in " the field of 
explaining and anticipating a process of economic evolution, " (Lange, 1935, p. 194) 
and with "the definite specification of the institutional framework in which the 
economic process goes on in capitalist society" (Lange, 1935, p. 194), rather than in its 
ability to inform the organization of the political economy. In particular, Lange argues 
that Marx's labour theory of value (Section 4.7.2) does not have the conceptual 
apparatus to deal with how to achieve market equilibrium in the business cycles 
found within "the economic system of Soviet Russia" (Lange, 1935, p. 191, n. 1 ). 
Instead, Lange argues that Marx's labour theory is used by Marx 
to provide a scientific basis for long range anticipations guiding the 
rational activity of a revolutionary movement directed against the very 
institutional foundations of the capitalist system (Lange, 1935, p. 191, 
n. l). 
Lange would seem to be advocating the use of the market for all `day-to-day' 
purposes, while reserving Marxian theory for policies in the distant future. 
Lange notes that that the `law of value' by which equilibrium asserts itself in an 
exchange economy is based on the division of labour which is found in any type of 
exchange economy, "whether capitalistic or an `einfache Warenproduktion' " the latter 
being defined, by Lange, as an exchange economy consisting of small independent 
producers each of whom possesses his own means of production (Lange, 1935, p. 
197; 1938, p. 73, n. 22). 
In Section 7.5.1 I consider the article "Economic Calculation in the Socialist 
Commonwealth" by Ludwig von Mises, first written in German in the 1920's and 
reformulated by Hayek in 1935 in "The Present State of the Debate" in Collectivist 
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Economic Planning ( Hayek, 1935[b] ). In this section, I briefly outline the basis of 
Mises' argument in order to give the context of Lange's famous treatise on the use of 
market mechanisms within a `socialist' economy. The basis of Mises' argument is 
that the principles involved in the private ownership of production are oppositional to 
those found in `socialism, ' where all the means of production are the property of the 
community (Mises, 1935, p. 90). 
However in his essay Hayek maintains that the problems which Mises identified lie 
in the real nature of the problem rather than in pure logic: 
But what is practically relevant here is not the formal structure of this 
system but the nature and amount of concrete information required if a 
numerical solution is to be attempted and the magnitude of the task 
which this numerical solution must involve in a modem 
community....... to make the result comparable with that which the 
competitive system provides (Hayek, 1935[b], p. 208). 
Lange was heartened by Hayek's apparent rejection of the outright denial of the 
possibility of economic calculation in a socialist economy: 
They [Hayek and Robbins, GT] do not deny the theoretical possibility of 
a rational allocation of resources in a socialist economy; they only doubt 
the possibility of a satisfactory practical solution of the problem (Lange, 
1938, p. 62, original italics). 
Lange noted that Hayek and Robbins did not actually provide a mechanism by which 
`rational calculation' could be achieved within a `socialist' economy, so Lange wrote 
On the Economic Theory of Socialism in 1938 as a way of addressing the problem 
(Lange, 1938, p. 65). 
7 .2 Lange's model of a socialist market 
in On the Economic Theory of Socialism 
In this section I briefly explore the way in which Lange proposed to use quasi- 
market mechanisms within the socialized sector of the economy. There are also 
classical markets in consumer goods and labour-power, the market in consumer 
goods appearing to be quite large (Lange, 1938, pp. 73-4,79). Lange maintains that 
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"in any actual socialist community" there "must be a large number of means of 
production privately owned " [e. g. farmers, artisans and small-scale entrepreneurs ] 
(Lange, 1938, p. 73, n. 22, GT's italics), and this was certainly the case for a period in 
the Soviet Union, even after the socialization of the major industries. 
A defining aspect of Lange's model is his system of `shadow pricing' within the 
socialized sector of the economy. In Lange's model shadow prices, that is, 
accounting prices, are used to mimic the functions of the market. In this model 
shadow prices are used as a means of regulating and co-ordinating the means of 
production and raw materials in the socialized sectors of the economy, mainly heavy 
industry. Lange maintains that, in the socialized sectors of the economy, shadow 
pricing allows the Central Planning Board, which is composed of salaried 
bureaucrats, to plan to combine factors of production, choose the scale of output for a 
plant and determine the output for an industry, allocate resources and to plan to fix 
other prices. Lange maintains that this is done in order to balance the quantity supplied 
and demanded for each commodity. In Lange's model, each industry has to produce 
exactly as much of a commodity as can be sold or accounted for to other industries at a 
price which equals the marginal cost incurred by the industry in producing that 
particular amount of the commodity concerned. 
In Lange's model, the Central Planning Board does this without recourse to 
working people, and without even consulting those people directly working in the 
industries concerned (Lange, 1938, p. 83): the bureaucracy, therefore, behaves as if it 
were the `market'. In the case of socialized industries the bureaucracy, substituting itself 
for the `market, ' uses quasi-market mechanisms and laws. As a result, I maintain in 
Section 7.5.2, that economic relations between workers and employers (even within 
`the state-controlled system') are the same as those between worker and employer 
within a capitalist system. 
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Lange argues that the `accounting prices' used by the Central Planning Board 
differ from market prices because accounting prices take into account all the social 
costs of production ( including the cost of eliminating negative externalities such as 
pollution and protecting health) which are conducive to the social good, but which 
might not make a profit and which would otherwise need government subsidies. I 
contend that although the content of the market mechanisms might be different from 
those within capitalism, the economic laws and mechanisms which operate within 
Lange's system of consumer goods distribution could be said to operate according to 
the same economic logic as those which exist in commodity production within 
capitalism. 
Within both the socialized sector of the economy and the non-socialized sector of 
Lange's model, the allocation between goods and services is based on same 
exchangeability between commodities as is found in a regulated market economy within 
capitalism. I maintain that, within Lange's system, the state as a producer behaves in 
similar way to a capitalist as described in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. For example, the 
market in labour-power in Lange's system necessarily results in the loss of control of 
productive activity by the worker. Therefore I conclude that, within Lange's model, the 
employer behaves as a capitalist in both the case of the state and in the case of the 
"large number" of small entrepreneurs who privately own the means of production. 
Lange's ideological support for the market economy is confirmed in a letter he 
sent to Hayek, written in 1940 (in T. Kowalik, 1994, pp. 298-299). In this letter 
Lange stated that he recommended socialization only in a situation of monopoly. 
This preference for a market mechanism seems to continue even in Lange's later 
works which, in Section 7.3, I show were significantly influenced by the 
epistemology of Stalinism. 
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7.3 Lan eg 's epistemology and ontology from 1950 onwards. 
I begin this section by illustrating that between 1944-1964 Lange held positions of 
trust within the Soviet establishment. I maintain that this indicates that the overt 
theoretical positions which he held were reflective of the dominant ideology within the 
Soviet bloc. 
Towards the end of World War II, Lange broke relations with the Polish 
government-in-exile in London and transferred his support to the Lublin Committee 
sponsored by the Soviet Union. In 1944 Stalin prevailed on President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to obtain a passport for Lange to visit the Soviet Union so that he could speak 
to Lange personally: as a result, Stalin proposed offering Lange a position in the future 
Polish cabinet. In 1945 Lange became ambassador of the Polish Peoples' Republic to 
Washington and became a go-between between Stalin and Roosevelt during the 
discussions on post-war Poland. In 1946 Lange served as the Polish delegate to the 
United Nations Security Council. Lange was a deputy chairman of the Polish Council 
of State from 1961-1965 and as such was one of the four acting Chairmen of the 
Council of State (head of state) from August 7 to August 12 1964, during a change of 
government. It can, therefore, be assumed that he was regarded as a trustworthy 
official of the state and, indeed, that his economic theories were consistent with the 
dominant social and economic ideology in the Soviet Union in the immediate post-war 
period. 
Lange's writings continued to be influenced by Stalinism after Stalin's death. 
Stalin's post as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was taken 
over by Nikita Khrushchev from 1953-1964. Although Khrushchev denounced 
Stalin's methods in 1956, and introduced certain more egalitarian policies, it has 
been argued that the basic social structures introduced by Stalinism were not greatly 
altered (A. Nove, 1989, p. 144). It has been noted that Khrushchev maintained 
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similar policies to those of Stalin in several areas. For example, Khrushchev still 
supported bureaucratic control of the economy, technological education and the 
training of `specialists', at the expense of an education which would allow social 
individuals to fully develop their capacities and powers ( the role of schooling in the 
Soviet economy is outlined in Section 7.4.1). Khrushchev also encouraged close 
working relations between the country's scientific establishments and the military. 
Krushchev's policies were influenced by the target of catching up and outstripping the 
West in terms of technology (in particular military technology) so that, as well as 
providing military security to its people, the Soviet Union would not be dependent on 
the West for expertise or component parts. 
In this section I contend that Lange's political theories were influenced by the 
epistemology of Stalinism and, as such, were also based on similar ideas about the 
nature of social change. In order to support this argument I now briefly compare the 
epistemology of Lange with that of Stalin. I begin this comparison with a brief outline 
of Stalin's epistemology, as outlined in Dialectical and Historical Materialism (1951). 
Here Joseph Djugashvili (Stalin) argues that matter exists outside and independently of 
consciousness. For Stalin, matter is primary: consciousness being secondary, a mere 
reflection of being and a passive reflection of objective reality (Djugashvili, 1951, p. 
18). For Stalin, this results in the concept of historical processes as natural and 
inevitable. For Stalin, these processes are not ones in which there is active sensuous 
influence by social individuals. This epistemology is used to support the argument 
for the transfer of political initiative from self-conscious human beings to structural 
entities which, in Stalin's case, are compromised bureaucrats not directly 
accountable to society. Stalin concludes that it is up to the Communist Party to impose 
on society a `true' reflection of reality. Lange's support for social organization 
consistent with this epistemology can be seen in On the Economic Theory of Socialism. 
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As was noted in Section 7.1, in this book the Central Planning Board co-ordinates 
economic activity without recourse to working people, and without even consulting 
those people directly working in the industries concerned (Lange, 1938, p. 83). 
Lange explicitly supports a Stalinist epistemology in Political Economy (1963), 
where Lange argues that the economic laws underpinning classical economics operate 
independently of human consciousness or will. The epistemological assumption in this 
contention is mistakenly grounded in the belief that social processes operate according 
to laws which are similar to natural laws, that is, unconsciously and according to a 
predetermined pattern (Lange, 1963, p. 78 ). Lange therefore concludes that, although 
the actions of individuals may be purposeful and conscious, the social relations in 
which these actions are embedded necessarily interplay in such a way so as to produce 
pre-determined outcomes: 
These conditions, in particular the existence of production relations, do 
not allow economic activity to be arbitrary. They determine the furrow 
which economic activity is forced to follow, that is to say, the amis [sic, 
surely "aims", GT] and means of action, and the manner in which the 
activity of various individuals or groups interplay. These conditions, 
determined by history independently of human will and consciousness, 
determine the economic laws which operate in such conditions (Lange, 
1963, p. 56). 
In Political Economy, Lange argues that social processes can be analyzed by 
professionals who have the, necessary `scientific' knowledge of social processes, 
which are perceived to be similar to natural processes. Importantly, even in his later 
works, Lange still envisages that market mechanisms could be controlled by 
bureaucrats. These bureaucrats are deemed to have an understanding of the necessary 
`scientific' knowledge which, in this case, appears to be a combination of knowledge 
of market economics and `scientific socialism'. For Lange, `scientific socialism' 
enables `organized society' to overcome spontaneity in social development and subject 
"the operation of economic laws [that is, market laws, GT] and the economic 
development of society to the direction of human will" (Lange, 1970 [b], p. 100). 
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Importantly, within Lange's model there are no democratic channels through which the 
interpretation of `the scientific knowledge' of the bureaucracy can be debated by those 
outside the bureaucracy/party: as a consequence the "direction of human will" is the 
result of interpretation by professional bureaucrats. Lange contends that this latter 
interpretation is needed because "the very process of the social revolution which 
liquidates one social system and establishes another, requires centralized disposal of 
resources by the new revolutionary State" (Lange, 1970, p. 106). 
For example, Lange maintains that during the first period of a socialist economy, 
both the planning and economic development of the `socialist sector', that is, all 
sectors except consumer goods and labour, should be highly centralized under a 
bureaucracy. Lange argues that the minimum requirement of the plan should be based 
on the allocation of investment to different branches of the economy (Lange, 1970[b], 
p. 106) in a way similar to the model outlined in Section 7.2. Lange also argues that the 
allocation of state investment would determine the direction of economic development 
because it would be aimed at the key parts of the economy, such as heavy industry. For 
Lange, this plan would include targets operated within market mechanisms to 
achieve the production of raw materials and the basic means of production, also to 
achieve the co-ordination of various aspects of the economy (Lange, 1970[b], p. 106). 
Lange argues that the realization of this plan would be achieved by two methods: 
firstly, by direct administrative orders and secondly, through a system of market 
incentives. These market incentives would be operated by bureaucrats in order to 
induce people "to do exactly the things which are required by the plan" (Lange, 
1970[b], p. 107). This is done by making "use of the automatic character of people's 
responses to given incentives" so that people will "react in a certain way which can be 
calculated" (Lange, 1970[b], p. 108, GT's italics) in order to realize "the conscious 
will of organized society" (Lange, 1957[b], p. 100) as interpreted by bureaucrats 
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employed by the Party. 
Following the Khrushchev era and the Prague Spring of 1968 Lange maintains that 
after a period of intensive industrialization, bureaucratic methods should not be used 
beyond their "historic justification", that is, after "the moment when socialist society 
starts to overcome these centralistic, bureaucratic methods of administrative planning 
and management..... " (Lange, 1970[b], p. 103). At this time Lange argues that rapid 
industrialization will bring about a growth in both the number and consciousness of 
the working class and also in the "growth of a new socialist intelligentsia" from the 
ranks of workers and peasants (Lange, 1970[b], p. 104). 
However, it is difficult to see what social relations could prefigure a change in the 
structural relations of such a society, in the absence of democratic relations within 
Lange's system. The importance of democratic relations in order to prefigure a socialist 
society is discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
7.4 Soviet organization of schooling. 
7.4.1 The development of schooling in the USSR between 1917 and 1920. 
Lange did not write systematically about education but, given Lange's support for 
the Stalinist concept of political economy (Section 7.3 ), it is likely that he would have 
endorsed the Stalinist concept of schooling then prevalent throughout the Soviet bloc. 
This concept held that schooling was mainly a means of providing skilled workers for 
the areas of the economy that the Party and bureaucracy considered important. The 
seeds of the bureaucratic control of Soviet schooling were evident from as early as 
1918 and grew considerably in the later 1920's under the increasing influence of 
Stalin's wish to increase the production of the economy. 
I begin by exploring the schooling which existed in the Soviet Union after the 
October Revolution of 1917. In 1917 Anatoly Lunacharsky was appointed as the 
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Commissar of Enlightenment' (Education Minister) for the first Soviet government 
and remained in office until 1929. In his speech to the First All-Russia Congress on 
Education, in 1918, Lunacharsky advocated a Soviet system that rested on popular 
initiative, and supported handing the control of schools to the organs of local self- 
government: 
We want true people's government, i. e. the transfer of all power to the 
masses of the people. Our line is this: to arouse the interest of the 
population at large in school affairs, to so order things that teachers 
should be elected and checked up on by the local population, which 
organized in committees or councils, should be the ultimate judge 
(Lunacharsky, 1981, p. 16). 
Lunacharsky wanted senior pupils to be involved in running schools, 
together with parents and teachers, so that these pupils would gradually 
become capable of running collectives. He also argued that senior pupils should 
particularly be allowed to run their own societies and clubs and to generate their 
own journals (Lunacharsky, 1981, p. 25). However, in the same speech, he 
argued that the small-peasant population did not understand the nature of 
either democratic reforms or the reforms of the schools. He also noted that the 
peasantry were concerned about the separation of the church from the state and 
that they perceived reforms to be "something imposed from outside" 
(Lunacharsky, 1981, p. 17)2. As a result Lunacharsky modified his earlier 
position, arguing that: 
We could not hand the whole undertaking over to the population at 
large, because it was not prepared. When we saw that the population was 
not coping with the given task, we had to correct its decision, to guide 
it, and in this respect we were acting as the people's assistants, saying to 
them, "Look, this is what workers' and peasants' government really 
means" (Lunacharsky, 1981, p. 17). 
I Enlightenment being a term synonymous with education. 
2Lunacharsky is referring to the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on "Freedom of Conscience, and on Ecclesiastical and Religious Societies", issued on 20 January 1918, forbidding the 
teaching of Scripture in schools. 
189 
However, this position was not held by everyone in the Narkompros 
(Commissariat of the Enlightenment). Commenting on the point of view voiced 
by Lunacharsky, Nadezhda Krupskaya (Lenin's wife) said: 
Let us not be afraid of the people, let us not be afraid that they will elect 
the wrong sort of representatives, and bring in the priests. We want the 
people to direct the country and be their own masters........ We are 
always thinking in old terms, that if we do not spare ourselves and work 
day and night in the people's cause, that is enough. But it is nothing. Our 
job is to help the people in fact to take their fate into their own hands 
(Sheila Fitzpatrick, 1970, p. 28, quoting from Krupskaya's article "On 
Educational Soviets", 1918, original italics). 
However, rather than allowing the direct democratic control of schools 
which Marx advocated (Marx, 1974[b], p. 357), the Narkompros issued a 
"Statement on the Organization of Education in the Russian Republic" in 
which popular initiatives were to be organized through `educational soviets' 
which would be elected by the population at local, regional and national levels. 
These soviets were to be entrusted with the administration of education within 
their areas (S. Fitzpatrick, 1970, p. 26). These soviets were responsible only 
to their own organs in the order of hierarchy: local to regional, regional to 
district, district to national and national to the Narkompros. 
The Narkompros was thus in a position of an appointed government body 
atop a pyramid of elected soviets. However, it denied itself the role of a 
`central directing power' (Fitzpatrick, 1970, p. 27). Importantly, these 
educational soviets were to be "controlled in political respects" by the Soviet of 
Deputies [the state's supreme governing body] (Fitzpatrick, 1970, p. 26). This 
established the educational soviet as a "controlling advisory" body under the 
education department. The soviet was to consist of elected representatives of all 
organizations represented in the Soviet of Deputies, in the same proportion, 
together with the elected representatives of teachers, pupils and "informed 
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persons". Its function was to "listen to the reports of the education department 
and consider the plan of work in education proposed by the department". The 
department itself was to be appointed by the executive committee of the local 
Soviet of Deputies (according to the instruction of the Commissariat of Internal 
Affairs [NKVD]) and financed by the central commissariat. The educational 
soviet was to hold executive power in local educational administration, and its 
lowest unit (in spite of NKVD instruction) was to be the volost [local] 
department. This policy brought the Narkompros into conflict with the 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Third Congress of Soviets, both of 
whom wanted to establish departments of each People's Commissariat at local, 
regional and national levels. Members of these departments would not be 
elected, but appointed by the executive committees of the local Soviet of 
Deputies. Each department would be jointly subordinate to the local Soviet and 
its central commissariat. 
Krupskaya insisted that the administration of schools should not begin at 
regional levels (according to the NKVD instruction) but at local level, because 
control of education would be in closer contact with local people. This would, of 
course, conform more closely to the model that Marx supported (Marx, 1974 
[b], p. 357). 
Within the Soviet Union, between 1918-1920, there was a debate between 
those who wished to see schooling as an aid to produce workers for the under- 
developed economy and for military defence against invasion, and those who 
wished to see education solely as a means of aiding the self-realization of the 
social individual. In theory the Narkompros' education policy excluded the 
possibility of specialized technical training for school-aged children. In 1918 the 
Narkompros attempted to close all schools designed to provide technical 
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education to those under the age of seventeen. Criticism followed from the 
labour union leadership, the Supreme Economic Council (Vesenkha) and the 
Young Communist League. They made a case based on the shortage of skilled 
workers and the need to provide youth with technical training relevant to their 
place of employment. In fact in defiance of central policy, labour unions, 
factories and local departments of education sponsored schools for young 
people, offering part-time instruction for two hours a day, six days a week. In 
the autumn of 1918, the Narkompros accepted these schools as a fact and agreed 
to accept shared jurisdiction over them with the State Committee for 
Professional-Technical Education and the Section for Professional-Technical 
Education. The debate about the degree of technical education in schools 
continued, with a sizeable number of delegates supporting more technical 
education. 
In 1920, the Soviet of Peoples' Commissars (equivalent of the Cabinet) 
ordered a reorganization of Narkompros and upgraded the Main Administration 
for Professional-Technical Education (Glavprofobr) to administer vocational 
schools, special courses, technicums3 and higher education instructions. 
Glavprofobr aspired to have a network of vocational schools to replace 
Narkompros' polytechnic schools. Glavprofobr expanded its network of 
schools and proposed to admit pupils under the age of seventeen. 
7.4.2 Schooling in the USSR under Stalin and its relations to the economy. 
In this section I show why the relationships between schooling, the state and the 
economy became more integrated. The move towards technical education was given a 
boost in 1922 when Stalin became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. In the late 1920's Stalin supported the policy of Socialism in One 
3 Technicums is a Soviet term meaning a mass-education facility training for lower-level technical staff. 
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Country, that is, the belief that it was possible to build a self-sufficient society in one 
country only, the Soviet Union. 
Under the influence of this policy, the dominant educational ideas in the USSR 
from 1928 onwards were ones based mainly on the provision of the skills and 
knowledge needed for technological development. The Glavprofobr announced that it 
was preparing curricula based on particular branches of industry for grades eight and 
nine of the secondary school. Glavprofobr began to devise a programme of academic 
and technical training for these schools, in which general academic subjects were to 
relate to the type of industry with which the school was affiliated. Consequently, 
schooling became more subservient to the needs of the economy. As Stalin, speaking 
in 1931, said: 
We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must 
make good this distance in ten years or we shall go under; to eliminate 
the vestiges of educational innovations of the twenties and to intensify 
moral upbringing in schools ( Joseph Zajda, 1980, p. 23 ). 
In 1931 the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party asserted total 
control over education and rejected the curriculum based on the open classroom, 
interdisciplinary approach to learning, group teaching and progressive assessment - 
all which, of course, had been introduced by the post-revolutionary government under 
the inspiration of Lunacharsky. In The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse (1991), Larry 
Holmes quotes the Central Committee of 25 August 1931 as stating: 
The Central Committee declares that by a large margin the Soviet 
school does not meet the huge demands placed before it.... The school's 
fundamental defect at the present time (is) its failure to provide a 
sufficient level of general-educational knowledge and an unsatisfactory 
preparation for technicums and higher education of fully literate people 
who have mastered the fundamentals of science (physics, chemistry, 
mathematics, native language, geography etc. )... (L. Holmes, 1991, p. 
137, original italics). 
As a result of this policy, the curriculum was restructured to enable the re- 
introduction of basic disciplines with special emphasis on the 3 R's and Russian. 
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Another important component of the curriculum was the ethical dimension of the 
system. Soviet education not only imparted knowledge and skills but also instructed 
pupils into the `norms and values' of the Soviet system, particularly as to the value of 
work. This was a process which, it was hoped, would enable the ruling group to 
inculcate loyalty to "the communist regime and to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, 
mastery of the environment, the acceptance of authority, love of the socialist 
Motherland, collectivism, conscientious labour for the good of society, a high moral 
sense of public duty, an uncompromising attitude to the enemies of communism, and so 
on" (from the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961, p. 108, 
quoted in Zajda, 1980, pp. 108-9 ). 
Post World War II, Stalin continued to emphasize the growth of heavy 
industry, partly by importing technology and technological ideas from the West4. This 
was for two main reasons. Firstly, Stalin deemed it necessary to compete militarily 
with the West and, in order to do this, to accumulate the products of heavy industry. 
Secondly, Soviet theoreticians at this time accepted the policy that the transition to 
the higher stage of socialism in Russia would take place between 1960 and 1965 (H. 
Marcuse, 1958, p. 167). For Stalin and his successors this transition to a higher stage of 
socialism was based on the continued growth of all social production, with 
preponderant growth in the means of production. 
In the next section I illustrate the oppositional principles between Lange's model 
of a `socialist-market' and orthodox socialist principles, using Mises' famous article 
"Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth" (Mises, in Hayek [ed. ], 1935) 
which formed the basis of the famous debate between Hayek and Lange in the 1930's 
on the viability of the use of market mechanisms in a `socialist' society. 
4 
The Soviet Union embraced Taylorism and Fordism, and imported American experts in these fields 
(Section 4.8). Hughes believes that concepts within the Five Year Plan can be linked to Taylorism (T. 
Hughes, 2004, pp. 250-1). 
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7.5 Criticisms of Lange's model of a socialist market. 
7.5.1 The oppositional nature of Lange's socialist market to socialist relations. 
In 1935 Mises, in his article "Economic Calculation in the Socialist 
Commonwealth" (Mises, in Hayek [ed. ], 1935), uses Aristotelian logic to show that 
under socialism all of the means of production are the property of the community and 
therefore, logically, it is the community alone which can dispose of them and 
determine their use in production. In the same work Mises argues that exchange 
value is only applicable when production is carried out by independent producers, 
using a market to co-ordinate the distribution of goods and services. Mises argues 
that because, in a socialist economy, all the means of production are under the 
control of the community, no produced good will become the object of exchange for 
value 5. Mises concludes that it is, therefore, impossible to determine the monetary 
value of any such good under socialism, because money has only use as a medium of 
exchange and computation in a market: 
It is irreconcilable with the nature of communal ownership of 
production-goods that it should rely even for a part of its distribution 
upon economic imputation of the yield to the particular factors of 
production (Mises, in Hayek [ed. ], 1935, p. 90 ). 
Mises further deduces that, because in a socialist system there is no role for exchange 
value, money or prices there can be no market (Mises, in Hayek [ed. ], 1935, pp. 90-93): 
It is logically absurd to speak of the worker enjoying the `full yield' of 
his work, and then to subject to a separate distribution the shares of the 
material factors of production... [because]... it lies in the very nature of 
socialist production that the shares of the particular factors of production 
in the national dividend cannot be ascertained (Mises, in Hayek [ed. ], 
1935[a], p. 90). 
Mises allows for the giving and receiving of presents (Mises in Hayek [ed. ], 1935, p. 91) as exchange not 
for value would no doubt take place. 
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Interestingly, Mises's criticisms of Lange's model of market socialism mirror 
Marx's observations about communal control and the distribution of goods and 
services: 
Within the co-operative society based on common ownership of the 
means of production the producers do not exchange their products; 
similarly, the labour spent on the products no longer appears as the 
value of these products, possessed by them as a material characteristic, 
for now, in contrast to capitalist society individual pieces of labour are 
no longer merely indirectly, but directly, a component part of the total 
labour (Marx, 1974[b], p. 345, original italics). 
However, although Mises indicates the oppositional principles that are present in 
Lange's model, Mises' analysis of a communist society rests solely on a linear form 
of logic and deals with logical principles rather than dynamic, interrelated social 
processes. As a consequence of a reliance on linear logic, Mises' analysis can neither 
analyze the social relations which necessarily result in alienation nor explore the 
historical processes which could prefigure a socialist society. In the next section I 
therefore propose to explore the alienating relations which necessarily occur within 
Lange's model, using a form of analysis based on social relations which are 
necessarily interrelated. 
7.5.2 Market and alienating relations in Lange's socialist market model. 
In this section I show how alienating relations are necessarily supported by 
`market' relations, in both the socialized and non-socialized sectors of the economy 
(Section 7.1), and intensified by the oppressive nature of the bureaucracy which 
administers the market mechanism in the socialized sector of the economy. 
I note in Section 7.2 that there are classical markets in labour-power and 
consumer goods within Lange's model (Lange, 1938, pp. 75,79). In the market in 
labour-power, workers are able to offer their services to the industry or occupation 
paying the highest wages (Lange, 1938, p. 79). Although the wages of those working 
"for publicly owned capital and natural resources" are fixed by the Central Planning 
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Board, the level of wages is fixed according to market mechanisms and laws (Section 
7.2). In Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.2 and Section 7.2 I maintain that, in the market in 
labour-power (even when the state is the employer), the relations between the employer 
and the worker are similar in form to those found within capitalism. In Lange's 
model these relations occur in following ways. These are, firstly, as a necessary 
consequence of the relation between the `employer' and the `worker' in which the 
latter loses control over the objects and services he produces, as well as over the 
conditions in which his productive activity takes place. Secondly, as a result of his 
productive activity, the worker develops estranged relations with other social 
individuals. Thirdly, instead of employing his capacities in creative, stimulating 
activities, the worker has to submit his capacities and powers to the goals of his 
employer and, as such, becomes in effect an appendage of the machine with which he 
works. Fourthly, as is noted in Section 4.4.1, a system based on price results in an 
external relationship through the use of exchange value. Within the system of exchange 
value any given product is representative of the equivalent of a different kind of 
product. As a result, the product's immediate identity as itself has given way to the 
equivalent of another because the existence of a product as an exchange value is a 
determination of itself (Marx, 1975[e], p. 268). Importantly, within Lange's model 
there is also a market in consumer goods, even in the higher stage of socialism (Lange, 
1938, p. 141) [Section 7.2]. 
In Section 7.5.1 1 maintain that the social relations and dispositions which would 
accompany this market activity are oppositional to the relations and dispositions needed 
to sustain the higher stage of socialism as envisaged by Marx. For example, market 
activity, because it is based on fragmented production, necessarily results in competitive 
activity; and this type of activity is oppositional to the human and co-operative activity 
needed to sustain the higher level of socialism, as conceived by Marx. 
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Lange is mainly concerned with the objective conditions needed to develop 
abundance and does not consider the subjective effects of market relations. For 
Lange, alienation, as described by Marx in German Ideology (Marx, 1970, p. 56) 
and discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, is mitigated when economic laws of 
the `market' (Lange, 1963, pp. 79-81, including n. 41) are employed by bureaucrats 
who have the `knowledge' of scientific socialism which, Lange contends, is 
necessary to achieve abundance (Section 7.2). 
I now consider the alienating (entfremdung) relations which occur in Lange's model 
as a result of bureaucratic activity. Marx provides a perceptive description of 
bureaucracies in "Critique of Hegel's `Philosophy of Right"' (written during 1843-4), 
which seems to have been ignored by Lange. Although obviously written about a 
nineteenth-century bureaucracy, this work deals with the nature of bureaucracy itself, 
and so could also be said to be relevant to the bureaucracy found in Soviet Russia. In 
"Critique of Hegel's `Philosophy of Right"', Marx describes bureaucracy as the "state 
consciousness", the "state will", the "state power in the form of a corporation, i. e. of a 
particular, self-contained society within the state" (Marx, 1975 [b], p. 107, original 
italics). For Marx "the spirit of bureaucracy" is "the formal mind of the state" which 
the bureaucracy makes into a categorical imperative (Marx, 1975 [b], p. 107). Marx 
argues that the bureaucracy safeguards the imaginary universality of the particular 
interest in order to safeguard its own interest, and part of doing this is to desire the state 
to be "a power" (Marx, 1975 [b], p. 107). Therefore, Marx concludes, a bureaucracy is 
"compelled to claim the formal for its content and its content as the formal" (Marx, 
1975 [b], p. 107). As a consequence "it enters into conflict everywhere with `real 
purposes at every point"' (Marx, 1975[b], p. 107). 
This way of managing social processes is contrary to the local democratic control 
proposed by Marx. Marx correctly observes that a bureaucracy would likely lead to 
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"passive obedience, the worship of authority" and "fixed, formal action of rigid 
principles, views and traditions" where "real knowledge appears lacking in content, 
just as real life appears dead, for this imaginary knowledge and imaginary life pass 
for the substance.... " (Marx, 1975[b], p. 108, original italics). This leads to the 
bureaucracy being a power above people which treats social individuals as things. For 
Marx, this results in the following form of alienation: 
The social power, i. e., the multiplied productive force, which arises 
through the co-operation of different individuals as it is determined by 
the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co- 
operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their 
own united power, but as an alien force existing outside of them, of the 
origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot 
control..... (Marx, 1970, p. 54 ). 
A more recent analysis of the role of the bureaucracy in the Soviet system is given 
by Herbert Marcuse in his book Soviet Marxism (Marcuse, 1958). Marcuse notes in this 
book that the maintenance of "repressive production relations enabled the Soviet State, 
with the instrumentalities of universal control, to regiment the consciousness of the 
underlying population" (Marcuse, 1958, p. 190). Marcuse notes, contrary to Lange, that 
the repressive production relations cannot prefigure an unalienated society because 
No matter how high the level of technical progress and material culture, 
of labor productivity and efficiency, the change from socialist necessity 
to socialist freedom can only be the result of conscious effort and 
decision (Marcuse, 1958, p. 190). 
Marcuse argues that this conscious effort is stifled by the "`spirit' of Soviet 
socialist construction, " that is "the specific rationality of the system" (Marcuse, 1958, p. 
190), which assumes "the role of an active factor determining the direction of the 
societal development" (Marcuse, 1958, p. 191). In Soviet Marxism, Marcuse also 
analyzes the nature of the "rationality" utilized by Soviet Marxism. Marcuse notes that 
Soviet Marxism claimed to have been able to create a "conformity" between productive 
relations and the "character of the productive forces" which could eliminate the conflict 
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between the individual and society, and between the particular and common interest. 
For Soviet Marxist theoreticians, "reason ceases to be split into its subjective and 
objective manifestations; it is no longer antagonistic to and beyond reality, a mere `idea' 
- but is realized in the society itself' (Marcuse, 1958, p. 85). For Soviet theoreticians, 
"such a society contains all standards of true and false, right and wrong" (Marcuse, 
1958, p. 86, GT's italics). Within Soviet Marxism, the Soviet State became equated 
with Reason and was concerned with the actualization of historical processes "in 
which commanded political practice would bring about the desired facts" (Marcuse, 
1958, p. 87, original italics). 
In the next section I propose to analyze the concept of alienation supported by 
Lange. As is noted in this section, Lange does not give a systematic analysis of 
alienation so, in the next section I analyze work on alienation by T. I. Oizerman, a 
prominent defender of the Soviet Union who has a very similar economic perspective 
to that held by Lange in the 1960's. 
7 . 5.3 A critique of the concept of alienation supported 
by Lange and T. I Oizerman, 
a prominent defender of Soviet Marxism. 
Lange's concept of alienation in the 1960's was consistent with the official Soviet 
interpretation, but he did not defend this concept in a systematic way. I consider it 
reasonable to examine an official Soviet source, T. I. Oizerman, a Soviet philosopher 
regarded in the 1960's as a "leading representative of the `official' Soviet position on 
Marx's Manuscripts and the concept of alienation" (Yanowitch, 1967, p. 38 ). 
According to Oizerman, Marx is primarily an economist and historian (Yanowitch, 
1967, p. 40 ) writing about market relations, including on alienation. Both writers, 
therefore, claim to understand alienation as a result of studying Marx. For both 
Oizerman and Lange, alienation is mainly "conditioned by objective circumstances" 
(Oizerman, 1964, p. 41), and has its roots "in certain historically transitory conditions 
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of material production", that is, in the "underdeveloped state of the productive forces 
of society, in the low level of social production", namely, in a market economy 
(Yanowitch, 1967, p. 40, quoting from Oizerman writing in Istoriia Filosofi 
[Oizerman, 1959, p. 59], GT's italics). Oizerman argues that "alienation is essentially 
a certain social relationship; it is therefore a question of alienated social relations, the 
destruction of which becomes possible and necessary through the development of the 
productive forces of a communist society" (Oizerman, 1964, p. 41, GT's italics ). 
Oizerman argues that the development of modern industry would outgrow these 
institutional forms and that, together with "scientific and technical progress and 
necessary social reforms", would support the abolition of alienation (Oizerman, 1964, 
p. 42 ). 
For Oizerman, the attitude to work as something external to the worker, as 
something imposed from the outside rather than satisfying man's need for productive 
activity, is acknowledged to be an essential element of Marx's concept of alienated 
labour. Oizerman notes that: 
(The ) attitude of a man towards his work as towards something alien, 
external, forced is conditioned by certain historically transient factors: 
the low level of productive forces in the society which had bought about 
private ownership of the means of production, social inequality and 
exploitation (Oizerman, 1964, p. 42, GT's italics). 
In his later writings Oizerman, like Lange, acknowledges that while socialism 
would free man from the "elemental forces of social development" (Yanowitch, 1967, 
p. 41) only communism would mark the end of all alienation, because only in 
communism would the productive forces have developed to the point where alienated 
social relations would disappear (Yanowitch, 1967, p. 41; Lange , 1938, p. 141). 
This theorist does not explain how concretely the rule of bureaucratic planners using 
market techniques would come to an end (if it would). Therefore, there were no 
mechanisms for ending the market in labour-power in Lange's model (or in similar 
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ones). For me the best analysis of this conclusion is expressed by Marcuse, who pointed 
out that within Soviet Marxism a dominant goal of communism is that all will be 
labourers of one community and that labour will change from burden to enjoyment 
(Marcuse, 1958, p. 183). Soviet patriotism, joined with "proletarian internationalism", 
served as justification for the "complete endorsement" of work as the very content of 
the individual's whole life" (Marcuse, 1958, p. 234, GT's italics). Free time was 
considered to be time when individuals took part in polytechnic training, not in 
education as an `end-in-itself. ' 
However, Soviet orthodoxy did not recognize labour in the Soviet Union to 
be alienated, because the social individual was supposed to invest all his energy and 
his aspirations in whatever function he found himself in, or was put in by the 
authorities, in order to achieve the ends aspired to by "organized society" (see Section 
7.2). As Marcuse notes, there is nothing socialist or communist in this formula - as 
long as labour does not allow for the free play of human faculties (Marcuse, 1958, p. 
236 ). For Marcuse: 
It is this obliteration of the decisive difference between alienated and 
nonalienated labour which enables Soviet Marxism to proclaim for the 
Soviet system the full development of the all-round individual as against 
the mutilated individual of Western society (Marcuse, 1958, p. 235). 
Marcuse correctly notes that Marx "made an essential distinction between work 
as the realization of human potentialities and work as alienated labour" and that, for 
Marx, " the entire sphere of material production, of mechanized and standardized 
performances, is considered one of alienation" (Marcuse, 1958, p. 234). Marcuse goes 
on to argue: 
By virtue of this distinction, the realization of freedom is attributed to a 
social organization of labor fundamentally different from the 
prevailing one [ in the Soviet bloc countries, GT] to a society where 
work as the free play of human faculties has become a `necessity', a 
`vital need' for society, while work for procuring the necessities of life 
no longer constitutes the working day and the occupation of the 
individual, (Marcuse, 1958, pp. 234-5). 
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The bureaucratic system in Lange's model is the form of central 
planning cited by both Hayek and Tooley (see Chapter Two), and also by 
Judith Suissa (see Chapter Nine) as being representative of all socialist states. 
However, I have tried to show that this form of `socialism' is not the 
model of `socialism' advocated by Marx: neither is it the model that I 
support in this thesis. In fact, equating bureaucratic central planning with 
socialism was at the time is the ideology which had particular dominance in the 
Soviet bloc. 
In conclusion: in Chapter Seven I analyze Oskar Lange's model of a `socialist 
market', in which market relations and laws are used in both the `socialized' sectors 
and non-socialized sectors of the economy, and note that these market relations 
necessarily result in alienating relations. I also note that Lange acknowledges that 
the nature of economic processes in the capitalist system is not substantially different 
from the nature of the economic processes in any type of exchange economy (Lange, 
1935, p. 197 ), including in his own model. Specifically, Lange notes that Marx 
argues that the `law of value' which operates in an exchange [market] economy is 
based on division of labour, so that the structural relations which result hold for any 
type of exchange [market] economy, "whether capitalistic or an `einfache Waren- 
produktion, ' " the latter being an exchange economy consisting of small independent 
producers, each of whom possesses his own means of production (Lange, 1935, p. 
197). 
I give three main reasons why the market relations present in Lange's model 
dehumanize the worker. Firstly, the worker loses control over the objects and services 
he produces. Secondly, the worker becomes estranged from other social individuals 
and, thirdly, the worker becomes effectively an appendage of a machine. The role of 
schools in the model of Soviet Marxism, which Lange supports, is to provide skilled 
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workers for the ends which "organized society" considers important. Therefore, 
although schools are not marketized in Lange's model, they are subject to some of the 
similar alienating conditions and social relations as state schools in 1950's England 
(Section 5.4), by virtue of being instrumental to the goals of a society that has market 
relations similar to those found in capitalism. 
I conclude that the form that alienating relations take within Lange's system are 
similar to those found in capitalism, but intensified by the role played by the 
bureaucracy in Lange's system. Consequently, in this chapter I maintain that the 
market and bureaucratic relations found in Lange's system cannot prefigure the 
structures and conditions needed to enable unalienated activity, including education. 
In Chapter Eight I argue that the conditions and social relations which could prefigure 
an unalienated society can be found in the system based on Marx and developed by 
the Yugoslav/Serbian Praxis theorist Mihailo Markovic (1923-2010). 
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Part Three 
Chapter Eight 
A transitionary period of a socialist market and the process of overcoming 
alienating relations. 
Introduction 
This chapter attempts to show how the conditions, social relations and values 
found in the model of socialism which has been defined by Marx and developed by 
Mihailo Markovic could prefigure a society in which unalienated activity would be a 
material possibility. I begin this section by outlining the social relations in which 
Markovic personally was embedded. Markovic was mainly writing for a Yugoslav 
audience. He primarily addressed how Yugoslavia could be enabled to move 
from bureaucratic `socialism', as outlined in Chapter Seven, to a form of socialism 
enabling the conditions and relations needed to prefigure an unalienated society. 
Markovic's model assumes a situation in which the socialization of the major 
industries and services, including schooling, has already occurred. A major aim for 
Markovic is to criticise a social model similar to that advocated by Lange, in which 
the bureaucracy administers without recourse to the majority of the people, and to 
suggest the relations and conditions which are necessary to prefigure an unalienated 
society. Unlike Lange, Markovic contends that the social change which supports 
unalienated activity cannot be prefigured by the manipulation of objective social 
relations and conditions. Markovic realizes that, for the move towards an 
unalienated society to be successfully completed, the support of the majority of the 
people is essential. In Section 8.11 consider the conditions and social relations 
necessary for Marx's realm of necessity and the transition to Marx's realm of 
freedom, both of which were defined in the introduction to Chapter Seven. 
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8.1 The conditions and relations necessary for Marx's realm of necessity and the 
transition to his realm of freedom. 
In the Introduction to Chapter Seven it was noted that the realm of necessity 
develops out of the conditions and relations of capitalism. Consequently, the realm of 
necessity contains some of the conditions, relations, ideological ideas and values of 
capitalist society, including those of market relations. It was also noted that the social 
relations and values found in capitalism will gradually dissolve as the conditions, 
social relations and values necessary for the existence of the realm of freedom develop 
and gain social support. The conditions and social relations needed to support the 
realm of freedom are outlined in Chapter Nine. 
While it is true that alternative modes of social organization will start to develop 
before all the objective conditions and relations necessary to support them are in 
place, these alternatives modes cannot be successfully completed without these 
conditions and relations coming to fruition. Social individuals cannot successfully 
build alternative social organizations solely on the basis of values, propensities and 
tendencies. The structural relations involved in the realm of freedom are conditional 
upon certain social relations and conditions. 
A necessary objective condition for the development of an unalienated society 
is the socialization of the means of production, that is, where productive resources 
belong to the society of all social individuals, without anyone having the right to sell, 
bequeath or further alienate any resources. The socialization of the means of 
production is a necessary objective condition because it provides the foundation 
for the rational, democratic planning which allows associations of producers both 
to control their own conditions of production and to develop ways of satisfying 
human needs, all in a manner appropriate to the nature of human beings: 
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socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human 
metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their 
collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; 
accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in 
conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human nature 
(Marx, 1981, p. 959). 
Socialization of production, under democratic control, releases significant 
economic resources. This can be illustrated by consideration of the pharmaceutical 
industry. For example, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, production of 
drugs by private firms causes a vast transfer of finance from the public purse to 
private firms. It has been reported that GlaxoSmithKline was charging the British 
National Health Service £6 per dose of swine flu vaccine which cost the firm £1 only 
to produce. The UK Government ordered 60 million doses, making GlaxoSmithKline 
£300m. in profit. During the period May-July 2009 the company announced profits of 
£2.4bn. (Lucy Tobin, 2009, pp. 1-2). In this case, the socialization of such a firm 
under democratic control would necessarily enable the release of these profits to 
address human needs, including the production of new drugs. Under the present 
system by comparison such expenditure from profits will have been contingent upon 
the will of the firm's owners. 
Another necessary objective condition for the development of the realm of 
freedom is a high enough level of technological advance to achieve abundance. ' 
This provides enough leisure time for social individuals to follow activities which are 
meaningful to them, and which simultaneously enable them to take part in changing 
society, so that there is both abundance and more `free' time. It is as a result of 
technological development that social individuals would be able to step "to the 
Marx defines abundance as "material elements for the development of the rich individuality which is 
as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose labour also therefore appears no longer 
as labour, but as the full development of activity itself, in which natural necessity in its direct form has 
disappeared" (Marx, 1973 [a], p. 325). 
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side of the production processes instead of being its chief actor" (Marx, 1973 [a], p. 
705), for example, by enabling machines to make other machines. Such 
technological development would reduce the extent to which social individuals have 
to engage in manual labour, and would be fundamental in enabling them to relate to 
the production process in a supervisory capacity. In brief, the realm of freedom is said 
to begin when "labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends" (Marx, 
1981, p. 959). 
Technological development also enables many raw materials to be replaced by 
artificial materials and new forms of renewable energy to be developed and 
introduced widely. The increased use of technology per se might initially be regarded 
as necessarily damaging to the environment. However, planning of the sort outlined 
in this chapter would be directly accountable to people, and would almost certainly 
aim reduce damage to the environment by a) changing the composition of output to 
less damaging products; b) replacing harmful economic inputs such as fossil fuels 
by renewable energy sources; c) developing technology so that resources are used 
more efficiently, and d) decreasing the `environmental intensity co-efficient' by 
changing not just the technical relations of production but also the social (Dickenson, 
2003, p. 20). 
For Dickenson, planned obsolescence, destruction of plants and machinery during 
slumps and production for conspicuous consumption are all oppositional to the 
production for human need; as would be the duplication of resources generally. 
Moreover, increasing the efficiency of energy use and the use of different raw 
materials would have a significant impact on reducing pollution, avoiding waste 
resources and reducing the cost of production. Because of abundance and the 
socialized distribution of goods, market relations would no longer necessarily be 
208 
needed in the realm of freedom. In Section 8.2, I support the argument that market 
relations would "wither away", along with the antagonistic dispositions which 
market relations support. 
The assumption by some writers that the "withering away" of market 
relations would be impossible because individuals are innately selfish and acquisitive 
is based on the belief that scarcity will always be a material reality (Nove, 1991, p. 
18ff; Lange, 1938, p. 141). I maintain that acquisitiveness is related both to a 
perception by social individuals of the scarcity of resources, and also to their 
calculation of the probable actions by others. Therefore, I contend that as 
abundance grows, the market becomes less dominant and so aspects of human nature 
such as acquisitiveness and possessiveness gradually lose their material purpose. As 
acquisitiveness loses its material purpose the reaction of social individuals will 
usually be to share with others: 
In your use or enjoyment of my product I would have the immediate 
satisfaction and knowledge that in my labour I had gratified a human 
need, i. e. that I had objectified human nature and hence had procured 
an object corresponding to the needs of another human being (Marx, 
1975[e], p. 277, original italics). 
I maintain that this is not because individuals would have become `good' 
because of a "transhistorical evaluative standard, defined by our human nature" 
(Geras, 1995, p. 154), but because acquisitiveness would have lost its material 
purpose. As argued in Section 4.1, there is no permanent selfish aspect of human 
nature preventing the development of new social relationships, contrary to a view 
consistent with the argument of Geras. 
It is important to repeat at this point that the type of society Marx is advocating 
would come into existence only because it would enable the type of activity and 
values which the vast majority of social individuals would support. The need for 
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support from the majority of social individuals for the institutionalization of social 
relations is a dimension of Marx's thinking which David Miller fails to acknowledge 
when he argues that there are no `features' in Marx's future society to prevent 
individuals from relapsing into forms of awareness and activity reminiscent of 
capitalism ( Miller, 1999, p. 217 ). 
Another condition necessary for the realm of freedom to develop is the growth 
of the realm of necessity at an international level. This is because the conditions 
considered above when applied internationally would, over time, create the 
conditions for abundance in all countries. This is even in cases where the supply of 
some resources would not quickly be increased, and thus unalienated activity 
would only gradually become a reality. For example, the more advanced countries 
could combine to assist the less advanced, and help to regularize prices for those 
goods and services still exchanged internationally on the market. Consequently, as a 
result of the gradual reduction in competition over resources, there would be a 
decrease in antagonistic internationally. As a result the likelihood of armed conflict 
would decrease and the need for coercive institutions such as an army (or armed 
police) would be less (see Section 8.2). This situation would allow the reduction of 
expenditure on arms. This in turn would allow governments to release funds 
previously earmarked for military purposes, which could instead be used to address 
the needs of social individuals. An indication of the amount of money that would be 
released can be found from a consideration of some articles written about the arms 
trade. 
In an article written in 2003 entitled "How Big Is the UK Arms Trade? " Brian 
Wheeler, the BBC News On Line Business Reporter, noted that in 1999 the UK 
government spent 2.6% (say, £26bn. at 1999 prices) of the Gross Domestic Product 
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on arms: resources which, I contend, could instead have been spent on such socially 
useful projects (www. bbcnews. co. uk, last accessed 16 April, 2009). Wheeler 
quotes former United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower as saying: 
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired 
signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not 
fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not 
spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the 
genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children... This is not a way of 
life at all, in any true sense (Former U. S. President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, speech on 16 April 1953, quoted on 
www. globalissues. org, last accessed 16 April 2009). 
8.2 The process of transcending the state in Mihailo Markovic's model. 
Both Marx and Markovic argue that the goal of an unalienated society would 
be made possible as a result of the conditions and social relations outlined in 
Section 8.1, which would prefigure both the "withering" of market relations and 
the abolition of the state. 2 
However, both Marx and Markovic note that in the realm of necessity some state 
functions would still be needed. 
Markovic gives three main reasons for this need. Firstly, he says, "it preserves a 
minimum of order and security which is an indispensible life-condition for every 
citizen.. ". Secondly, he says, "it mediates among conflicting particular interests of 
various social groups, regions, nations, races and religions". Thirdly, he says, "it 
regulates and co-ordinates the basic economic, educational and cultural activities of 
the whole society" (Markovic, 1982[a], p. 116). 
Markovic notes that while the political organization of society has "the form of a 
state, the room for autonomous functioning of self-governing bodies will be greatly 
As Engels notes (Engels, 1975, p. 333), aufheben does not mean to annihilate or destroy, but to 
transcend, while the content is preserved in a new and higher form. Aufheben has sometimes been 
translated as withering and the process is often referred to as the "withering of the state". 
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restricted" (Markovic, 1982[b], p. 33). Markovic states that: 
When the state determines both the legal framework and the social 
conditions under which those organs may operate, this constant 
interference decreases the sense of responsibility, initiative, dignity, 
and creative imagination of workers, and dangerously shifts their 
interest from the issues of production towards issues of distribution 
(Markovic, 1982[b], p. 33). 
Therefore, unlike that of Lange (Chapter Seven), Markovic's concept of self- 
governance is based on support of the material realization of self-determination. This 
is because it is through the structural relations of self-managed units of production and 
full participation in all aspects of political, social and economic life that, Markovic 
argues, alienation can be mitigated. I outline these relations in detail in Section 8.3. 
For Markovic, the nature of self-determination is conditioned "by a given 
social situation, by the level of technology, the given structure of production, the 
nature of political institutions, the level of culture and the habits of human behaviour" 
(Markovic, 1974[a], pp. 209-10). Markovic differs from Soviet theorists such as 
Lange by placing more emphasis on subjective choice and conscious activity than 
on bureaucratic decision making. For Markovic, it is essential for self-determination 
that: 
(1) external objective conditions constitute only the framework of 
possibilities of a certain course of events, whereas upon the subjective 
choice and conscious activity will depend which of these possibilities 
will be realized; (2) that the subjective choice is autonomous, 
genuinely free and not heteronomous and compulsory. This means that 
the subject by his own activity creates a new condition of the process 
instead of merely repeating time and again an act which he was 
compelled or for which he was programmed. This act need not be 
arbitrary and groundless; it should be an act of self-realisation, of the 
of the actualization of basic human capacities, of the satisfaction of 
genuine human needs (Markovic, 1974 [a], p. 210). 
As was noted in Sections 3.2 and 8.1, when social individuals no longer have to 
fight for resources the antagonistic features of human behaviour would disappear and 
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the coercive functions of the state would no longer be necessary. At this stage there 
would be no need for a state because no incompatible choices between social 
individuals would have to be made and no opportunity foregone. Because resources 
would be collectively owned there would sometimes be choices for the totality of 
social individuals, but there would be no financial gain for any social individual or 
group of social individuals. Under these circumstances there would be no need for 
any social individual or groups to compete and take possessions for their own 
exclusive use from what is freely available to all. Because abundance would have 
been achieved, the task of planning, at this stage, would involve no competing 
interests. There would still need to be an administration to deal with the distribution of 
things, and decision making would merely be about the order in which things could be 
done (Section 8.3). Importantly, this administration would control things and services, 
but not people. It would not be a `power above' social individuals and therefore not as 
alienating (entfremdet) as the state outlined in Lange's system in Chapter Seven. 
8.3 A brief exploration of the background to Markovic's model of socialism. 
Markovic defines socialism as "the transformation of private property into 
common social property" (Markovic, 1982 [a], p. 88). Socialism for Markovic is 
therefore a process which necessarily begins with the aspiration to transfer the 
ownership of the means of production either to associations of producers or to other 
organizations representing the populace. 
In order to situate Markovic's model historically, I briefly describe the context 
of Markovic's work. If one considers the geographical composition of Yugoslavia, 
one can see why Markovic favoured a federal system of governance at a national 
level. The term Yugoslavia refers to several regions, many of which are based on 
separate ethnic identities: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and 
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Slovenia. 
The Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was proclaimed in 1943 by the Yugoslav 
Partisans resistance movement which operated during the World War II. It was 
renamed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946. The political model 
which was adopted was based on the lines of centralized planning and state 
ownership of enterprises (with the exception of agriculture). The centralized planning 
of the means of production applied mainly to raw materials and large-scale industry, 
while small-scale industrial production and agricultural production were still 
provided by private producers and co-operatives. Because of the fragmentation of 
production, markets were needed to distribute goods and labour power. It was 
envisaged by socialist theorists that, as large-scale industry became more 
mechanised and productive, small-scale industry would gradually decline and, with 
it, the need for markets. 
On June 28 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, but had 
associated member status of the economic grouping Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), known in the West as Comecon. Under the influence of Edward 
Kardelj and Milovan Dijas, the leaders of Yugoslavia began to re-assess the Soviet 
model of governance. In 1950 a law was introduced supporting workers' self- 
management, initially in a limited number of economic sectors. This law gave workers 
the right to directly elect workers' councils as the main decision-making bodies of a 
work-place. These decision-making bodies were to have the right to decide on 
production plans, inputs, hiring policies and, to a limited extent, income-distribution. 
Centralized planning took the form of a set of targets and the setting of a single 
price-structure. In 1953 state property was replaced by `social property' which was 
regarded as the property of society as a whole. Although this did not give property 
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rights to enterprises in the social state, it gave them the right to use socially-owned 
assets and to appropriate their product. The form of this model was supported by 
Markovic, but he explored ways in which the content of the model could be made 
less bureaucratic and more democratic. To re-call, Markovic's aim was a unalienated 
society of the type advocated by Marx which, of course, differed fundamentally from 
the type of `unalienated' society envisaged by the Soviet theorists who supported 
Stalinism (Section 7.4.2). 
8.4 Markovic's model of self-management. 
For Markovic the highest authority of an enterprise's self-management would 
be "the collective of all workers (in small working communities), or the council 
composed of workers' delegates (in larger ones)" (Markovic, 1982[b], p. 28 ). At 
the workplace, such a body would be: 
responsible for the basic making of decisions regarding all issues of 
production, and distribution, employment in principle, such as rights 
to, and of, election and re-election of the operative management that 
is responsible for technical decision-making (Markovic, 1982 [b], p. 
28). 
For Markovic, self-management is enabled when "the functions of directing social 
processes are no longer performed by forces outside of the mass of society, opposed to 
it, but are instead in the hands of the very same people who produce, who create 
social life in all its forms" (Markovic, 1982[b], pp. 32-33 ). 
Therefore, Markovic's style of management rests on structural relations, all of 
which are designed to return political power to associations of social individuals. 
The members of a self-governing body, at any level of social organization, would be 
directly electable by the people, or be delegated by a lower-level organ of self- 
government or by associations of social individuals in a given field; but not 
allocated from a "centre". In this system it is the lower-level organization which 
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decides regulation of day-to-day matters pertaining to the work-place. In the case of 
schools this would be about the pattern of the working day, the hiring and firing of 
staff, and liaison with the local community. 
Markovic, being within the political and demographic context of Yugoslavia, 
argues for a central organ of self-management, that is, a federal congress of `peoples' 
delegates', which I discuss in Section 8.6.. For Markovic, co-ordination and control 
of services used by the whole of society would take place at a higher level. Therefore, 
the authority of the central federal assembly would rest on that of national or regional 
assemblies, and all of them would be ultimately authorized to decide on certain 
matters by councils of basic working organizations and local communities. 
The members of self-governing bodies would be elected for limited periods, with 
the principle of rotation strictly observed, and the members of self-governing bodies 
being directly responsible to their electorate (rather than to any political 
organization). Such delegates would be obliged to report regularly to the community 
which they represent, are subject to recall and regular re-election, and must not 
enjoy any material privileges as a result of their elected position. Therefore it can be 
seen that, for Markovic, self-management does not mean that every social individual 
takes part directly in all levels of self-management. In Markovic's model only the 
basic level of self-management is characterised by direct democracy (Markovic, 
1982 [b], p. 36). 
The next level of self-management is constituted by councils of larger working 
associations and assemblies of larger communities where, for Markovic, referenda 
would be the only feasible way to direct democracy. Markovic argues that such 
structures would be able only to resort to means compatible with the "autonomy" and 
the "self-determination of each unit. " Markovic argues that this would reduce the 
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likelihood of centralism, in turn preventing the "lasting, alienated authoritarian 
power" (Markovic, 1982[b], p. 32). 
An intermediary level of decision making would be constituted by co-ordinating 
boards for whole branches of activity and/or by regional bodies of self-government. 
These bodies would coordinate the development of all communities in a defined 
geographical area. All these councils would be limited in their decision making by 
existing legislation and, by the accepted policies made at a federal level of decision 
making (Section 8.5). 
Although Markovic believes in a significant amount of decentralized decision 
making, he also contends that, in the realm of necessity, there would be a role for 
central co-ordinating bodies. Markovic argues that, during the realm of necessity, the 
main reasons for coordination at a regional and national level would be to eliminate 
waste, reduce social friction, solve ecological problems and develop mutual aid in 
order to help the vulnerable. 
However, Markovic argues that, within the structural relations of self- 
government, professional officials should not be able to block or control any political 
organization, or to determine general policies, the definition of general goals or the 
criteria for the evaluation of possible political programmes. Professional officials 
would merely act as advisors to the delegates, and have to be subordinate to the 
assemblies and councils of self-governance (Markovic, 1974 [b], pp. 228-9). Unlike 
the managers in Lange's model, such professionals would not be permanent paid 
officials. These post-holders would be directly answerable to the bodies electing 
them and could be replaced at any time if they are regarded as being unsuitable. The 
structures considered above could also be used in the management of schools, and are 
considered in Section 8.6. 
217 
8.5 Markovic and federalism. 
For Markovic, federalism is a real alternative to centralism and decentralism in 
Yugoslavia. Markovic defines federalism as "a union of communities (national states, 
provinces, cultural or political organizations) which collaborate as equal partners 
while preserving a high degree of autonomy" (Markovic, 1982 [b], p. 30). Markovic 
notes that supporting such an institution would require an understanding of the need 
for solidarity. 
For Markovic, a federal assembly would consist of several chambers. Markovic 
suggests that, in order to prevent power falling into the hands of one group, there 
should be a central organization, composed of three chambers, whose decision- 
making would be made by delegates subject to recall and re-election. Markovic 
recommends that one chamber of the federal assembly should be composed of 
delegates of workers, another constituted by delegates of communities and a third 
composed of directly elected delegates of all citizens. The first two chambers would 
approach issues from the point of view of particular professions or regions. The third 
chamber would mediate between the two from the point of view of the interests of all 
society. 
Markovic argues that a federation of this kind would be possible "when all 
component communities have an objective interest in co-operation, in sharing certain 
natural or cultural resources, in exchanging goods and experiences, [and sic] in joining 
efforts against natural forces or some other threat" (Markovic, 1982 [b], pp. 30-1) . 
Markovic argues that such a structure would be "a free creation of parts rather than a 
primary whole that determines the conditions of its parts" (Markovic, 1982, [b], p. 
31). He argues that this is because, in his model, federalism does not have any 
dominating centre "because none of its component units aspires to domination, and/or 
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because all of them strongly resist any such tendency" (Markovic, 1982, [b], p. 31). 
8.6 Markovic and schooling in the realm of necessity. 
Neither Marx nor Markovic write extensively about schools and schooling. 
Therefore I extrapolate from the ideas of Marx and Markovic when outlining 
the possibilities for schooling within the realm of necessity. 
In the realm of necessity, the state and the ideological superstructure of society 
would still exist and schooling would form part of that superstructure. However, the 
content of the superstructure will be different from that which exists in capitalism 
because the processes would be under the democratic control of majority of the 
people and, therefore, there would be the possibility of starting to develop the 
conditions and social relations needed for an unalienated society. 
In the realm of necessity, schools would play a vital role in supporting the 
transition to an unalienated society by both providing pupils with' an appreciation of 
the values which support such a society and the knowledge and skills necessary to 
support the development of the conditions and social relations necessary for an 
unalienated society. Because of the socialization of the main areas of the economy 
including schooling and social services, there would be no private provision of 
schools or of schooling for profit. 
Schooling at this stage of society would take place in schools which would 
probably look very much like schools today. However, the management of the 
schools would differ substantially. Schools at this stage would be under democratic 
control in order to support the development of conditions and social relations which 
would enable fully human activity. 
However, for Markovic, schooling, in the realm of necessity, is not an end-in- 
itself. For Markovic, schooling, at this stage, is primarily instrumental in building 
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the conditions and relations needed to enable the transition to a society that would 
support fully human activity and education as an end-in-itself. Therefore schooling is 
structurally related to the economic and political needs of society. 
For Markovic, schooling is structurally related to the economic and political 
needs of society in two main ways. Firstly, it provides future workers with the 
knowledge and skills necessary to increase the productive capacity to a level where 
abundance can be achieved. Secondly, schooling would be vital to provide the 
knowledge, skills and dispositions needed to support the democratic self- 
management of productive activity. Therefore, Knowledge of mother tongue, 
Mathematics, Science and Technology and the skills necessary to take part in 
decision making would be central, and probably compulsory, parts of a curriculum 
for pupils of school age. This is because this knowledge and these skills would be 
essential for society to provide the level of abundance necessary for social 
individuals to take part in fully human activity. 
Marx was insistent that the state should not interfere in the study of `pure' 
subjects. Marx argued that such subjects should be studied for according to their 
"eternal principles" (Marx, 1974[a], pp. 209-10; 1974[b], p. 357; 1974[c], p. 326). 
This is an important condition if society intends social individuals to gradually 
develop their powers and capacities in an unalienated way. Therefore it can be 
assumed, in a society influenced by Marxist ideals, that subjects and skills not 
needed for either technological development or the administration of things would be 
taught in such a way as to enable social individuals to develop their capacities in 
ways that are meaningful to them. 
At this stage of social development, because of the release of resources and the 
political consensus underpinning society, decision makers would try to enable 
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unalienated activity where possible. It is probably safe to assume that education could 
be a life-long experience and be free at all levels. One could also assume that there 
would be no entry qualifications for courses. Social individuals would be able to enter 
a course at whatever level they chose, the assumption being that they would drop out 
if they did not have the aptitude or necessary knowledge for the course they joined. 
Individuals would, of course, be advised at what level they should start any 
exploration of a subject, the emphasis being solely on the development of the 
individual's skills and capacities. 
As was noted in Section 8.2, the knowledge and these skills need to participate 
in the collective decision-making are also needed in order to create the social 
relations which enables associations of social individuals to move forward to a fully 
human society. This type of schooling, provided within a society inspired by Marxist 
ideals, is therefore is a necessary condition for transition to an unalienated society. 
The content of this schooling would be decided democratically through structures 
similar to those outlined in Section 8.4. However, because schooling has an impact on 
society as a whole, the content and style of the curriculum and the management of 
schools, the standards of teaching and the standards of school buildings would be laid 
down and monitored by centrally elected bodies. Within Markovic's model, school 
inspectors would be directly responsible to the higher decision-making bodies at a 
national level. The management of this schooling differs substantially from that of 
`Soviet Marxism' because schools in Markovic's model are under democratic 
control even at a national level, and, as such, reflect the concerns of the wider 
community and not merely the interests of bureaucrats. 
The importance of democracy in supporting the development of the relations 
needed to overcome political alienation means that democratic dispositions and values 
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have to be encouraged within schools. Therefore, it is vital that schools are organized 
in a way which supports the development of the skills and dispositions needed to 
enable the development towards the realm of freedom. Schools safeguard democracy 
by developing a critical spirit and building up the free and independent public opinion 
essential for the development of the process towards an unalienated society. 
Within Markovic's model, the workers in the school, parents and older pupils 
would have a say in the manner in which the schools is run. This issue has been 
addressed by Patricia White in Beyond Domination (Section 6.4.2). Although White 
situates her model of schooling in a liberal democratic society, the mechanisms she 
suggests for developing democratic dispositions are still relevant. However, because 
she bases her model on external relations, she fails to address the way which the 
interrelations between the structural relations of the school and the pupils would 
necessarily need to support the acquisition of such dispositions. For White, the 
development of such dispositions is contingent and may or may not happen. The 
consideration of the necessary relation between the structural relations of the school 
and the development of the dispositions of individual pupils would have provided the 
basis for a very interesting ontological study into the role of school organization in 
developing the confidence and political consciousness of pupils. I have not addressed 
the epistemological basis of this process because my thesis primarily considers the 
ontology of alienating relations. However, I consider that such a study would make an 
important contribution to the philosophical analysis of self-realization. 
The day- to-day management would be overseen by delegates from such 
"communities for education" as schools, universities, scientific institutes and 
academies, as well as from representatives of such artistic institutions as theatres, 
publishing houses and galleries. Each local group of schools would send delegates 
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from schools to local councils and from local councils would be sent delegates to 
regional and republic-level assemblies. Assemblies at republic-level would make 
final decisions on educational, scientific and cultural policy and take responsibility for 
distributing school funds. These funds would consist of guaranteed amounts, which 
would be automatically allocated according to a fixed percentage of the total fund 
accumulated each year to cover general social needs. 
8.7 Alienating relations within Markovic's s sy tem. 
It was noted in Section 8.1 that, at the beginning of the realm of necessity, 
there would still be many of the conditions and social relations found in 
capitalism. In this thesis I contend that although these conditions and social relations 
might have a slightly different content, the economic principles operating would still 
be the same as within classical capitalism. For example, at the beginning of the realm 
of necessity there would still be commodity production, markets3 and, workers 
would still need to alienate their labour. As a result of verausserung (alienating 
through selling) would still take place. 
There would still be a market in labour-power even though the state would be 
the employer and the worker would be paid out of communal capital. Therefore, 
the category of worker would not be abolished at this stage and the community 
would be still being a community of labour (Marx, 1975[fJ, pp. 346-7). 
Although the worker would have the knowledge that what he is producing 
would contribute to the goods needed by social individuals, nevertheless, the 
worker would lack direct control over their productive activity, and consequently 
still be estranged from the productive process. 
Although the day- to- day management of the means of production would be in the 
3 The most prominent one being in foreign trade. 
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hands of associations of worker/producers, ultimate control of the means of 
production would still be exercised through state bodies and, even though these 
bodies would be elected by associations of producers, the worker would still 
relinquish control of his productive activity. 
Where there is the fragmentation of production, the distribution of goods would 
still be conducted through markets. Because of the fragmented nature of production, 
exchange value would still be the measure of value and the mediating function 
between persons engaged in productive activity (Marx, 1974, p. 346 ). Because of 
the social need for verausserung (alienating through selling) of a social individual's 
labour, social structures still support individual possession of goods as an essential 
aspect of life. As a consequence, man's will, his activity and his relations with 
other workers would still be to a certain extent competitive. As a consequence of 
this form of social mediation, the social individual would perceive others as 
independent of himself and also strange and alien to himself. 
Nevertheless, in Markovic's system, workers would exercise more control 
over the conditions of their productive life than would workers subject to the 
systems favoured by Oskar Lange and, therefore, some of the social relations 
which would prefigure an unalienated society would be present. In Markovic's 
system, power in self-governing bodies would be delegated to people in a particular 
field and not allocated from the centre as it is in Lange's model. When all decision- 
making comes from the top, social power is alienated; but not so when it is delegated 
from lower-level social organisations (Markovic, 1982 [a], p. 121 ). However, it can 
be seen from the following quote, that in this system, a significant amount of control 
over conditions of activity is still taken by intermediate and higher level bodies over 
which social individuals have no direct control: 
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a certain amount of power is, then, delegated to it. In such a way the 
authority of the central federal assembly rests on that of national or 
regional assemblies, and all of them are ultimately authorised to decide 
on certain issues by the councils of basic working organisations and 
local communities (Markovic, 1982[a], p. 122, GT's italics). 
Markovic differentiates his model from those of bureaucratic states and of liberal 
doctrines of `social contract' and `majority rule', by arguing that, in his model, 
"power originates from the councils in the atomic social community, even when a 
considerable amount of it has been delegated to higher-level self-governing 
institutions" (Markovic, 1982 [a], p. 122) . 
Markovic contends that his system is less alienating than other statist systems, 
because his model is based on societal support for solidarity and the autonomy 
and self-determination of each social unit (Markovic, 1982 [b], p. 32). However, 
Markovic's form of governance still has structural relations which take a "certain 
amount" of control over the conditions of life out of the hands of the majority of 
working people and into the hands of delegates over whom they have no direct 
control. I maintain that, as such, the relations in Markovic's system would be still 
alienating, although to a lesser degree than those found in Lange's model. I have 
argued that, on the basis of the scenario outlined in Section 8.1, national co-ordination 
is needed to ensure efficient use of resources at a time when there is still scarcity. 
However, I noted in this chapter that, as technology develops and abundance 
becomes more realizable, many, if not all, of these structures would wither and that, 
as a consequence of the social relations in Markovic's model, a non- unalienated 
activity. 
In conclusion: in Chapter Eight I give three main ways in which the relations 
and conditions in Markovic's model could prefigure the social relations necessary to 
support an unalienated society and education as an unalienated activity. The first way 
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is that the socialization of the means of production would be under democratic 
control and would enable the greater satisfaction of the material needs of social 
individuals. The second way is that market relations, commodity production and 
exchange value as the measure of value would gradually decline in importance in 
every-day life. The third way is that the technological development necessary to 
gradually increase the amount of free time would enable social individuals to 
take part in meaningful activities. Moreover, increased automation of production and 
abundance would gradually support the political decision to release schooling 
from being mainly instrumental to the needs of the economy, thus enabling it to 
become a service which addresses human need and unalienated activity. 
In this Chapter I have shown how the conditions and social relations found in 
Markovic's model could prefigure an unalienated society and, consequently, 
enable education as an unalienated activity. The form and content of such an 
unalienated society are discussed in Chapter Nine. 
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Part Three 
Chapter Nine 
The global realm of freedom, including education as an unalienated activity. 
Introduction 
This chapter explores in more detail the social relations and conditions which 
would be necessary to support unalienated social relations. I note in Section 8.2 and in 
the conclusion of Chapter Eight that the realm of freedom begins only when "labour 
determined by necessity and external expediency ends" (Marx, 1981 [b], p. 959); and 
with the disappearance of markets and the state. In Section 8.2 I note that this is 
made possible when abundance in all necessary goods and services has been achieved, 
and by the general support for the co-operative and humane dispositions which 
enable such a society. In this chapter I note that, as a result of abundance, there would 
be no need for social individuals to compete with each other over resources, or to hoard 
goods. As a result the disposition to acquire and possess `things' would gradually 
disappear as the material forces supporting such dispositions wither away. 
Consequently, the need for coercive institutions, such as the police, to intervene in 
conflicts over property rights. It would also be unnecessary to have any deliberate 
educational intervention as part of a `civilizing process'. 
In the latter part of this chapter I explore the concept of education as an `end-in- 
itself', with reference to philosophers as apparently different as John Dewey, Paul 
Hirst and Ivan Illich. I also illustrate the differences between my own argument and 
those of most anarchists, since the lack of authority structures in both my model and 
the models supported by anarchists may otherwise result in the perception that my 
model is a model of anarchism. 
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9.1 The conditions and relations necessary for unalienated activity 
The realm of freedom would be enabled by three main conditions. The first 
condition would be the expansion of productive forces and technology. This would 
release social individuals from being directly involved in production. For example, 
the tools and equipment needed for production could come from automated productive 
processes unless, of course, certain instruments or component parts come from the 
creative products of craftsmen/women who would be pursuing their productive activity 
as an end-in-itself. 
The second condition would be the decision by the majority of social individuals to 
support the realm of freedom. I maintain that the presence of abundance and the 
changes in the nature of productive activity, which would have been taking place since 
the beginning of the realm of necessity, would have been transforming the social 
individuals involved into ` different subjects' from those existing within capitalist 
relations (Marx, 1973[a], p. 712 ). To briefly recall, it was noted in Section 4.3 that 
when productive activity takes place within alienating relations, an object 
necessarily confronts social individuals as something other, as something which is 
not their own and which is alien to them. In unalienating conditions an object would not 
confront social individuals as something other, but as something belonging and 
satisfying to them. The activity involved in the realization of social individuals' 
powers would create an awareness of what is required for their realization, especially 
the awareness that the activity to realize the conditions and relations necessary must be 
done with others. 
The need of social individuals for unalienated activities would be paramount; and 
this would also be the predominant aim for associations of social individuals. Therefore, 
in the realm of freedom, it is likely that the social individuals regulating production 
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would be members of scientific or technological associations which would take 
part in productive activity because they would both value their own activities as an 
end-in-itself. They would also understand the necessity of providing the goods and 
services to others, in order to enable the latter to take part in unalienated activities, 
including education. I maintain that as a consequence of both the enthusiasm for 
particular activities and the willingness to help others, there would be no need for 
formal schooling to ensure a supply of socially-aware skilled enthusiasts. 
The third main condition for existence of the realm of freedom is abundance. In the 
realm of freedom goods would be available on demand in much the same way as 
that described by William Morris in News From Nowhere (Morris, 2003, Chapter Six: 
"A Little Shopping"). In Morris' society, goods are free, abundant and of good quality. 
They are available at shops for the asking, without the exchange of money. Because of 
the absence of scarcity, social individuals would have no material need to hoard; and 
dispositions such as acquisitiveness, possessiveness, greed and egoism would no 
longer be materially relevant. Consequently, there would be no grounds for conflict 
between groups of people on the basis of financial or positional gain and no need for 
coercive organizations such as the police or army. I now consider David Miller's 
criticisms of Marx's concept of a communist society, which I examine because these 
criticisms form a coherent whole, being similar to some `classical' criticisms of 
Marxism. 
9.2 Miller's criticisms of Marx's concept of unalienated activity. 
David Miller, in Market, State and Community (1999), has criticised Marx's 
description of a communist society on three grounds. Two of these criticisms are 
ontological and the third is economic. I begin with the two ontological criticisms, both 
of which are concerned with the capacity of social individuals to develop their 
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individuality within "communism", without the return to what Miller calls "the 
personal engulfment of pre-capitalist societies" (Miller, 1999, pp. 214,242-3). 
Miller's first ontological argument therefore specifically draws on Cohen's concept 
of "the personal engulfment of pre-capitalist societies" and argues that market 
structures would be necessary in a "communist" society to prevent the personal 
identification with a specific task, in the manner found in pre-capitalist societies. 
Miller borrows the term "engulfment" and the concept of "personal engulfment of pre- 
capitalist societies" from G. A. Cohen's discussion in his article "Marx's Dialectic of 
Labour" (Cohen, 1974, pp. 242-3). In this article, Cohen uses the concept of 
engulfment to describe this process of identification with a group or task (Cohen, 1974, 
pp. 239-243). For Cohen the concept of engulfment is primarily based on feelings 
rather than on structural relations. For example, for Cohen, "engulfment by X is 
compatible with a feeling of constraint by Y, where X and Y are distinct: a person 
lacking the freedom of detachment may also experience obstacles to, and pressures 
upon, his will" together with "a lack of awareness of oneself as capable of 
independence from X" (Cohen, 1974, p. 240, GT's italics). For Cohen, the self is 
never completely effaced by environmental circumstances or other selves. 
Miller acknowledges that Marx was against market structures in a communist 
society, and maintains that there are two possible ways Marx could have responded to 
the charge of engulfment. Firstly, Miller proposes that Marx might have said that 
capitalism had brought about an irreversible shift in human nature, which would have 
enabled persons in a post-capitalist society to continue to develop as individuals. ' 
Secondly, Miller considers that Marx might have argued that the development of 
individuality begun under capitalism could continue and be enhanced under 
' Interestingly Miller uses the term individual, not social individual. 
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communism. In reply to these possible responses of Marx, Miller argues that the 
"irreversible shift in human personality" would "model the transfer of capitalism's 
human achievements to communism on the transfer of its material achievements - the 
expanded forces of production etc. " Miller argues that it is difficult to see "how 
aspects of human personality can be transferred in the same way as physical objects, or 
even as scientific knowledge" (Miller, 1999, p. 214 ). I maintain that Miller's 
argument is a misinterpretation of Marx, and instead argue that Marx maintains 
that " social individuals" may be distinct from their activity when such activity is an 
object of [their] will and consciousness. For Marx "social individuals" separate 
themselves from their immediate feelings, experiences and activities, in order to 
inform these feelings, experiences and activities with the results of their deliberations. 
Next I consider Miller's second ontological argument. In this argument Miller 
denies that the mechanisms of a communist society would prevent individuals from 
lapsing back into "the immediate identification with the social group" (Miller, 1999, p. 
215 ). In this argument, Miller notes that in a communist society work will be 
voluntary and tasks rotated, but argues that he is not clear how such features would be 
sufficient to support the development of individuality. As part of this second 
ontological argument, Miller contends that the rotation of tasks brings two difficulties. 
Firstly, Miller maintains that rotation of tasks may prevent individuals from developing 
their individual capacities to the full. Secondly, Miller claims that, if an individual 
wishes to spend a lot of time on a specific activity, a certain degree of coercion would 
be necessary by society to ensure that other tasks, essential to the functioning of 
society, are performed (Miller, 1999, pp. 215-6). 
Regarding the first point, Miller argues that, within communism, individuals 
might still "work in a spirit of simple identification with their task and their social 
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group" in such a way that constrains the exercise of individual choice and the 
development of individuality (Miller, 1999, p. 215). I contend that Miller's concept of 
productive activity in communist society is contrary to that held by Marx. Marx argues 
that an unalienated society would only be sustained when "social individuals" are 
willing to undertake activities because they realise the need of others for goods or 
services. It is as a consequence of this willingness to address the needs of others, that 
there would be no compulsion to `work. ' 
Moreover, Marx points out that in capitalist societies simple identification with 
social tasks takes place as a result of the division of labour supported by similar 
market relations to those which Miller favours in his model. Marx argues that the 
structures of a market society force a "cleavage between the particular and the common 
interest": 
each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced 
upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, 
a herdsman, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to 
lose his means of livelihood (Marx, 1970, p. 54, GT's italics). 
Marx concludes that within capitalism choice takes place within conditions and 
social relations over which most "social individuals" have no control, and that there 
is not the capacity to choose unalienated activity in a capitalist society. It is only within 
the realm of freedom that "social individuals" have the possibility of choosing 
unalienated activity: 
While in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of 
activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, 
society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for 
me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, 
fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just 
as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or 
critic (Marx, 1970, p. 54, GT's italics). 
Importantly, Marx argues that it is only in a communist society that social individuals 
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are not subordinated to prescriptive definitions of their activity: 
With a communist organisation of society, there disappears the 
subordination of the artist to local and national narrowness, which arises 
entirely from division of labour, and also the subordination of the artist 
to some definite art, thanks to which he is exclusively a painter, sculptor, 
etc., the very name of his activity adequately expressing the narrowness 
of his professional development and his dependence on division of 
labour, In a communist society there are no painters but at most people 
who engage in painting among other activities (Marx, 1970, p. 109). 
In Marx's day, when large swathes of the countryside were given over to labour- 
intensive agrarian production, these skills would have been developed by individuals 
taking part in activities with their parents from an early age. However, in an industrial 
or post-industrial age this is not the case and social individuals would probably have to 
learn these skills from others with whom they would have neither family ties nor market 
relationships. In these cases social individuals would need to access the skills and 
knowledge of other individuals who were enthusiasts and willing to share their skills 
with others. The development of social dispositions and awareness would make it 
highly likely that social individuals who were enthusiasts in activities would take 
pleasure in sharing their knowledge and in helping others develop some expertise. 
In the realm of freedom or a communist society, all the activities would be learnt by 
observing and directly taking part in activities with skilled social individuals. Hunting, 
in a post-capitalist society is a group activity and social individuals would learn and 
have their skills developed through taking part in the activity with others who would be 
already experienced and skilled. Even where the activities which Marx lists are ones 
which could be conducted alone, for example, fishing, they are also activities which, 
predominantly, would involve the acquisition of skills from experienced practitioners. 
In support of Marx's argument, G. A. Cohen has pointed out that this type of 
activity would be possible because individuals do not enter a "position in a structure 
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of roles, in such a way that he could identify himself, if only for the time being, as a 
hunter, etc" (Cohen, 1974, p. 259). Cohen argues that this is because, in the realm of 
freedom, Marx maintains that individuals have the possibility of facing one another 
without the mediation of institutions representing "fixation of social activity, this 
consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us" (Marx, 
1970, p. 54). 
Next, I consider Miller's economic criticism of Marx's concept of a communist 
society. This is based on Miller's argument that, in the absence of a market, there would 
no mechanism for encouraging the development of new products (Miller, 1999, p. 218). 
Miller states that planning would be done by planners (presumably bureaucrats) 
informed, at best, through customer surveys (Miller, 1999, p. 218). As a result of 
Miller's assumptions about the nature of planning, Miller concludes that labour will not 
result in a communal bond between producer and "consumer" [Miller's term] (Miller, 
1999, p. 218). 
I maintain that Miller's theory of how production would be organized is very 
similar to that of Lange, described in Chapter Seven. This is because Miller's model is 
also one based on partial commodity production, combined with partial bureaucratic 
allocation of resources. Therefore the social relations in Miller's political economy (see 
Section 6.1.1) cannot necessarily be prefigurative of an unalienated society. 
Miller's criticisms of Marx are abstracted from the conditions and structural 
relations upon which Marx's theory of an unalienated society is based. For example, 
Miller has ignored the fact that a condition for the existence of the realm of freedom is 
that work will be practically non-existent (G. A. Cohen, 1974, p. 261). This aspect of 
Marx's concept of an unalienated society is possible because technology will have 
automated work practices and created sufficient abundance, so that social individuals 
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have the possibility of sufficient free time to fulfil their interests. Therefore, for Marx, 
in the realm of freedom, the impetus for following an interest will come from internal 
need and not external necessity. 
When Marx refers to social individuals driven by the external necessity of 
"bringing nature under the control of society", he is referring to societies that still need 
to develop technology to the level where many work processes are automated (Marx, 
1979 [a], p. 649). (It is only at a stage following this automation that social individuals 
do not need to have a direct involvement with production. ) By definition, these are not 
societies that have the conditions and relations found in the realm of freedom, a point 
which G. A. Cohen accepts in Karl Marx's Theory of History (Cohen, 1978, pp. 23-4). 
It is this issue to which Miller refers in his book (Miller, 1999, p. 219, n. 29). This is an 
example of Miller's tendency to transfer some of Marx's statements about an 
unalienated society to prior stages of society with different conditions and relations. 
As was noted in Section 9.1, if one places the activity possible in the realm of 
freedom within the internal social relations and conditions that necessarily exist, there 
would be no tension in the social individual between the wish to take part in 
unalienated activity and the wish to take part in the production of the goods and 
services needed by all social individuals. There would be no need either to calculate 
the amount of time put into social activity in order to claim time for individual leisure 
activities (contrary to Miller's assertion, 1999, pp. 216-7). It follows that there would 
be no need on the part of society, contrary to Miller's suggestion, to use compulsory 
methods to ensure that social individuals take part in production (Miller, 1999, p. 
216). To recall from Section 9.1, this is because, in the realm of freedom, social 
individuals would be aware of the fact that their capacity to engage in unalienated 
activity would depend on the willingness of others in society to produce goods and 
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services for all, thus enabling the development of human unalienated activity, including 
education, which would have become by then an end-in-itself. 
9.3 Education and other unalienated activities, in the realm of freedom. 
In this section I consider the way in which education could be conceived in the 
realm of freedom, and show that this is not an unfamiliar way of thinking about 
education. I illustrate by reference to writers as apparently diverse as John Dewey, Paul 
Hirst and Ivan Illich. 
In this section I maintain that the instrumental rationale given for schooling in the 
realm of necessity (Section 8.5) no longer necessarily applies in the realm of freedom 
because, in the realm of freedom, there would be abundance and the automation of 
most production. The existence of these conditions would enable all social individuals 
to have the opportunity to take part in activities which are meaningful to them. As noted 
in Section 9.1 any technological work needed would generally be done by associations 
of enthusiasts in that field. Moreover, because there would be no need for a state, 
state functions would be replaced by the administration of things (Section 9.1). Once 
again, it is highly likely that this administration would be done by social individuals 
interested in "keeping things together" (Morris, 2003, p. 130). Consequently, education 
in the realm of freedom would enable the development of human powers and capacities 
as ends-in-themselves. 
In the realm of freedom education would not be a separate activity, as it is under 
capitalism, but would form an integral part of the social activities in which social 
individuals choose to become involved. Social individuals would learn the skills and 
the knowledge which they feel would be needed as a result of taking part in activities 
meaningful to them. For example, social individuals might become guides to a 
historical building in their locality because they wish to give others the opportunity to 
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study the building. As a consequence of the questions they are asked, they might then 
develop an interest in the history of the building and locality and possibly of the 
relevant historical periods more generally. Moreover, social individuals would be able 
to spend as much time as they considered necessary in such activities. During the course 
of these activities they would develop a variety of skills and capacities. In the words of 
William Morris, "information lies ready to each one's hands when his own inclinations 
impel him to seek it. In this as in other matters we have become wealthy: we can afford 
to give ourselves time to grow" (Morris, 2003, p. 111). 
I now consider the ways in which John Dewey, Paul Hirst and Ivan Illich each 
explore the concept of education as an end-in-itself. John Dewey has noted in his article 
"Self-Realization as the Moral Idea" (Dewey, 1893) that it is in such a situation that 
one finds the self and therefore has the possibility of achieving self-realization. Dewey 
defines the self not as a "presupposed fixed schema" but as capacities defined as 
concrete specific activities (Dewey, 1893, p. 653). For Dewey, in this situation, 
activity " is not action for the self that is required (thus setting up a fixed self which is 
simply going to get something more, wealth, pleasure, morality, or whatever), but action 
as the self' (Dewey, 1893, pp. 661-2, original italics): 
To realize capacity does not mean, therefore, to act so as to fill up some 
presupposed ideal self. It means to act at the height of action, to realize 
its full meaning (Dewey, 1893, p. 659). 
Dewey argues that a capacity is realized "when we can say that no possible future 
activities or conditions have anything to do with the present action except as they enable 
us to take deeper account of the present activity" and to "see it in its totality" (Dewey, 
1893, p. 659). For Dewey, the whole character of man is "identical with man in all his 
concrete make-up and manifestations". Dewey argues that "certain traits of character 
have such an obvious connection with our social relationships that we call them `moral' 
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in an empathic sense" (Dewey, 1916, p. 415). Dewey also argues that "the moral and 
social quality (sic) of conduct are, in the last analysis, identical with each other". 
Therefore, for Dewey, to possess virtue "means to be fully and adequately what one is 
capable of becoming through association with others in all the offices of life" (Dewey, 
1916, p. 415). 
Although Dewey gives an interesting analysis of capabilities, he does not 
recognise that only in an unalienated society, of the kind described in this chapter, can 
capabilities be realized as ends-in-themselves. I maintain that this is because Dewey 
fails to recognise the interrelated nature of social relations and the oppositional nature of 
capitalist relations to the self-realization of social individuals' capacities. Although 
Dewey's concept of morality is based on social action, it fails to support the 
emancipatory action which would be needed to provide the conditions and relations 
which would support the development of capacities as ends-in-themselves. I now 
consider a different concept of education as an end-in-itself. 
Throughout Paul Hirst's works also, liberal education is something that has a 
value in its own right, as an end-in-itself. However, for Hirst, learning involves 
drawing on what is known and what is handed down by specialists. It is something 
external: a power above the person and therefore alienating. For Hirst, knowledge can 
be acquired only from a "master on the job" (Hirst, 1974[a], p. 45). In other words, 
knowledge is within the purview of a specialist elite. Hirst argues that knowledge can 
only be learnt from a master on the job because a) the forms of knowledge (as logical 
units) require "particular training in distinct worlds of discourse"; b) the forms 
necessitate the development of "critical standards according to complex criteria", and c) 
the forms involved one coming to look at experience in particular ways (Hirst, 1974[a], 
p. 45). 
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In his later version of liberal education, Hirst broadens the scope of social 
practices to be included in such education. He regards social practices to be a 
"modification of present practices" (Hirst, 1993, p. 185). Hirst states in his 
article in Educational Theory (1983): 
If we are to develop rational educational practice it now seems to me we 
must start from a consideration of current practice, the rules and 
principles it actually embodies and the knowledge, beliefs and principles 
that the practitioners employ in both characterising that practice and 
deciding what ought to be done. The practical discourse in which what is 
going on can be expressed will have much in common with the discourse 
of everyday practical activities........ The activities and practices of 
everyday life are developed and modified in a wide context of 
knowledge, beliefs and values about men and their physical and social 
context ( Hirst, 1983, pp. 16-19, GT's italics). 
I contend that Hirst therefore imports concepts and dispositions which, being 
derived from capitalistic practices, are therefore necessarily alienating. Hirst, 
therefore, has to contend with the limitations which capitalism imposes, such 
as scarcity and lack of leisure (Hirst, 1993, p. 193). Indeed, Hirst acknowledges 
that a life involving intrinsically worthwhile pursuits is "not merely as a logical 
possibility but ... a practical 
ideal, the good life, to which all should aspire, 
difficult though it may be to attain for contingent reasons" (Hirst, 1993, p. 185, 
GT's italics). 
In this chapter I have maintained that the limitations which capitalism imposes will 
have gradually been overcome during the realm of necessity and will, by definition, no 
longer exist at the start of the realm of freedom. In the realm of freedom the 
availability of resources, human and non-human, needed for practical activities could be 
made available through informal networks such as those proposed by Ivan Illich 
(Illich, 2007) and Everett Reimer (Reimer, 1971). Alternatively, or in addition, centres 
supervised by enthusiasts would enable social individuals to have access to the 
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objects needed for learning, including lists of those already engaging in specific 
activities. Although I envisage information networks such as those suggested by 
Reimer, my model is necessarily based on social conditions and relations 
fundamentally different both from those in the model of Reimer/Illich and from those 
in the anarchist school of thought which influenced them (R. Chappell, 1978, p. 369 ). 
There is a fuller discussion of the ideas of Reimer/Illich on education in Section 9.4.4. 
In the next section I show the differences between my own argument and those of 
most anarchists, since otherwise the lack of authority structures in both my model and 
the models supported by anarchists may result in the perception that my model is a 
model of anarchism. 
9.4 A brief exploration of anarchism and education. 
Since the nineteenth century, there has been a debate between Marxists and 
anarchists about the nature of social change and the role of the state in any transition to 
a communist society. The anarcho-communists2 have more in common with Marxism 
than have other anarchists. The main difference between the Marxist and the anarcho- 
communist views of an unalienated future lies in the nature of social change. To clarify 
this difference, I begin this section by briefly outlining the ideas of the French 
anarcho-communist Elisee Reclus (1830-1905) on social change. I start with Elisee 
Reclus because he is in sympathy with significant aspects of Marx's ideas on political 
economy. 
9.4.1 Elisee Reclus: anarcho-communism and Marxism. 
Elisee Reclus, a contemporary of Marx, is attributed as saying that an anarchist 
society was necessarily a communist society, because the communist means of 
production and distribution (as defined by Marx) necessarily results in similar features 
2 They share the collectivist critique of Marxism but reject the title collectivist. 
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to those of an ideal anarchist society (Marie Fleming, 1979, p. 194 ). Reclus argues 
that the communist means of production and distribution necessarily result in no state, 
and therefore in no hierarchical forms of organisation. As with other anarchists, Reclus 
strives to implement his ideas about power and hierarchy within contemporary society. 
In this chapter I have argued that the ideal society which Reclus wishes to achieve must 
be prefigured by the social relations and conditions outlined in Section 8.1, and can only 
be institutionalized when these social relations and conditions have been fully 
established. 
Not all anarchists have the same view of the ideal society. Although all anarchists 
aim for a society without a state and a hierarchy, they have different ideas about 
economic relations within an ideal society: for example, Reclus' anarchism differs from 
that of anarchists who support mutualism. Anarchism based on mutualism is based on 
private property relations and as such it necessarily results in fragmented production, 
the division of labour and markets. This mutual form of anarchism is sympathetically 
described by Judith Suissa in her book Anarchism and Education (Suissa, 2006), which 
is discussed in the following section. 
9.4.2 Judith Suissa's interpretation of social anarchism and its implications for 
education. 
In this section I use Suissa's book to illustrate my differences with mutual 
anarchism. Suissa acknowledges that "many of the central ideas and principles of 
social anarchism overlap with those of Marxism" (Suissa, 2006, p. 12, GT's italics). I 
maintain that this overlap includes Suissa's view of human nature, and especially the 
dialectical relation between consciousness and the social context, which she supports 
(Suissa, 2006, pp. 28-9,97). 
To briefly recall, in Section 4.11 argue that Marx accepts that, although it is 
possible to abstract common components from the concept of human nature, these 
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components give only a partial view of the social individual, and do not by themselves 
correspond to reality. Also in Section 4.7 I note that Marx maintains that, although 
human nature is mediated by social relations, the sufficiency of these conditions and 
social relations for the occurrence of a particular development involving human 
activity also depends on human thought and action. It is therefore the range of 
possibilities which is determined by inherent social relations, rather than any particular 
outcome within the range. 
Suissa does not acknowledge the similarities between her view of human nature and 
that of Marx. I maintain that this is because she has adopted the view that, in Marx's 
thought, consciousness is determined solely by the material conditions of life, 
particularly of those of production: 
the anarchists reject the basic Marxist materialist assumption that 
consciousness is determined by the material conditions of life - 
specifically, by the relations of production. The anarchist position 
implies, at least to some degree, life may be determined by 
consciousness ...... (Suissa, 
2006, p. 136). 
Suissa's view also results in her assumption that, in Marx's writings, thought 
structures are determined mechanistically by the base/superstructure relationship 
(Suissa, 2006, p. 136). In Section 4.2 I argue that Marx's ontology cannot be 
deterministic because his conception of social development allows for the influence of 
human thought and action and, in Section 4.7.1, I outline Marx's and Engel's 
criticism of such a mechanical concept of the base/superstructure. Briefly, in Section 
4.7.1,1 note that, although Marx gives primacy to the economic base, he does not 
regard it as always the most evident determinant (Marx, 1970, pp. 57-8 ). I also note 
that Marx argues that man's relationship to the economic base does not merely 
correspond or reflect economic structures. More precisely, the social individual's 
relation to the economic base involves social and economic relationships which 
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change partly as a result of the ideas held by social individuals about economic 
activity (Marx, 1981, pp. 927-8). Moreover, although Suissa acknowledges that 
individual freedom and well-being is "sustained in the context of social interaction" 
(Suissa, 2006, p. 115), she does not acknowledge the prefigurative role of internal 
relations involved in social interaction; for her social relations tend to be mainly 
external and therefore contingent. 
Suissa cites some of the political differences that exist between anarchism and 
Marxism: in particular, the support of Marxists for a common, central ownership of 
the economy, state control of production and the need for "a period of dictatorship" , 
during the period of transition from socialism to communism (Suissa, 2006, p. 13). 
Suissa argues that, if revolutionaries use the state to realize their goals, they would 
"inevitably reproduce all its negative features (the corrupting power of the minority 
over the majority, hierarchical, centralized authority and legislation, and so on)" 
(Suissa, 2006, p. 13, GT's italics). She contends that, accompanying this political 
view, is an epistemology in which "Marxists claim to create a scientific theory of social 
change... [which]... leads to a form of elitism in which the scientific `truth' is known 
only to an elect few, which would justify attempts to impose this truth on the `masses' 
without any critical process" (Suissa, 2006, p. 13). 
Instead, Suissa argues that "the exact form which the future society will take can 
never be determined in advance; the creation of the harmonious, free society is a 
constant, dynamic process of self-improvement, spontaneous organisation and free 
experimentation" (Suissa, 2006, p. 13, GT's italics). Attacking what she perceives to be 
a form of Marxist epistemology, Suissa argues that anarchist theorists have insisted 
"that the revolution itself was not subject to scientific understanding, and its course 
could not be determined in advance, favouring instead an organic image of social 
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change" (Suissa, 2006, p. 13). Suissa states that anarchists do not regard the 
revolutionary process "as a linear progression, in which there is a single point of 
reference - the means of production - and a single struggle" (Suissa, 2006, p. 136). She 
contends, therefore, that anarchists reject "the basic Marxist materialist assumption 
that consciousness is determined by the material conditions of life - specifically, by the 
relations of production" (Suissa, 2006, p. 136). 
9.4.3 Critique of Suissa's model of society and social change. 
The form of `Marxism' that Suissa is criticising in Anarchism and Education is 
broadly the model I criticise in Sections 4.7.1 and 7.3. I argue that Suissa's 
interpretation of Marx is not an accurate version of either Marx's theory of social 
change or his theory of the state. To conceive of social change as a linear progression 
would have been contradictory to the dialectical method which Marx uses. As a result 
of the dialectical method, Marx would not provide blue-prints so as to specify the 
particular content of future societies. However, Marx did produce a priori arguments 
to show why certain conditions and relations would be necessary for an unalienated 
society, and it is these arguments which informed his critique of capitalist societies. 
To recall, in Section 4.1 I argue that, for Marx, the process of social change is not 
deterministic, contrary to Suissa's argument in her book Anarchism and Education 
(Suissa, 2006, p. 13 ). Instead, for Marx, the process of social transformation from 
capitalism to an unalienated society is only possible if people behave in a certain way. 
Marx assumes that they would behave in this way only ifthey were aware of certain 
structural and relational possibilities and would be prepared to struggle for them. 
Absence of this type of analysis means that Suissa is at a disadvantage when 
analyzing how to change social systems. All that can be guaranteed by Suissa are 
aspiration and hope; but these alone, I argue, are insufficient to change a socio- 
244 
economic system. Additionally, there is nothing in Suissa's methodology which 
necessarily allows for the establishment and maintenance of the objective conditions 
and relations necessary to underpin her new system. Therefore it follows that, for 
Suissa, whether the social system is changed or not is a matter of chance. 
Regarding Suissa's understanding of Marx's theory of the state, I also contend that 
her concept of the state disregards Marx's work on the organization of the Paris 
Commune, as outlined in The Civil War In France (Marx, 1974[a], pp. 209-213). 
Crucially, Suissa's model disregards a form of governance which allows for change 
within the state through social relations based on the self-management of workers. 
Contrarily, Suissa argues that all states enshrine a hierarchical mode of organization 
with repressive measures which control their subjects, and also engage in aggressive 
acts against other states (Suissa, 2006, p. 13, quoting David Miller's Anarchism 
[Miller, 1984, p. 82]). It follows that, for Suissa, within anarchism schools should be 
run entirely by communities with no input from a state or any other administrative body 
(Suissa, 2006, p. 48). She argues that this would be possible because society would be 
organized in small communities (Suissa, 2006, p. 70). She believes that such 
communities would be sustained if there were an anarchist system of education 
nurturing altruistic and co-operative values (Suissa, 2006, p. 41). Suissa assumes that, at 
this stage of society, individuals would be committed to social values by virtue of the 
nature of the communities in which they live, and the hopes that these communities 
would have for their future. While I agree that such values would be necessary to 
sustain such a community, I contend that this aspiration has insufficient recognition 
of the objective conditions and social relations which must necessarily underpin 
such a society if the life-style for it to which Suissa aspires is to be a real possibility. 
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9.4.4 Everett Reimer and Ivan Illich: anarchism and education. 
I note in Section 9.3 that Ivan Illich and Everett Reimer also engage in a joint 
exploration of models of schooling influenced by anarchist ideas. In this section I intend 
to explore their concept of education in more detail. Of his book School is Dead, 
Reimer states, ".. This book is the result of a conversation with Ivan Illich that has 
continued for fifteen years. We have talked of many things, but increasingly about 
education and school, and eventually about alternatives to school" (Chappell, 1978, 
p. 369, quoting Reimer, 1971, Foreword). Illich states, in a letter to Chappell (1977), 
that he [Illich] is influenced, but to a lesser extent than is Reimer, by nineteenth 
century anarchists, especially by Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin and Sterner 3. 
Reimer aims to base his model in a neo-liberal political economy, where justice 
gives the "distribution of wealth, and other values" consistent with the "minimum of 
constraint by others" (Reimer, 1971, p. 99). Reimer's model, therefore, contains 
coercive elements of liberalism which I maintain are alienating. Reimer admits that non- 
coercive education is only fully realizable as greater social justice is also achieved. 
Reimer also argues that both education and social justice are intimately interrelated 
(Reimer, 1971, p. 94). 
Reimer argues that low state intervention in the economy (and, presumably, in 
education) would necessarily result in the private provision of education through 
market mechanisms, with `grants' being paid into individual education accounts from 
which individuals could purchase education (Reimer, 1971, pp. 135,147). In other 
words, Reimer's model of schooling is compatible only with a system where there is a 
low level of state intervention at all levels of society, such as that found in laissez-faire 
capitalism. In this chapter I argue that a model of deschooling, such as that supported 
3 An unpublished letter from Ivan Illich to Robert Chappell, July 1977 (quoted in Chappell, 1978, p. 369). 
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by Reimer, can in fact only apply within the conditions and social relations exist in 
Marx's realm of freedom, and which are discussed in Section 9.1. 
I now consider Illich's work on deschooling in some detail. Illich states that a 
good education system should have the following goals: 
1. To liberate access to things by abolishing the control which persons 
and institutions now exercise over their educational values. 
2. To liberate the sharing of skills by guaranteeing freedom to teach or 
exercise them on request. 
3. To liberate the critical and creative resources of people by returning to 
individual persons the ability to call and hold meetings - an ability now 
increasingly monopolized by institutions which claim to speak for the 
people. 
4. To liberate the individual from the obligation to shape his 
expectations to the services offered by any established profession - by 
providing him with the opportunity to draw on the experience of his 
peers and to entrust himself to the teacher, guide, adviser or healer of his 
choice... (Illich, 2007, p. 56). 
In conclusion: in his ideal society, Illich argues that there should be easy access to the 
things and people that would be needed in order to become educated. To access these 
facilities there would be a need for a system of categorization. Importantly, Illich notes 
that this categorization would be administrative purposes only, and that knowledge 
cannot be delineated in such a hard and fast way (Reimer, 1971, p. 124). 
Illich sets out this access to educational resources in the following way. Firstly, 
there would be reference services to educational objects that are needed for learning. 
Reference services and objects could be stored in libraries, laboratories, museums, 
theatres and factories. Secondly, there would be skill exchanges which would enable 
individuals to list their skills, the conditions under which they are willing to teach, and 
the addresses where they could be reached. Thirdly, there would be peer matching via a 
communication network which would enable individuals to describe their interests. 
Fourthly, and lastly, there would be a directory of independent educators (Illich, 2007, 
pp. 42-3). The possibilities for this type of database would be enhanced by computer 
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technology, as can be seen through the advent of the internet. 
Like Reimer, Illich argues for a market in schooling (Illich, 2007, pp. 6,24), and 
supports some of the methods used by Milton Friedman and James Tooley to facilitate 
school choice (Illich, 2007, p. 4). Like Reimer, Illich suggests that funds should be 
made available to students by the state in a form of a grant which would enable 
students to "purchase" a "share" of the education of their choice (Illich, 2007, p. 5 ). 
There are similarities between this method of funding education and that advocated by 
James Tooley which is analyzed in Appendix A3. Like those of Reimer and Illich, 
Tooley's model also rests on `light' state intervention and private provision within 
market mechanisms, with vouchers being given to parents in order to purchase a 
minimum level of schooling4. In Chapter Five I show how market models based on 
private property relations are oppositional to education as an unalienated activity. I note 
that Illich and other anarchists mentioned in this section disregard the necessity for 
the social relations and conditions, outlined in Section 9.1, to prefigure an unalienated 
form of deschooling. To my mind this makes their models unworkable and, as such, 
merely aspirational. 
In Chapters Eight and Nine I show that alienation can only be completely 
overcome within the social relations and conditions which Marx ascribes to the 
realm of freedom. I argue that it is only within such an unalienated society that 
unalienated activity, including education, may be actually chosen by all social 
individuals. In my final conclusion to this work I outline the implications this finding 
has for the process of marketization which is occurring with increased speed and 
intensity in England today. 
4 
Tooley mentions Illich's model in Disestablishing the School (Tooley, 1995, p. 2). 
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Conclusion: Enabling education to be an 'end-in-itself'. 
This thesis offers an analysis of the marketization of school provision and 
schooling, with particular reference to the alienating social relations which necessarily 
result from objective market relations. I based this analysis on the concept of 
alienation developed by Marx because Marx is the main theorist to analyze, in a 
systematic way, the alienating relations which necessarily result from objective 
market relations. 
This thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part sets the scene within 
which my analysis of the marketization of school provision and schooling takes 
place. At the beginning of Chapter One I produced empirical evidence to support 
the argument that changes which allow the marketization of school provision and 
schooling are not merely a series of isolated reforms, as the liberal philosophers 
discussed in this thesis have maintained. They are rather the result of a process in 
which policy moves are made to support the marketization of school provision and 
schooling, where markets are defined in the classical sense of the term. At the time 
of writing, I am not aware of any liberal philosopher of education who has 
maintained that the marketization of school provision and schooling necessarily 
increases alienating relations oppositional to the possibility of education being an 
end-in-itself. 
In this thesis I maintained that the failure of liberal philosophers of 
education to recognise the alienating relations necessarily present in the 
marketization of schooling is mainly due to two reasons. One reason is ontological 
and one is ethical. The ontological reason is that, for liberal philosophers, market 
relations are primarily based on external relations, which are contingent. This 
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ontology results in the perception by liberal philosophers that the direction in which 
markets reforms are moving is entirely speculative. The ethical reason given by Harry 
Brighouse is that Marx's analysis is irrelevant because it is not compatible with the 
`value-neutral' form of liberalism which most liberal philosophers of education 
support. 
In Chapter Two I compared the relations within James Tooley's concept of a 
`lightly' regulated market with those within Brighouse's concept of a regulated 
market. This is in order to show that, despite the presence of regulation within 
Brighouse's model, oppositional relations between the market and education are 
present in both models. 
In Section 2.3.1 1 examined the epistemological and political concepts which 
influence Tooley's model. I noted that Tooley bases his support for markets on 
Hayek's epistemological and political beliefs. I also noted that Tooley never seems to 
address Hayek's ontological assumptions, despite the fact that Tooley supports 
Hayek's epistemology. Tooley supports Hayek's political belief that prosperity and 
`civilization' depend on capitalist structures and values. Like Hayek, Tooley never 
presents a systematic analysis or an explicit definition of alienation: when Tooley 
briefly mentions alienation he equates it with "disaffection" and "falling engagement. " 
Tooley seeks to establish only if alienation has occurred as a result of personal 
experience within social relations. I maintain that such a conception of alienation is 
only partial because it does not include the objective relations and conditions which 
necessarily give rise to "dissatisfaction. " 
In Section 4.9 I noted that Brighouse dismisses Marxism solely because it 
contains substantive values. Brighouse acknowledges that, if Marxism made the 
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choice for alienated or unalienated activity optional, as Brighouse recommends that 
Marx should, Marx's theory could not necessarily aim to eliminate the evils of 
capitalist society which, Brighouse notes, is one of the main reasons for the 
existence of Marx's theory. I conclude that Brighouse would prefer to have 
alienation within his own system rather than to embrace the substantive values which, 
I contend, are an essential part of Marx's theory. In Section 4.9 I show that 
Brighouse's form of liberalism narrows choice to only those activities which are 
enabled by the structures and conditions found within capitalism. I therefore maintain 
that, because the structures of Brighouse's model cannot support unalienated activity, 
they necessarily result in the inability of individuals to choose unalienated activity. 
In contrast to an ontology based on external, contingent relations, Marx's 
systematic analysis of the markets and alienation is based on internal social relations. 
Within an ontology based on internal social relations, the range of all possible 
developments is necessary: that is, each actual development has to have been inherent 
in the relevant social relations. However, the sufficiency of the conditions and social 
relations for the occurrence of a particular social development crucially depends on 
human thought and action. Within this ontology, it is the range of possibilities which 
is determined by inherent social relations, rather than any particular outcome within 
the range. 
Part Two of this thesis sets the ideological context for the development of market 
relations. Part Two, Chapter Three charts how alienating relations increased as a 
result of the development of market relations in England from the seventeenth to 
the nineteenth centuries, and considers how the main ideological responses to these 
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changes, and the major ideological interpretations of these changes, have 
informed Marx's analysis of alienation. 
In Chapter Four I note that Marx defines alienation using two main strands which 
are interrelated. The first strand is based on the selling of labour-power and the 
consequential relinquishment of control of their own labour by those who have no 
capital and who have to sell their labour-power in order to be productively active. 
The second stand is based on the estrangement which occurs, as a result of the first 
strand, when something existing outside and independent of the social individuals 
confronts them as a hostile and alien power. 
In Section 4.8 I showed the relevance of Marx's analysis of alienation to the 
process of marketization in school provision and schooling in the twentieth century 
and maintained that private property relations have remained fundamentally the 
same since Marx's day, even though the content of capitalism has changed from 
entrepreneurial capitalism to monopoly or corporate capitalism. In Chapter Five I 
have specifically tried to show the relevance of Marx's analysis of alienation to the 
present process of marketization in school provision and schooling, with specific 
reference to the market models of James Tooley and Harry Brighouse. 
Part Three explored the alienating relations found in various forms of market 
socialism, and proposed an alternative model based on Marx's realm of freedom. In 
Chapters Six and Seven, I explored models of market socialism where the market is 
an integral part of the `end-state'. In Chapter Six I analyzed the market model of 
David Miller as outlined in his book Market, State and Community (1999). I noted 
that, in this book, Miller argues for market relations in most areas of the political 
economy, and does not discount market relations in services such as education. 
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In Chapter Six I also noted that Miller concedes that it is important to overcome 
alienation to allow his model to be viable. In the same book, Miller maintains that a 
progressive consciousness supporting co-operative and humane relations would be a 
sufficient condition for overcoming alienation. In the same chapter I maintained 
that it is not possible to counter alienation in the way which Miller advocates 
because, for Miller, overcoming alienation is solely the result of changing awareness 
rather than of changing the objective relations and conditions necessary to enable 
unalienated activity. I also argued that, by basing his economy on capitalist 
market relations, Miller is supporting subjective relations which are oppositional to 
the principle of freedom' and the development of fraternity, and so which cannot 
necessarily prefigure the development of freedom as defined by Miller. 
In Chapter Seven I analyzed Oskar Lange's model of a `socialist market', within 
the Soviet context, in order to ascertain how far the relations found within such a 
system could prefigure an unalienated society. In Section 7.2 I noted that, although 
within Lange's market model the emphasis would appear to be on socialist relations 
rather than market relations, market relations and laws are fundamental to the 
operation of both the `socialized' sectors and non-socialized sectors of the economy. 
In Section 7.2 1 showed that Lange's preference for market economics is ideological 
as well as instrumental. I also noted that Lange acknowledges that the nature of 
economic processes in the capitalist system is not substantially different from the 
nature of the economic processes in any type of exchange economy, including those in 
his own models. 
' As manifest in his book as autonomy and freedom of choice. 
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I also noted in Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 that the role of schools in the model of 
Soviet Marxism which Lange supports is to provide skilled workers for the ends 
which "organised society" considers important. I also noted that, although schools are 
not marketized in this model, they are subject to such similar alienating relations as 
schools, say in the 1950's in the UK, in that they are instrumental to the goals of a 
society that has market relations operating within the same economic logic as those 
found in capitalism. In Section 7.5.2 I gave three main reasons why the structural 
relations present in Lange's model are similar in form to those found in classical 
capitalism (Chapter Four) and, as such, are dehumanise the workers within their 
productive activity. Briefly these are, firstly, the worker loses control over the 
objects and services he produces; secondly, that the worker becomes estranged from 
other social individuals and, thirdly, that the worker becomes effectively an 
appendage of a machine. 
Lange argues that alienation (as described by Marx in The German Ideology) 
is mitigated when economic laws of the `market' are employed by bureaucrats who 
have "knowledge of scientific socialism" which, Lange contends, is necessary to 
achieve abundance. In Section 7.5.2 1 noted that Lange does not give a systematic 
analysis of alienation so, in Section 7.5.3, I explored the philosophical work on 
alienation written by T. I. Oizerman, a prominent defender of the Soviet Union 
who has a very similar economic perspective to that of Lange. In Section 7.5.2 I also 
showed how the alienating relations present in Lange's model are intensified by the 
role played by the bureaucracy. 
In Chapter Eight I maintained that the conditions and social relations which could 
prefigure an unalienated society, so supporting education as an unalienated activity, 
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could be found in the model based on Marx and developed by Mihailo Markovic, 
a Yugoslav/Serbian praxis theorist. In Chapter Eight I outlined three main ways in 
which these social relations and conditions are prefigurative of an unalienated society. 
Firstly, that market relations, commodity production and exchange value as the 
measure of value would be present to a `normal' extent only at the beginning of 
Marx's the realm of necessity; and would diminish in importance thereafter. 
Secondly, Markovic maintains that the socialization of the means of production must 
always be under democratic control, including at the work place. Thirdly, 
Markovic's model recognizes technological development to be essential to gradually 
increase the amount of free time crucial for social individuals to be able to take part in 
meaningful activities. I also noted that increased automation of production, and so 
abundance in more products, would gradually support the political decision to 
release schooling from being mainly instrumental to the needs of the economy. This 
process would gradually provide the conditions and social relations necessary to 
support the realm of freedom and enable education to become an end-in-itself and 
thus become a meaningful activity for social individuals. 
In Chapter Nine I discussed in more detail the conditions and social relations 
necessary for an unalienated society to exist, and the form that unalienated 
education could possibly take within an unalienated society. In Chapter Nine I also 
showed why alienating relations could only be completely overcome within the 
social relations and conditions which Marx ascribes to the realm of freedom. I 
argued that it is only within such an unalienated society that unalienated activity, 
including education, could be actually chosen by all social individuals. 
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In the latter part of Chapter Nine I outlined the differences between my own 
argument and those of many anarchists, since the lack of authority structures in my 
model may otherwise result in the perception that my model is a model of 
anarchism. I briefly explored the political ideas of Elisee Reclus because his ideas are 
closer to those of Marx than are the ideas of many other anarchists. However, I noted 
that Reclus claims that his ideas could be implemented directly within a market 
society (presumably if supported by a sufficient number of people). Reclus also 
rejects the realm of necessity as a phase of development which necessarily prefigures 
development towards an unalienated society. Therefore I rejected Reclus' theory as 
one which contains the relations and conditions necessary for an unalienated society. 
Chapters One and Two of this thesis consider market relations as supported by 
present-day capitalism. In Chapter One I have maintained that all three major UK 
political parties, by extending marketization to school provision and schooling, have 
objectively contributed to an increase in alienating relations. In Section 1.5 I showed 
that marketization of school provision and schooling would be firmly on the political 
agenda, no matter which of the three main parties became the party/parties of 
government. I maintain that despite the concern of Prime Minister David Cameron 
for "our broken society", he fails to take into account that marketization results in 
objective social relations, which necessarily prefigure an increase in the alienating 
relations which, in turn, result in "our broken society. " In this thesis I have argued 
that every opportunity should be taken to slow down and even reverse the policy of 
marketization of school provision and schooling which, I argue, is occurring at an 
increasing rate in England today. 
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The finance and banking crises of Autumn 2008 shook the faith of many in 
capitalism. Simultaneously, the fall in the stock market affected many pension funds, 
causing many of the most supposedly affluent parts of the working population to be 
very angry and scared. Apparent `double standards' were shown when, for example, 
the Scottish Widows' life insurance company stopped small investors withdrawing 
their money from one of their allegedly troubled funds, while no such prohibition 
applied to the major `players' in the financial markets. In the second half of 2009, 
although markets showed signs of recovery, the economic situation still remained 
uncertain. The ongoing recession (including the accompanying austerity measures) 
has exposed the claims that capitalism has the necessary checks and balances to 
prevent a general market collapse. As Martin Wolf, the senior financial commentator 
on the Financial Times, noted: 
the combination of the fragility of the financial system with the huge 
rewards it generates for insiders will destroy something even more 
important - the political legitimacy of the market itself - across the 
globe (M. Wolf, 2008, p. 11). 
In response to the crisis there have been movements of resistance internationally. 
In Europe alone in Greece, France, Spain, Portugal and Ireland strikes and protests 
have been accompanied by alternative programmes and debates about the way 
forward for anti-capitalist movements. Within this process lie the conditions and 
social relations which prefigure the change in consciousness necessary to support the 
emergence of a non-capitalist party. Such a non-capitalist party would be logically 
opposed to the marketization of social goods, including school provision and 
schooling, and in favour of services which would be run by accountable, democratic 
bodies. 
257 
At the present time an emergent non-capitalist party would be writing a manifesto 
for a situation where a significant number of schools would be controlled by private 
providers. Some of these private providers would have ownership rights of schools, 
while others might have been given a contract of five years (see the section entitled 
Privatisation Failures on the European Strategy Unit website www. european-services- 
strategy. oorg. uk). It is possible that such a non-capitalist party, being committed to 
reverse marketization, would initially seek to reverse legislation which allows private 
providers to opt-out of the regulations making schools subject to a broad and 
balanced National Curriculum. A non-capitalist government would develop a 
National Curriculum which would enable pupils to develop the values, skills and 
knowledge needed to sustain and develop a democratic socialist society which would 
prefigure an unalienated society. 
Under present conditions, in order to start to bring schools under accountable 
democratic bodies, these would need to be run by councillors and directly-elected 
school governors (subject to recall), acting on behalf of the local authority. Legislation 
to support the above democratization of schools would likely impose extra costs on 
any school where previously all key decisions would have been taken by an owner or, 
say, an area director acting on behalf of the owner. As a consequence, it might well be 
anticipated that some schools would directly leave the private sector, thus enabling the 
government to put these schools under the control of democratically accountable local 
authorities. This would make such schools more responsive to democratic, rather than 
market processes, and thereby decrease alienating relations. Such a process would 
have ideological consequences because it would be in direct opposition to the neo- 
liberal ideology, which portrays the market as a mechanism of superb efficiency 
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which must not be interfered with under any circumstances. This process would show 
that conscious human action could over-ride the supposedly natural laws of the market 
and would raise the question of why the economy as a whole could not be run in the 
interests of the majority of people. 
In Chapter Nine it was argued that over a period of a few years a non-capitalist 
government would plan to take into public ownership the land, finance and the major 
corporations. Such socialization would contain the necessary conditions and social 
relations which would prefigure a society in which widespread rational, democratic 
planning would be possible. Consequently, the conditions and social relations in such 
a society would enable associations of producers and service-providers to have more 
control over their conditions of work. This would enable social individuals to develop 
the conditions and social relations which would prefigure an unalienated society. It is 
only within such an unalienated society that the possibility of social individuals 
developing their "true individuality" (Marx, 1956, p. 176) would be the normal state 
of affairs. An important dimension in developing this individuality would be 
education. In this thesis I maintain that it would only be within such an unalienated 
society that education would necessarily be an unalienated activity. 
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Al. Assessment of Article XIX of the GATS Treaty, with reference to school 
provision and schooling. 
In particular Article XIX of the GATS treaty, which allowed countries to engage 
in progressive liberalisation, together with the Guidelines and Procedures for 
Negotiations on Trade in Services issued on 26th March 2001 stipulated that the 
starting point for negotiation of specific commitments should be the then current 
schedules. 
Schedules attached to past WTO reports have cited higher educational services as 
services to be included in this agenda. In 2001 Gottlieb and Pearson, an international 
law firm specializing in trade law, was hired by the Canadian Association of 
University Teachers to analyze the way the Treaty affected education services. 
Although Gottlieb and Pearson were acting for university teachers the same 
implications seemed to apply to schools (Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001, p. 13). 
In their legal opinion published in 2001, Gottlieb and Pearson have drawn 
attention to the fact that, because of the wide interpretation of `non-commercial' and 
`not in competition' terms, public sector/government service providers may not have 
been exempt from GATS rules under the concept of services under government 
authority (Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001, pp. 10-12). 
Gottlieb and Pearson pointed out that the situation was especially complicated 
where there was a mixed public/private education system, or where a significant 
amount of funding for public institutions came from the private sector or where 
`public' institutions were providing privatised programmes. Gottlieb and Pearson 
noted that key terms such as `not in competition' and `commercial basis' and 
`services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority' appeared to have been 
given their ordinary meaning in the context of their object and purpose. Therefore 
there did not appear to be any limits or qualifications to the terms (Gottlieb and 
Pearson, 2001, p. 12). Commenting on the term `competition', Gottlieb and Pearson 
observed that "placed in the context of its GATS provisions , the term 
"competition" would normally imply the interaction of "like" service providers" 
Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001, p. 12, GT's italics). However, they noted that in 
accordance with Article 1.3(c) of the GATS treaty, service providers did not have to 
be "like" service providers or provide "like" services to be in competition with one 
another. They noted that, according to Article 1.3(c), "to be in competition" providers 
simply had to "try to get what others seek" (Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001, p. 12). 
Gottlieb and Pearson also noted that it could be argued that "competition may take 
place between providers irrespective of the mode of supply", for example a provider 
delivering a course through the internet could have been in competition with a 
provider delivering the same course through a classroom (Gottlieb and Pearson, 2001, 
p. 12). 
In conclusion: I maintain that the judgement of Gottlieb and Pearson confirms 
that almost any private involvement in school provision would operate as a legal 
`Trojan horse', potentially opening up the whole sector to privatisation. 
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A2. Philosophical and empirical considerations of Tooley's 2002 `70% voucher 
Ipan. ' 
Tooley, in his Ph. D. thesis (Tooley, 1994[a], pp. 32,148-9), originally assumed 
the view that, apart from an implied quite limited safety net provision, there would 
be no public sector provision of schooling in his market model. 
Since 2000 Tooley has argued, as an alternative to the above position, that a 
school fees voucher system which would also enable pupils to access their local 
state school (or any private alternative) would probably reduce overall government 
spending and, as a consequence, taxation. The latter part of this appendix evaluates 
certain aspects of the suggested voucher scheme as possibly applied in England, and 
also attempts to verify or refute its effect on government finance 
Tooley's model of school voucher introduction for England and Wales, written in 
his 2002 paper entitled "Market Approaches to Education, Examples and Evidence 
Part I", may be criticized for two main reasons. Firstly, from a Hayekian point of 
view the type of model used by Tooley in this `70% voucher plan' would be 
unacceptable for the epistemological reasons already cited in detail in Sections 2.3.1 
and 2.3.2. Briefly, according to Hayek, any conclusions from a model such as that 
used in Tooley's 2002 paper would be based on logical presuppositions which are 
unverifiable empirically, since they do not correspond to the nature of many social 
processes. 
Secondly, I argue that Tooley has made two conceptual errors within the 
economic analysis used in the model used in this 2002 paper. I note that Tooley has 
not taken into account the behaviour of suppliers in the market - the private school 
operators - who will not of course be ignorant of the 
increased opportunities which 
the vouchers give them in setting fees. This argument is consistent with the 
subsequent findings of the 2005 UK Office of Fair Trading enquiry (Office of Fair 
Trading, 2005), in relation to the setting of school fees, as to the way an individual 
school, or school-owning company, might be expected to act. This named 50 
independent schools as exchanging fees information, resulting in higher fees. 
I also note that Tooley did not deal with larger families. In Social Trends, 2007, 
it was estimated that in Britain, in 2006, roughly three quarters of households with 
children had more than one child (Office for National Statistics, 2007[a], Table 2.5 
page 16). Therefore, any financial inducement which would work only for a single 
child per carer(s), would exclude three-quarters of households with children and, of 
course, many more children than three-quarters. Households Below Average Income 
(DWP, 2006) concluded that 60% of three-child UK households and 78% of four 
child households belonged to the two lowest quintiles for household income 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2006, Supplementary Table E2, p. 138). 
In Social Trends (ONS, 2007[a], Table 5.14, p. 65) it is estimated that for 
Britain in 2004 about one child in nine in the lowest financial quintile had gone 
hungry at some point in the survey period, compared with one child in two hundred in 
the top quintile; whilst the comparable figures for missing leisure facilities were 
given as one in three compared with one in fifty respectively ( it is acknowledged 
that there might be some differences as between `British' and `English' figures, but it 
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not accepted these would affect the validity of my analysis ). 
Thirdly, I deal with two categorical errors in Tooley's 2002 paper. Before dealing 
with these errors, I briefly outline the data on which I base my analysis. Using the 
UK government official figures from Population Trends 2007, for the secondary 
age-range for England, I have estimated that as just over 600,000 children would 
be in each age cohort the total pupils within ages 12-17 would be approximately 3.7 
million pupils (Office for National Statistics, 2007[b], Table 1.2, p. 35 ). The 
original percentage of pupils at private schools is given in 2000/2 as roughly 7% of 
the cohort in a DfES survey in 2000/2 (news. bbc. co. uk, last accessed 17 July 2010). 
In his paper (Tooley, 2002, Part 1, pp. 37-39, and Table 8) Tooley estimates an 
increase of private secondary sector schooling take-up by means of `70% cost 
vouchers' being given to parents. Tooley states that around 277 000 new students 
would be educated in the private sector as a result. It can therefore be seen from 
Tooley's figure that, as a percentage of the age-range in England schools, private 
education would probably double the existing private take-up by proportion of the 
cohort (from very roughly 7% of the 3.7 million pupils (as above), to very roughly 
14%). 
I now deal with the two categorical errors I believe to be in Tooley's 2002 paper. 
Firstly, Tooley states that there would be a considerable saving to the Treasury, and 
argues that the `70% voucher' would be a spending [cost to the Treasury] as opposed 
to [in place of] the full 100% average spend per pupil in state schools. In this 
argument, I maintain that Tooley has confused the concepts of average and marginal 
costs. When a school expands pupil numbers, there are additional or marginal costs 
per extra pupil: similarly, if a state school were to contract pupil numbers, under the 
mechanism Tooley describes, there would likely be a contraction of costs. However, 
to deal with the cut in approximate percentage figures in Tooley's proposals (from 
7% to 14% of the cohort), it is not obvious that if a state school cohort were to 
contract from say 93 to 86 pupils then fewer teachers would be needed. It would be 
quite plausible that class sizes would merely contract from 31 to 28 or 29. The school 
might well not be able to function with fewer classrooms, a smaller playground, 
fewer gym, music, or art facilities or fewer science laboratories, just because of this 
size of reduction in pupil numbers. Therefore, although it is likely there would be 
some savings, it is not likely that these savings would `pay' for the private sector 
voucher. Therefore, in my view, Tooley has not demonstrated any overall saving. 
I now outline what I regard to be the second categorical error in his 2002 paper. 
Tooley says that, on account of increased competition, private school expansion 
should result in a lowering of fees. It would seem he has confused a basic assumption 
of neo-classical/traditional economics. What he has proposed is not a planned 
expansion of supply (of private school places) but a subsidy which would increase the 
demand. Most economics textbooks explain that the effect of a subsidy to demand in 
any market will be to increase the price. Tooley seems to be alive to the issue of price 
elasticity of demand, as he has varied this relationship within his model to give 
differing results, but he has not seemed to have considered the normal expectations of 
supply side adjustments to the market price. 
In conclusion: In this appendix I offer two main criticisms of Tooley's `70% 
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voucher plan'. Firstly, I criticize Tooley's `70% voucher plan' from a Hayekian 
epistemological point of view since, according to Hayek, any conclusions from a 
model such as that used in Tooley's 2002 paper would be based on logical 
presuppositions which are unverifiable empirically because they do not 
correspond to the nature of many social processes. Therefore, it has to be questioned 
whether Tooley, in his 2002 paper, can still be said to be influenced Hayekian 
epistemology. It could be argued that the model used in Tooley's 2002 paper is more 
influenced by a type of epistemology based on rational deduction. If so, one might 
ask whether Tooley is supporting the very rational constructivism which he 
condemned from 1994 onwards. 
Secondly, I criticize Tooley's model on account of a number of conceptual or 
categorical errors. I note that Tooley has made two conceptual errors within the 
model of economic analysis used in his 2002 paper: namely, a failure to show a 
gross saving to the public purse and also a likely increase, rather than a decrease, 
in the price of private school fees by confusing his voucher plan, which is clearly a 
subsidy to demand for school places, with a mechanism to necessarily expand the 
number of private school places. 
I consider that it is therefore questionable whether private schooling can in fact be 
organized for the majority of pupils in England by means of a voucher system along 
the lines that Tooley proposed in 2002. 
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A3. Empirical consideration of government funding to households in 
anticipation of their future educational expenditure. 
This section deals with the criticism, made in a private communication in 
October 2000 1 by Harry Brighouse, of my assertion that most UK or English 
households could not then have afforded £3000 per annum school fees per child, if 
given a tax rebate for education. This £3000 figure was derived from a particular 
state secondary school's spend per pupil at the time, and the figure was subsequently 
confirmed as broadly correct as a minimum figure by the DIES website which, 
accessed in early 2008, said, among other things, that the real terms funding per pupil 
in 2005/6 aged 3-19 was £4230 per annum, up from £3030 in 1998/9. Brighouse 
argues that my conclusion is wrong for three reasons. Firstly, he says that additional 
tax savings would outweigh the additional schooling costs for all but in "very poor 
and very large" households. Secondly, he argues that those considered at the upper 
levels of the poor could save money from non-essential goods in order to pay school 
fees. Thirdly, Brighouse argues that school fees could be paid over a life-time rather 
than on a `pay as you go' basis. 
Firstly I deal with Brighouse's first criticism of my argument. I begin by 
outlining the information on which I base my argument. Although below I 
concentrate on school fees for households with one or two children only, it should be 
remembered that for one and two adult households with children, 4 million had two 
or more children as against 2.5 million with one child only. 
Using statistics from the UK official source Family Spending (Office for 
National Statistics, 2000[a], Table 1.3) it is possible to obtain average income tax 
figures paid by each household income decile group. I note from official tax statistics 
for the financial year 1999-2000 (Revenue & Customs, 2004, Table 3.11) that the 
amount of income tax owed for England for financial year 1999-2000 was £81.5bn. I 
also note, from Table 1.3 in Education and Training Statistics for the United 
Kingdom ( Office for National Statistics, 2001), that during 1999-2000 the total 
public expenditure on education was £40.77 bn. for the UK, of which £32.77 bn. was 
for England (80.37% of the UK figure). The schools budget for the UK was 
£25.44bn. and so it would seem plausible for the share for England to be 
approximately 80% of this UK figure. However, further figures for the UK were 
given as £1.97bn. for educational services and student support while a further figure 
of £1.41bn of the UK education budget was not broken down by precise function. In 
order to make a proper comparison with expenditure by private schools, therefore, 
there must be a range of figures for the school budget, depending on what proportion 
of these extra costs would in fact be borne by schools. The overall calculation for 
England therefore turns out to be a schools budget ranging between about £20.45bn. 
and £23.17bn, respectively 25.09% and 28.43% of the income tax take of £81bn. To 
be as fair to Brighouse as possible, I have assumed a 28% figure for the income tax 
rebate on which to base the subsidy to the cost of schooling for different decile 
groups of income-tax rebate recipients. From the Family Spending (ONS, 2000[a], 
Table 1.3) figures, it was possible to calculate the monetary worth of a reduction by 
28% of the income tax take for each decile group. This proposed rebate from income 
' Email dated October 20 2000, forwarded to me, from Professor Brighouse. 
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tax to enable families to buy children's schooling in the market place can then be 
compared for each decile group. (Since at the time of my original writing some 
updated figures for government expenditure were not available for the years 
1999/2000, assumptions were made for calculations [taking into account inflation] 
from the 1997 government schools' budget figures). 
The school fees proposed by Brighouse of £3000 per annum per child at the 
time corresponded to £57.69 per week on a pay as you go system for each child. 
Brighouse argued that, by reference to savings schemes, that if each child is 
educated for thirteen years (total £39000) in primary and secondary education, 
payment could in principle be made over an adult's total working life, which I have 
taken as thirty-nine years. Taking any interest paid from such a savings scheme to be 
equal to inflation, about £19.23 per pupil per week in `real terms' money would 
have to be paid over thirty-nine years to provide for thirteen years' primary and 
secondary education for one pupil. 
Income tax rebates would only be payable as follows: twenty-eight per cent of 
income tax paid per decile per week ranged from £0.31 for the poorest household to 
£4.14 for the 4`h decile/2"a quintile, £9.16 for the middle (decile 5), £12.24 for the 6th 
decile, to £18.00 for the 7th decile, £24 for the 8th decile and £34 for the 9th decile. 
One tenth of households could afford pay as you go school fees from income tax 
rebates, another one fifth or three tenths could likely manage a savings scheme, but at 
least 60% of the population would be unable to afford to pay for private education for 
only one child by means of tax rebates - even paying over a working lifetime. 
Brighouse had objected in May 2000 that private schemes would allow in 
principle for fees to be paid up front and the loan to be paid off gradually. I agree, but 
argue that for a family with two children to have to pay off such a debt (£78 000) 
would require a large tax rebate to service the debt which only those in the higher 
income brackets could afford it. Fewer people would be able to afford any 
commercial scheme than would be able to pay via a government `zero-[real] interest' 
loan. 
I now show why Brighouse's second criticism, namely that households could 
cut down on other expenditure in order to fund education for their children, is not 
viable. Firstly, I will outline the information on which I base my argument. UK 
official figures (Office for National Statistics, 2000[a], Table 4.5, p. 71) give UK 
weekly family spending by the one and a quarter million households with one adult 
and child (ren) in the two lowest quintile groups by income of such households. 
These tables show spending of £7.40 and £13.10 on leisure goods and £10.40 and 
£14.80 on leisure services. The figures for alcohol and tobacco are respectively £3.50, 
£3.80, £6.60 and £7.10. Leisure goods' breakdown includes all books, newspapers 
and magazines, TV purchase, photography and garden plants, as well as toys. The 
breakdown of the `leisure services' category includes TV rental and licence, 
`educational and training expenses', holiday expenditure, sports admissions, cinema, 
theatre, as well as gambling and cash gifts (presumably to children). The totals of the 
above spending categories are £27.90 per week for the lowest quintile and £38.80 per 
week for the second lowest. The elimination of practically all such expenditure 
quoted would still not enable fees of £3000 per year even for one child to be made on 
a pay as you go basis. For the second lowest quintile, fees for two children would be 
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possible over a working lifetime of thirty-nine to forty years at around £3000 pa. 
each (schooling for two over 13 years possibly totalling £78000). This would of 
course involve a household not having a TV, or books, and withdrawing children 
from all leisure facilities and sports which are not provided totally freely by the 
school. It would also involve never taking a holiday away from home, or going to a 
film, or anywhere which charged admission. 
It can be seen that for households at the second quintile of income distribution, 
any income tax rebate (£4 or so weekly) would not be large enough to increase the 
number of children (two) whose schooling could be paid for over a life-time. For 
1999-2000,59% of children in three-child households and 83% of children in four+- 
child households were in the bottom two quintiles for income distribution (DWP, 
2006, p. 138, table cited in Appendix A2). This would therefore leave many children 
whose parents could not afford to pay for schooling under Brighouse's model. 
In conclusion, I conclude that the statistics available for 1999-2000 do not 
indicate that the cost of private schooling could then have been easily financed by 
the means of income tax rebates for a large number of households and/or by such 
households cutting down on so-called "non-essential" goods. At the time of writing, 
Brighouse has not provided any model with contrary results. 
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A4. Milton Friedman's market theory. 
Unlike Hayek, Friedman claims to base his economic and ethical ideas mainly 
on a positivistic approach to economics, politics and ethics (Friedman, 1953, p. 4). 
Positivists believe that statements obtain their validity only by their relationship to a 
concrete referent or to logic. For Friedman, the task of positive economics "is to 
provide a system of generalisations that can be used to make correct predictions about 
the consequences of any change in circumstances" (Friedman, 1953, p. 4). Within 
Friedman's model, this is to be done by "the development of a `theory' or 
`hypothesis' that yields meaningful (i. e. not truistic) predictions about phenomena not 
yet observed" (Friedman, 1953, p. 7). 
For Friedman, theory is to be a blend of two elements, a "language" and a 
body of "substantive hypothesis designed to abstract essential features of a complex 
reality" (Friedman, 1953, p. 7). In its former role, with the comment that, "theory has 
no substantive content; it is a set of tautologies. " Friedman likens such a theory to a 
filing system (Friedman, 1953, p. 7). The validity of a "theory is to be judged by its 
predictive power for the class of phenomena it is intended to explain" (Friedman, 
1953, p. 8). The distinction between `language' and `hypothesis" is the positivist one 
between "analytic" and "synthetic". 
In the process of verifying theory, no appeal is made to preference. This does 
not mean that Friedman does not state a preference for certain values, merely that 
values are not relevant to the examination of the consequences of certain social policy 
decisions. According to positivists, theories contain two types of principles: internal 
tautologies and "bridging principles". The bridging principles link the theoretical 
terms to observed entities. However, Friedman argues: 
economic theory must be more than a structure of tautologies if it is to 
be able to predict and not merely describe the consequences of action; 
if it is to be something different from disguised mathematics. And the 
usefulness of the tautologies themselves ultimately depends ........ on 
the acceptability of the substantive hypotheses that suggest the 
particular categories into which they organize the refractory empirical 
phenomena (Friedman, 1953, pp. 11-12 ). 
Friedman argues that it would be an error to suppose that a test of the 
validity of a hypothesis is whether it conforms to reality (Friedman, 1953, p. 14). He 
argues that one cannot perceive facts without a theoretical construct. He argues that 
"the ideal types [of theory] are not intended to be descriptive; they are designed to 
isolate the features that are crucial to a particular problem" (Friedman, 1953, p. 36). 
Unlike Hayek, he argues that constructs will not fully correspond to 
empirical reality : 
A theory or its "assumptions" cannot possibly be thoroughly 
"realistic" in the immediate descriptive sense so often assigned to 
this term. A completely "realistic" theory of the wheat market would 
have to include not only the conditions directly underlying the supply 
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and demand for wheat but also the kind of coins or credit instruments 
used to make exchanges; the personal characteristics of wheat - 
traders such as the color (sic) of each trader...... Any attempt to move 
very far in achieving this kind of `realism' is certain to render a 
theory utterly useless ( Friedman, 1953, p. 32). 
For positivists, hypotheses are not dependent on observations corresponding 
to reality but on assumptions (Friedman, 1953, p. 14 ), see also: 
the validity of a hypothesis .... is not by itself a sufficient criterion for 
choosing among alternative hypotheses. Observed facts are 
necessarily finite in number; possible hypotheses infinite. If there is 
one hypothesis that is consistent with the available evidence, there are 
always an infinite number that are (Friedman, 1953, p. 9 ). 
Friedman acknowledges that public policy making predictions have to be 
evaluated, which means importing values into models. Friedman adds that in 
making public policy there are two steps. These are a) predicting the consequences of 
a suggested policy and b) evaluating the consequences. For Friedman "the first step 
is the domain of science, the second of values" (Friedman, 1953, pp. 317-8 ). For 
Friedman, then, values merely have the status of preferences because they cannot be 
verified either logically or empirically. 
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